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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Corruption in higher education is a newly emerging topic in the field of education 
research. Some aspects of corruption in education have been addressed in recent works 
by Anderson (1989, 1992, 1999), Eckstein (1993, 2001, 2003), Heyneman (2004, 2007), 
Noah and Eckstein (2001), Petrov and Temple (2004), Segal (2004), Sykes (1988), and 
Washburn (2005), as well as in numerous news publications. Scholarly work on 
corruption in higher education is lacking while the problem itself is significant. 
Legal cases on corruption in higher education grow in number and receive more 
attention from the media, legislators, numerous constituents, and from the general public. 
The presence of corruption in higher education throughout the world is a growing 
concern for the industry as it influences its effectiveness and efficiency. The negative 
impact of higher-education corruption on economic development and social cohesion is 
also disturbing. 
Corruption increases inequalities in access to higher education, slows down the 
process of accumulation of human capital, and hence impedes economic growth and 
negatively affects economic development and social progress. The negative effects of 
corruption on economic growth and personal income were investigated in the works of 
Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Myrdal (1968), Bates (1981), Wade (1982) Lui (1985, 
1986, 1999), De Soto (1989), Klitgaard (1986, 1988, 1991), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 
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(1991, 1993), Mauro (1995, 1997, 1998), Choi and Thum (1998), Gong (2003), Svensson 
(2003, 2005), Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2005), and Heyneman, Anderson and 
Nuraliyeva (2008). With the rapid internationalization of higher education and the 
growing volume of trade in educational services, matters of educational credentials--and 
credibility in general--become ever more important. 
The three major issues in higher education are access, quality, and equity. These 
issues are universal and at stake in every nation. Corruption affects all three of these 
issues. It has a negative impact on the quality of higher education and other services; it 
increases inequality in access to higher education, and causes inequities. Every nation 
solves problems of access, quality, and equity differently. Thus, also corruption in higher 
education is part of the news in every country, the ways in which the national media 
reflects on corruption in higher education differ. The same is true for legal actions, 
undertaken in order to prosecute and curb corruption. 
Factors that reshape higher education in the former Soviet Union (FSU) are 
common to all countries. These are a growing demand for higher education, globalization, 
and government inefficiency. Countries of the former Soviet Bloc reform higher 
education faster than most European countries. Political, economic, ideological, language, 
and cultural factors are all important for the reform. One of the negative sides of the 
reform is growing corruption of higher education institutions and in the educational 
industry overall. Corruption, and higher education corruption in particular, is something 
known but not described theoretically. At the same time, increasing scale and scope of 
corruption in higher education urges better understanding of the problem within the 
context of socio-economic transformations. 
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Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study may be defined as follows: setting a conceptual ground 
for further methodological developments and empirical research focused on different 
aspects of corruption in higher education and the development of measurements and 
indicators of its prevalence in higher education. Major research question may be 
formulated as follows: what is corruption in higher education, what is known about its 
prevalence, and how it can be approached? 
The set of questions derived from the major question is as follows: 
 What is corruption in higher education as a socio-economic category? 
 What are the methods to study corruption in higher education? 
 How is corruption in higher education defined and approached in the media and 
in legal cases in countries with different educational systems? 
 What are the forms of corruption in higher education? or In what forms is 
corruption present in higher education? How does corruption in higher 
education manifest itself? 
 What are the mechanisms through which corruption in higher education sustains 
itself? 
Goals of this study may be formulated as follows: 
 Categorization and classification of corruption in higher education, based on 
both media reports and legal records; 
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 Identification of methods and development of approaches to study corruption in 
higher education; 
 Description of corruption in higher education, using number of theoretical 
frames and analytical techniques; 
 Investigation of corruption in higher education in international, and comparative 
perspectives; 
 Identification of possible proactive and reactive policies in higher education 
institutions in respect to corruption; 
 Identification of the problems and directions for further studies of corruption in 
higher education. 
The work is intended to make a conceptual contribution to the subfield of 
corruption that exists in several disciplines, including political science and economics, 
and almost non-existent in the field of education, and higher education policy in 
particular. 
 
Literature review 
 
Corruption is present to a larger or lesser extent in any society at any stage of its 
development. Historically, fundamental changes in societies lead to a rapid and great 
increase in corruption along with other illegal activities. These illegal activities, however, 
later become legal and so what was regarded as corrupt before is regarded as something 
normal. Conversely, what was earlier accepted as the norm and well-tolerated by a 
society may well become an unacceptable practice of corruption. In many societies or 
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types of organizations, corruption is indispensable to a state of stability, or a steady state. 
Highly institutionalized corruption is normally present in societies where corruption is 
widespread and takes place on a large scale. In such cases institutionalized corruption 
substitutes for the legal institutions or complements them. 
During fundamental economic and social transformations, the phenomenal growth 
of corruption does not necessarily lead to its institutionalization. Even widespread 
corruption may long stay un-institutionalized. Such a long-term chaotic condition may be 
explained in part by the contrary forces exerted or preventive measures undertaken by the 
government or groups in civil society. Consistent with expectations, historical aspect of 
corruption may be found to be as important as the structural basis of corruption. Genesis 
of the university and its corrupt practices are described in works of Baldwin and 
Goldthwaite (1972), Brockliss, Denley, and Schmitt (1981), Compayre (1893), Flynn 
(1988), Haskins (1957), Hill (1972), Hyde (1972), Kaminsky (1972), Kibre (1948), 
Maieru (1993), Payne (1975), Piltz (1981), Rait (1931), Rashdall (1936), Thelin (1982), 
Verger (1972, 2000), and others. 
In non-democratic societies corruption, informally approved, imposed, or 
regulated by public authorities, is an indicator of a vertical power rather than an indicator 
of a weak state (Andreski, 1966, 1968; Darden, 2001, 2002). Corruption is used on a 
systematic basis as a mechanism of direct and indirect administrative control and 
redistribution of wealth on the state level and all the way down to local authorities and 
administrations of public and private institutions. Control and redistribution of wealth, in 
this case, are based on blackmail and selective justice. 
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According to the data analysis, presented by Shleifer and Treisman (2003, pp. 27-
28), administrative corruption is very high in poor countries of the former Soviet Union, 
such as Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, lower in the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, 
and Lithuania, and even lower in relatively wealthy Hungary and Slovenia. Individuals’ 
perceptions about corruption put Russia lower than Argentina, Brazil, Romania, or 
Lithuania. Svensson (2005) notes that, “All of the countries with the highest levels of 
corruption are developing or transition countries. Strikingly, many are governed, or have 
recently been governed, by socialist governments.” (Svensson, 2005, p. 24) Referring to 
the works of Lipset (1960), Demsetz (1967), and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Schleifer (2004), the author points out that higher per capita income and higher level of 
human capital reduce corruption. 
The increasing gap between pay rates in private and public sectors of the 
economy urges public employees to seek other sources of income (Gorodnichenko and 
Sabirianova, 2006). Along with the health services industry, higher education has become 
one of the industries, most affected by corruption. At the same time rapid development of 
higher education, its partial privatization and increasing flow of financial resources have 
created a base for corruption. College professors, who lost the bulk of their savings to 
inflation in early 1990s, and are now grossly underpaid, and they adjust their professional 
ethics and behavior accordingly by accepting bribes and numerous other benefits and 
utilizing their privileged position and control over the access to higher education. 
The problem of corruption in the former Soviet Bloc is reflected in a number of 
research papers and its existence is proven on the basis of surveys. For instance, a poll 
developed by the Ukrainian Institute for Social Research showed that 78 percent of 
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respondents believed that all or most of the government officials have accepted bribes. 
More than 80 percent stated that corruption was prevalent within the judicial branch of 
government, while 71 percent responded in the affirmative to a query about whether they 
believed that most government officials were tied to the mafia or private family business 
relations. Moreover, good portion of Ukrainians is inclined to accept bribery as a normal 
part of everyday life (Woronowycz, 2003). 
Solomon and Foglesong (2000, p. 75) note that the number of reported incidents 
in Ukraine rose two-and-a-half-fold between 1990 and 1998 to 2,449, and these incidents 
led to 1,641 convictions. Numerous surveys in the Russian Federation reveal the same 
situation with corruption. The total estimate of the amount entrepreneurs have paid to 
officials in 2001 approximated $33.5 billion, slightly less than the total revenue of the 
Federal budget in this year (Popov, 2005, p. 33). This does not include bribes that 
consumers pay for access to healthcare services, social services, and educational services 
as well as ordinary bribes to traffic police etc. paid on a daily basis. More than half of all 
Russians had to pay a bribe at least once in their lives, while 19 percent do it quite often. 
Most often bribes are paid for medical services (51 percent of the respondents), followed 
by traffic violations (31 percent of the respondents) and educational services (20 percent 
of the respondents) (Newsru, June 2006). 
In 1999 James Leach, Chairman of the US House Banking Committee, wrote that 
he had conducted a study of the most corrupt regimes, including the Philippines under 
Marcos, Zaire under Mabutu, and Indonesia under Suharto. Bad as these were, each was 
outdone by the “pervasiveness of politically tolerated corruption’ in post-communist 
Russia (Leach, 1999; Shleifer and Treisman, 2003, p. 27). The surveys by Transparency 
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International and by the World Bank picture Russia as a very corrupt country (UN, 2003). 
In the 2001 survey by the World Bank, Russia was 142
nd
 out of 160 countries. According 
to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Russia was 71
st
 out of 102. In 2006, Russia 
was in 121
st
 place with the score of 2.5, and in 2012 it was in 133
rd
 place with the score 
of 2.8 (Transparency International, 2006, 2012). Contrary to expectations, development 
of a substantial private sector in higher education leads to an increase in corruption. 
Private higher education institutions are as corrupt as their public counterparts, which 
prove that not only public officials are susceptible to corruption. Moreover, perceptions 
of the public about corruption lead to an increase in the number of incidences of 
corruption and total volume of graft (Cabelkova and Hanousek, 2004; Tumennasan, 2005; 
Olken, 2006). An increase in public perception of corruption in higher education 
facilitates a further increase in corruption as well as the total amount of graft accumulated 
by the college instructors and administration. 
Corruption is not limited to developing and transition economies only. The 
developed nations suffer of corruption as well. The survey conducted by the 
Transparency International in 2006 placed the US at 20
th
 position with the corruption 
score of only 7.3 out of 10 possible, where 10 would mean no corruption at all and 1 
would mean highest level of corruption. The US shared 20
th
 position with Chile and 
Belgium, falling down from 17
th
 place with the score of 7.6 in 2005. Major European 
Union members were not much better in this regard, with France at 16
th
 place and 
Germany at 18
th
 place. Japan occupied 17
th
 position with the score of 7.6. The recent 
survey conducted by the Transparency International and presented in November of 2012 
places the US at 19
th
 position with the same corruption score of 7.3. The US borders in its 
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corruption rank with Chile (20) and Uruguay (20). Major European Union members are 
not better in this regard, with France at 22
nd
 place. Germany occupies 13
th
 place, while 
the UK and Japan share 17
th
 position with the score of 7.4 (Transparency International, 
2005, 2006, 2012). 
In North America and Western Europe, concerns about large-scale corruption run 
high despite a low level of direct experience of bribery for services. In spite of the lack of 
daily experience with bribe-paying, 85 percent of respondents in North America think 
that the business environment is affected to a moderate or large extent by corruption 
while 89 percent believe that the same is true for political life (Transparency International, 
2006). Media sources and legal reports point to a significant level of corruption in higher 
education in the developed world, ranging from the mafia ties with universities in Italy 
and widespread cheating on the standardized tests in the UK to bribery in entry 
examinations in Japan and major cases of embezzlement and financial aid fraud in the US. 
Corruption is studied by scholars in few disciplines. Major approaches used by 
economists and political scientists in investigating and modeling corruption include 
principal-agent theory, game theory, red tape theory, and grease-the-wheels theory. 
Principal-agent theory, first developed in economics to study relations between the 
owners of the enterprises and their managers, is now widely used in investigating 
numerous issues in public policy and may be applied to the issues of higher education 
corruption. Principal-agent problem in the fields of public policy and economics is 
described by Banfield (1975), Becker and Stigler (1974), Darden (2002), Kunicova and 
Rose-Ackerman (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978, 1999), and Solnick (1998), to 
name a few. 
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Referring to Klitgaard (1988, p. 23) Gong (2002, p. 88) states that corruption: 
“occurs when an agent betrays the principal’s interests in pursuit of his/her own or when 
the client corrupts the agent “if he or she (client) perceives that the likely net benefits 
from doing so outweigh the likely net costs” According to the “grease-the-wheels” 
concept of corruption, it helps overcome bureaucratic obstacles that remain from the 
previous regime. 
Addressing the question whether higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption, 
Svensson (2005, pp. 32-33) notes that it might be true, but there is not enough evidence 
to support it. This statement can only be proven empirically. The evidence is very 
contradictory. Theories of higher wages generally do not hold. There are too many 
speculations around the suggestion of rising wages in order to reduce corruption. Patterns 
of consumption (Tumennasan, 2005), as well as perceptions about corruptness of 
different institutions (Cabelkova and Hanousek, 2004; Olken, 2006) influence 
willingness to bribe, acceptance of bribes, and considering bribery as an extra source of 
income. 
Goorha (2002) suggests that better paid public officials are less corrupt. The red 
tape theory, presented by Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999) and developed mathematically by 
Guriev (2003) may be used in explaining or justifying different measurements of 
corruption in higher education. Illegal income, derived from imposing the red tape, is 
based on monopolization of certain rights and privileges, and, more importantly 
discretion to allow or deny access to higher education. 
Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996, p. xiii) say that “Corruption is a problem and 
corruption control a constant challenge for all governments. Corruption undermines 
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citizens’ confidence in and commitment to the commonwealth and can even destroy the 
legitimacy of the political system. Therefore, it is not difficult to agree with a phalanx of 
scholars and practitioners who argue that corruption must be controlled.” Callow (1976, p. 
144) concludes that “Perhaps the heart of the issue is not the kind of graft or who 
perpetrates it or even its magnitude but rather its impact upon the democratic process. 
Graft of any kind breeds distrust. Distrust breeds cynicism. Cynicism is the most 
powerful enemy of the democratic representative process.” 
In the western literature, research on corruption exists in two major areas: 
development economics and politics. Within development economics corruption is 
described as an attribute of third world countries. In politics focus is on corruption in 
public policy including American (Scott, 1969; Benson, 1978; Moore, 1992; Philp, 1997), 
Japanese (Mitchell, 1996), and Australian (Palmer, 1992) public policy. Some work is 
done on describing corruption in politico-economic perspective, including rent-seeking 
behavior (Krueger, 1974; Buchanan, et al., 1980; White, 1996), rise of the state 
bureaucracies (Wilson, 1975; Weber, 1978), and cross-national characteristics (Treisman, 
2000). 
Corruption is something difficult to define. As Keller (1978, p. 7) points out: 
The word “corruption” itself, as the numerous definitions attached to it in the 
Oxford English Dictionary attest, is an elusive and ambiguous one. For some 
it is a strongly normative concept, describing an illegal or immoral 
transgression of prevailing mores for the benefit of oneself or one’s group. In 
this sense the presence of corruption usually is as much dependent upon the 
stance of the observer as it is on the act of the transgressor: I am reality-
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oriented; you are self-interested; he is corrupt. Often the corrupt do not regard 
themselves as such; and rightly so, by their own frame of values. Often 
enough (as in tyrannies) the most corrupt act is to accord with law and 
custom; to violate or subvert authority may well be the higher morality. Nor is 
corruption, even when accepted as such, necessarily harmful. No less than 
reform, as Samuel Hantington observed, it “may… be functional to the 
maintenance of a political system. Corruption has been understood in yet 
another sense: as something natural, organic, an ineluctable part of the 
business of living.” 
The definition of corruption varies depending on the inquiring discipline. 
Economics has advanced significantly in modeling corruption, but is experiencing 
difficulties in testing the models (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Tirole, 1992; Bardhan, 1997). 
Whatever problem economists might have in explaining corruption is indicated by Rose-
Ackerman’s (1978, p. 2) definition of corruption as an “allocative mechanism” for scarce 
resources: “When this allocation is somehow shared between a market system in which 
wide inequalities in income are taken for granted, and a democratic political system that 
grants a formal equality to each citizen’s vote… Political decisions that are made on the 
basis of majority preferences may be undermined by wide use of an illegal market as the 
method for allocation… Corrupt incentives are the nearly inevitable consequence of all 
government attempts to control market forces – even the “minimal” state.” She 
recognizes that personal values limit the applicability of this approach, since economics 
cannot substitute for the personal integrity of political actors. State officials’ profiteering 
is based on abuse of their discretionary powers and monopolistic positions. Johnston 
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(1982, p. 4) says that not all behavior that breaks rules is corruption. “Corruption 
involves abuse of a public role or trust for the sake of some private benefit.” Private 
benefit is a very broad term and may be understood differently depending on the context. 
Peters and Welch (1978, p. 976) analyze corrupt acts by the component elements 
involved in the corrupt act and exchange: “We believe this process can meaningfully be 
partitioned into the “public official” involved, the actual “favor” provided by the public 
official, the “payoff” gained by the public official, and the “donor” of the payoff and/or 
“recipient” of the “favor” act.” Johnston (1986, p. 379) summarizes the definitional 
problem: “We should not expect to find a sharp distinction between corruption and no 
corrupt actions. Instead, we will find fine gradations of judgment, reflecting a variety of 
equivocations, mitigating circumstances, and attributed motives.” Berg, Hahn, and 
Schmidhauser (1976, p. 3) state that the definition of corruption requires systemic 
concept. They write that: “Political corruption violates and undermines the norms of the 
system of public order which is deemed indispensable for the maintenance of political 
democracy.” 
Lasswell and Rogow (1963, p. 320) propose that “A corrupt act violates 
responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact 
incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. A system of public or civic order 
exalts common interest over special interest; violations of the common interest for special 
advantage are corrupt.” For Leon (1993, p. 25): “Political corruption is a cooperative 
form of unsanctioned, usually condemned policy influence for some type of significant 
personal gain, in which the currency could be economic, social, political, or ideological 
remuneration”, and concludes that political corruption is an integrated, systemic part of 
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the American political process. The same suggestion could probably be made for the 
system of higher education in the former Soviet Union (FSU). 
Key (1934, p. 386) considers corruption in politics and public policy in the US 
and defines graft “… as an abuse of power for personal or party profit.” Key (1934, pp. 
386-387) says that graft usually involves a relationship between the official exercising the 
power which is abused and some other individual or individuals and that the techniques 
of graft are the methods employed in these relationships plus the methods used in cases 
of graft involving only a single individual. 
In the Post-Soviet literature, corruption is normally described in the area of the 
shadow economy and to the lesser extent in relations between the economy and different 
levels of bureaucracy and administration that is in political organizations. A newer trend 
in Russian and Ukrainian research on corruption is to present a descriptive analysis of 
corruption perceptions by population based on pools and surveys. Higher education 
corruption is still not described theoretically. It is much more difficult to estimate the 
volume of corruption in higher education than to estimate the volume of a shadow or 
unofficial economy. The shadow economy in the FSU is mostly legal in its process and 
becomes illegal at the stages of different forms of realization. Products produced by the 
shadow economy are legal and do not differ from those produced legally, but avoiding 
taxation and illegal agreements make the sector a shadow economy. 
One of the approaches is to consider corruption as illegal by its nature within any 
organization, even if it is broadly accepted and treated as normal. Corruption in Russia is 
deeply rooted in the culture of the society and has a proud tradition. In historical 
perspective Russian tsar Ivan Grozny, one of the patriarchs of the centralized Russian 
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Empire, prescribed public servants to feed from the service.
1
 This was his laconic 
response to the voices of the state servicemen from provinces asking for salaries. Salaries 
were not paid for years and people in the state service collected their benefits from the 
public. Those were bribes in kind and rarely money. 
As follows from the Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire, dated 1630, state 
servicemen were sworn not to embezzle from the state and not to accept bribes from the 
public (Pisar’kova, 2004). In the era of Peter the Great, material conditions of Russian 
bureaucrats and state clerks were good (Milov, 2001, p. 487). However, starting in 1723, 
they have deteriorated significantly. Small salaries did not cover even the cost of living 
and furthermore were never disbursed in time (Pososhkov, 1937, p. 221). The chronic 
budget deficit was yet another reason for state servicemen to seek additional sources of 
income. They worked as horsemen, grooms, and gatekeepers. In 1727 salaries for lower 
level state clerks were abolished altogether. The state servicemen were once again 
advised to “feed from the service.” (Solov'ev, 1991, p. 89) The ruling regime was 
somewhat critical only about the direct extortion from the public, but other forms of 
corruption, including gifts and gratuities, were allowed (Demidova, 2002, pp. 142-145). 
Bribery in state offices was de facto legalized while corrupt practices led to the 
development of the culture of legal nihilism. Not only poorly paid state clerks were 
susceptible to corruption. Well-paid high-ranked bureaucrats collected much bigger 
bribes than did their subordinates. 
A similar situation takes place in contemporary Russia and other parts of the 
former Russian Empire, including Ukraine and Central Asia. Salary for public workers, 
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including higher education instructors and administrators is often not paid in time. Arrays 
in Russia and Ukraine use to reach six to twelve months and more, while in countries of 
the Central Asia salary in many instances is non-existent. While in Russia corruption was 
not wide spread during the soviet times and was not well tolerated by the public, in 
Central Asia corruption simply became more open and rampant than it used to be, though 
still would be illegal. Involvement in the illegal activities requires braking personal ethics 
and certain norms of behavior and establishing new type relations with the same and new 
people and organizations. Russian higher education, however, chose this way of 
adaptation to the new economic realities. 
The need for strong definitions of corruption, bribe, bribery, graft, misconduct, 
misuse, embezzlement, etc. in the field of corruption is obvious. Definitions of corruption 
such as “abuse of public office for the personal gain” are too broad and lack specificity. 
They raise at least two questions. What is abuse and what is public office? As far as one 
can understand the word “abuse,” its meaning is very broad. The word abuse can have 
numerous interpretations and contexts. One can take, for instance, child abuse and 
alcohol abuse. In these two cases the same word has two different meanings. More recent 
substitution of the word abuse by the word misuse does not change the insufficiency of 
the definition. The meaning of “public office” is even broader. Moreover, corruption is an 
abuse not only of the public office, unless “public office” is defined as everything where 
interests of at least two individuals meet and where they coordinate their activities. 
This research asserts that the definition of corruption as the abuse of public office 
for private gain is convenient in a sense that it is perfectly inclusive. The strength of this 
definition is in its inclusiveness, but the weakness is that it is not specific. The definition 
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is very general. It is applicable, but it does not discover the essence of corruption. We use 
a narrow definition of corruption that regards corruption as such only if it constitutes an 
illegal act. This approach is grounded in the very nature of the concept of corruption and 
coercion that anticipates blackmail on the basis of the risk of accusation and legal 
prosecution by the state. 
A substantial body of literature is now being developed on corruption as a 
phenomenon of transition economies, starting from the Soviet times (Azrael, 1965) and 
up to the present (Holmes, 1996; Easter, 2000; Hellman, 2000; Kotkin, 2001; Kotkin and 
Sajo, 2002; Zhdanov, 2002). The issue of corruption within the field of economics is now 
also being studied in China (Gong, 1997, 2002; He, 2000). In the post-Soviet literature, 
corruption is normally described in the area of the shadow economy and to a lesser extent 
in relations between the economy and different levels of bureaucracy and the 
administration of political organizations. A newer trend in Russian and Ukrainian 
research on corruption presents a descriptive analysis of perceptions about corruption 
held by the population based on polls and surveys. 
All of these theoretical approaches are used to address the classical issues of 
corruption, including first of all state-businesses relations where entrepreneurs interact 
with bureaucrats, and bureaucrats interact with their supervisors and their constituents. 
Little theory has been developed on interactions of the general public with public 
employees or servicemen, including health care professionals and educators. Corruption 
that takes place in such interactions is known as petty corruption. However, corruption in 
higher education is not limited to petty or everyday corruption only. Large scale 
embezzlement and fraud can be met in national educational systems, not only in 
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development and transition economies, but in the US and European Union as well. 
Higher education corruption is still not described theoretically. 
Quite a few works address different aspects of corruption in higher education, 
including relations between the university and business (Anderson, 2001; Bok, 1982; 
Cichy, 1990; Soley, 1995; Washburn, 2005), academic misconduct (Anderson, 1999; 
Arrowsmith, 1966; Bailey and Richards, 1985; Decoo, 2002), research misconduct and 
research fraud (bell, 1992; Bird and Dustira, 2000; Breitmayer, 2000; Brydensholt, 2000; 
Coggins, 2000; Culliton, 1987; Koshland, 1987; Rhoades and Gorski, 2000; Stegemann-
Boehl, 2000), academic dishonesty and fraud (Blankenship and Whitley, 2000; Eckstein, 
2003; Fairweather, 1996; McCabe, Trevino, and Butterfield, 1999; Pulvers and Diekhoff, 
1999; Silber, 1970, 1980; Simon, 1971, Wilshire, 1990), bribery in admissions and 
academic process (Chapman, 2003; Hallak and Poisson, 2004; Johns, 2003; Miyazaki, 
1981; Stetar, Panych, and Cheng, 2005; Suroor, 2005; Waite and Allen, 2003), cheating 
(Cizek, 1999; Croucher, 1997; Diekhoff, 1996; Greaney and Kellaghan, 1996; Kerkvliet 
and Sigmund, 1999; Maline and Maramark, 1993; McCabe and Trevino, 1996; Moffat, 
1990; Saxe and Spalter, 1992), plagiarism (Goldsmith, 1998; Lathrop and Foss, 2000; 
Mallon, 1989; Roig, 1999), diploma mills (Snyder, 1974; Stewart, 1988), and 
intercollegiate athletics (Delany, 1997; Duderstadt, 2000; Friday and Hesburgh, 1993; 
Sperber, 1990, 2000). 
The literature is overwhelmed with considerations of scientific misconduct, 
cheating, and plagiarism, while investigations into such aspects of corruption as bribery 
and embezzlement are lacking. Also, the literature on corruption in higher education is 
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focused on academia itself and does not account for the socio-economic context and 
settings in which academic corruption develops. 
 
Conceptual framework 
 
Corruption in higher education is something understood and acknowledged but 
not necessarily described in theoretical terms. Most information on corruption comes in 
the form of anecdotes. However, as corruption becomes more of a cultural phenomenon, 
it becomes crucial to theorize corruption in order to be able to resist it. The problem of 
corruption is obvious, but defining corruption is a challenge. The word corruption comes 
from the Latin word corruptio, which in Medieval Latin expressed a moral decay, wicked 
behavior, putridity, rottenness (Johnston, 1996, p. 322). Milovanovic (2001) says that in 
this context one could talk of bribes, or other dishonest means for achieving particular 
disgraceful ends, as a symptom of an ailing society. Johnson’s Dictionary defines bribe as 
“a reward to pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct”, while corruption is “a loss of 
purity and purpose, a social decomposition.” (Osborne, 1997, p. 10) 
It is obvious that different authors use the word corruption in different contexts, 
expressing different meanings. White and Allen (2003, p. 282) point out that “Agreed 
upon definitions are rare, and definitions of corruption run the gamut of being too broad 
to be rendered relatively useless, to being too narrow and thus be applicable to only 
limited, rare, well-defined cases.” The discussion of corruption is field specific. The 
literature in political science focuses on corruption in public policy. It includes rent-
seeking behavior (Krueger, 1974; Buchanan, et. al., 1980; Klitgaard, 1986; White, 1996; 
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McChesney, 1997), the rise of state bureaucracies (Wilson, 1975; Weber, 1978), and 
cross-national characteristics (Treisman, 2000). The definition most cited in the political 
literature is given by Nye (1967, p. 419): 
Corruption is behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role 
because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status 
gains, or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding 
influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the 
judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by 
reasons of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal 
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding use). 
Economics has advanced significantly in modeling corruption, but is experiencing 
difficulties in testing the models due to the lack of large and reliable datasets (Rose-
Ackerman, 1978; Tirole, 1992; Bardhan, 1997). Whatever problem economists might 
have in explaining corruption is indicated by Rose-Ackerman’s (1978) definition of 
corruption as an “allocative mechanism” for scarce resources. The state monopolizes 
certain allocative functions, be it permissions and licenses, or access to public services. 
State officials’ profiteering is based on abuse of their discretionary powers and 
monopolistic positions. 
The definition of corruption as it is used in economics underlines the role of the 
state and assumes the corruptibility of a government official. Corruption in higher 
education presents the need for a more inclusive definition. The challenge to an 
understanding of corruption as applied to higher education arises when one is confronted 
with cases of bribery. These may take place in private higher education institutions as 
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well as in public ones. Anecdotal evidence from the Former Soviet Bloc indicates that 
bribery in higher education may be as common in private colleges as in state colleges and 
universities. Students pay bribes in exchange for good grades independently of the type 
of higher education institution. This urges more inclusiveness in the definition of 
corruption. 
The definition of education corruption includes abuse of authority for material 
gain (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996). Heyneman (2004, p. 638) adds to this definition by 
arguing the following: “But because education is an important public good, its 
professional standards include more than just material goods; hence the definition of 
education corruption includes the abuse of authority for personal as well as material 
gain.” Miller, Roberts, and Spence (2005, p. 5) point to the relativeness of the term 
corruption and apply it to academia: 
The notion of a corrupt official or other role occupant exists only relative to some 
notion of what an uncorrupted occupant of that morally legitimate role consists of. 
The notion of an academic has at its core the moral ideal, or at least, the morally 
legitimate role, of an independent truth-seeker who works in accordance with 
accepted principles of reason and evidence, who publishes in his or her own name 
only work that he or she has actually done, and so on. So an academic motivated 
by a desire for academic status who intentionally falsifies his or her experimental 
results or plagiarizes the work of others is corrupt relative to the ideal or morally 
legitimate role of an uncorrupted academic. On the other hand, a person 
occupying an academic position who paid no heed whatsoever to the truth or to 
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principles of reasoning and evidence and who made no pretense of so doing 
would at some point cease to be an academic of any sort, corrupt or otherwise. 
The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) offers defining 
corruption in education as a “misuse of public office for private gain that influences 
access, quality, and equity in education.”2 Sayed and Bruce (1998) and Waite and Allen 
(2003) present a broad social approach to define corruption. Sayer and Bruce (1998, p. 3) 
present a broader social approach to definition of corruption, stating: “What is commonly 
meant by corruption, it places the emphasis on morality and has its roots in classical 
conceptions of corruption which sought not so much to identify behaviour, but to judge 
the overall political health of a society and its institutions.” Waite and Allen (2003, p. 282) 
reflect that “the term corruption is any use of power or position through discrete acts or 
behavior(s) that benefit an individual, group, or organization.” They state that their 
definition of corruption “must allow for states of corruption, that is, the accrual of such 
acts over time as to constitute a state, climate, or culture of corruption. The gains or 
benefits derived through corruption can be other than financial. Waite and Allen (2003, p. 
282-283) point out that the definition of corruption must also allow for a normative 
judgment or assessment of corruption, one that is not based on strict legal interpretation 
but that draws from more widely held, commonplace conceptions of corruption as the 
deviation of a person, organization, or group from its purposes, such as when self-interest 
influences decisions by administrators.” 
Petrov and Temple (2004) apply a narrow definition of corruption that regards 
corruption as such only if it implies illegality. This study adheres to Petrov and Temple’s 
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  23 
(2004) approach to corruption and applies a narrow definition of corruption that regards 
corruption as such only if it implies illegality. It uses an operational definition of 
corruption in higher education as a system of informal relations established to regulate 
unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office of 
public or corporate trust. The task of creating a set of well-grounded definitions seems to 
be a primary methodological task for the problem-focused research in the field of 
corruption. 
National laws differ and legality and illegality are not universal. Accordingly, 
there might be not one universal definition of corruption in higher education that would 
apply equally well to different national systems in different historical periods. Granting 
access to publicly funded higher education on any premise other than academic merit is 
equated to corruption. Access to higher education in exchange for a bribe is deemed to be 
corrupt. In the decentralized market-based systems of higher education gaining access to 
educational services in exchange for payments is a norm. 
Corruption in universities existed long before the emergence of the market 
economy. Medieval universities were riddled with corruption, including bribery, laxity in 
examinations, and cheating. Some were but diploma mills (Compayre, 1893; Hyde, 1972; 
Thelin, 1982). Depending on the system and legal frameworks laid in the society, certain 
forms of funding, modes of operation, patterns of behavior, and standards of conduct in 
higher education may be considered corrupt or non-corrupt. Corruption in higher 
education is time and place specific. 
There is a variety of forms of corruption in higher education. Corruption in higher 
education is not limited to bribery, or to academic corruption. Bribes are but the most 
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explicit manifestations of corruption in education. Other forms of corruption include 
extortion, embezzlement, fraud, nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, kickbacks, cheating, and 
research misconduct. They rarely appear on their own. Forms of corruption are often 
connected in bundles. For instance, assigning a high grade to a student in exchange for a 
bribe implies fraud. A form itself can have different origins. A bribe can be offered 
voluntarily or extorted. It can be in the form of cash, merchandize, service, or a monetary 
donation. Gross waste in educational management, embezzlement from the state funds, 
and sexual misconduct that take place in higher education institutions do not represent 
academic corruption per se, because they are not part of academic process. Corruption 
develops in organizational structures that evolve and replace each other. 
The problem of corruption is obvious, but defining corruption is a challenge. 
Waite and Allen (2003) characterize the difficulty of defining corruption as follows: 
“Definitions of corruption are problematic. Agreed-on definitions are rare, and definitions 
of corruption run the gamut from being too narrow and thus applicable to only limited, 
rare, well-defined cases.” They suggest that the discussion of the issue of corruption 
seems to be entirely absent in the literature on educational administration. The task of 
creating a set of well-grounded definitions seems to be a primary methodological task for 
the problem-focused research in the field of corruption. The categorization of corruption 
is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
 
Corruption in higher education: classification, forms, and approaches 
 
Categorization 
 
Criteria Classification Forms Fields that study 
Corruption 
 
Theories applied 
Motive Who gains? 
(recipients of the 
benefits of 
corruption) 
Individual gain 
Institutional gain 
Common good 
Individual 
corruption (bribery, 
embezzlement, 
nepotism, 
cronyism) 
Institutional 
corruption 
(misinformation, 
misappropriation) 
 
Public Policy 
Microeconomics 
Behaviorism 
 
Principal-agent theory 
Political corruption 
Rational behavior 
 
 
Legal vs. 
illegal 
Legality 
 
 
Legal 
Illegal 
Abuse, waste 
Bribery, fraud 
Legal studies 
Accounting and 
Audit 
 
White collar crime 
Accounting 
Locus 
 
Place, process, 
stage, unit 
 
Education 
 
 
Services 
 
 
Administration 
Admission (bribes, 
nepotism) 
Instruction (bribes) 
Research (fraud) 
Health Care 
(malpractice, fraud) 
Management 
(embezzlement, 
waste, abuse, fraud) 
 
 
 
Higher 
Education 
Administration, 
Organizations 
Finance 
Public finance 
Higher Ed 
Management 
Organizational 
theories 
(wide variety) 
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Categorization Criteria Classification Forms Fields that study Theories applied 
Intensity 
 
Measurability 
 
 
Density 
 
 
Total volume 
Average size 
 
Distribution 
(monotonicity 
and inequality) 
Measurable 
(quantified), 
unmeasurable 
(unquantified, hidden) 
Case by case, rare, 
common, widespread, 
systemic 
Large, medium, small 
Large, medium, small 
 
Monotonic, sporadic 
Equal, unequal 
Bribery (monetary, 
non-monetary) 
Waste 
Abuse 
 
Statistics for 
Business and 
Management 
Theories of 
distribution 
Probability theory 
 
Function 
 
What is 
achieved? 
Equilibrium 
Market vs. State 
 
 
 
Reform 
 
 
Income generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bribery, 
Macroeconomics 
 
 
Political 
Economy 
 
 
 
Transition 
economics 
 
Microeconomics 
 
General equilibrium, 
Rational expectations, 
Resource Allocation 
Economic security, 
Public sector, 
Government 
intervention, 
“grabbing hand” 
theory 
Institutional theories 
“Grease in the 
wheels” or “speed 
money” 
Theory of firm 
“Red tape” theory 
Utility 
(impact) 
 
Effects Cost 
Benefit 
 
Bribery 
Embezzlement 
Inefficiencies 
Waste, abuse, fraud 
Development 
economics 
Theory of firm 
Cost-benefit analysis 
 
Theory of monopoly 
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Based on the synthesis of media materials and legal records, this study derives a 
grounded category of corruption in higher education. Definitions of corruption such as 
“abuse of public office for personal gain” are too broad and lack specificity. This 
research asserts that the definition of corruption as abuse of public office for private gain 
is convenient in that it is inclusive. The strength of the definition, then, is in its 
inclusiveness, but its weakness is that it is not specific. The definition is very general and 
may be applied to many aspects of the public sector, but it does not disclose the essence 
of corruption. Its applicability to the private sector is also unclear. 
This study employs a different conceptual understanding of corruption. This 
understanding is based on the principle of historicism and rationality and can be 
formulated as follows: Corruption is a net or a system of relations that 1) includes 
property relations, 2) exists between individuals and institutions that enter and maintain 
these relations on the basis of both voluntary and involuntary participation, 3) is based 
upon fundamental socio-economic conditions within specific institutional and time 
frames, 4) serves as a mechanism for distributing and redistributing wealth and power, 5) 
functions in the regimes of decreased, constant, and increased scale, 6) violates current 
laws, norms, and formal procedures existing within a society, and 7) is either recognized 
or not recognized as corruption by different groups of people. 
Corrupt activities in certain settings and contexts may be rational, depending on 
an environment, organizational climate and culture. Rawls states that the reasonable and 
the rational cannot be derived from each other and that reasonable people propose fair 
terms of cooperation, that cannot be substituted by an agreement based on corruption. But 
the reasonable exists within certain organizational systems and is not solely a 
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characteristic of the society overall. A corrupt person may well be characterized by other 
members of society as reasonable, rational, and cooperative. 
Often groups reach an agreement to satisfy their interests and this agreement may 
be based on corruption. Participating in corruption may be more beneficial and less risky 
than non-participating. In this case cooperative behavior may seem to be more rational 
and reasonable than non-cooperative. This type of reason, however, is not a public reason 
but one of persons and organizations. This is not a Rawls’s reasonableness in its political 
meaning. Even though corrupt practices are widespread and lead to an agreement, they do 
not represent a public reason, defined by Rawls (1993) as a characteristic of a democratic 
people. Corruption has an overall negative impact on society and so is obstructive to 
public good and fundamental justice. 
While Rawls’s approach might be characterized as somewhat idealistic, an 
historical determinism-based approach is derived from the specific socio-economic 
conditions, under which every particular event, activity, institution, or rule may be 
characterized as corrupt or otherwise, independently of moral and ethical constructs. This 
research develops a category of corruption based on corruptio that means “perversion of 
purpose.” 
Corruption in higher education is detrimental to the society for at least two major 
reasons. First, it has a negative impact on the economy and society due to the lowered 
efficiency of the system, as does bureaucratic corruption. But, in the distinction of 
ordinary bureaucratic corruption, corruption in higher education reduces the total social 
welfare of the society because of its negative effect on the quality of educational 
programs and qualifications of college graduates. Moreover, unqualified specialists may 
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pose a threat to the society through their professional activities. For instance, doctors with 
low quality education will not be able to provide proper or best treatment to their patients. 
Civil engineers will construct poor buildings that may fall, etc. This consideration of 
social welfare imposes especially high moral standards on college faculty as educators as 
well as controllers of education quality and skills of their graduates. 
In times of major socio-economic transformations it is unclear what is and what is 
not allowable, and what are the basic rules. Faculty members who are involved in corrupt 
activities often do not know the rules, interpret the rules in their favor, and as well 
arrange and adjust the rules. Moral and ethical considerations are replaced with an 
economic rationale. The only ground here is a mainstream of socio-economic 
development, at the top of which there is a new, i.e. adjusted old social order with its new 
laws and regulations. These new rules are only observed and followed if they adequately 
reflect reality. Unfortunately, the new rules most often reflect quasi-reality, i.e. the reality 
that exists in people’s imaginations and ideals about fairness and a better social order as 
well as political proclamations, and so breaking a law means moving toward equilibrium 
in socio-economic relations rather than violating such an equilibrium. 
To summarize, it is sometimes good to be corrupt. It is good to be corrupt for the 
academically unsuccessful student to make his/her way through the college. It is good to 
be corrupt for a professor to survive financially and maintain good relations with the 
university administration. It is good to be corrupt for the administration, to retain its 
student body and maintain the financial soundness of the university. And it is good for 
the government to have corrupt universities, because it is easier to make them loyal and 
comply with government policies, whatever unfair they may be. 
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Informative base of the study 
 
The informative base of the study consists of the following major sources: 
 scholarly publications, including those in the fields of educational policy, 
development economics, political science, public policy, sociology, and 
organizational theory; 
 publications in the mass media, including periodical editions and on-line news 
editions; 
 legal cases and court records; 
 on-line resources, including reports on corruption. 
 
Research methodology 
 
While a categorization of corruption has been in stages of development and 
revision over the last two decades, the methodology of studying corruption is at best in its 
infancy. There are two major methods applied in research on corruption. Economists tend 
to focus on survey-based quantitative methodologies. In political science and public 
policy the methodology of research on corruption is narrowed down to case studies, and 
resembles more closely investigations and journalistic-style commentaries, rather than 
rigorous scholarly work. Interviews are another approach to investigate corruption in 
large organizations and industries. 
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Due to the secrecy and illegality of the subject matter in research on corruption, 
one of the major challenges is the reliability of data. Moreover, the research is often 
focused on corruption in developing countries where obtaining reliable data is an 
immense challenge. Quantitative methodologies of studying corruption in higher 
education can rely heavily on the works of Babbie (1995), Johnston (2001), and 
Kaufmann (1998). 
As data are crucial to quantitative research, identification of sources for data 
collection and the process of collection itself are considered in this discussion. Such 
characteristics of the data, as validity, reliability, and preciseness are important. 
Measurements of corruption may be separated into the measurements of effects of 
corruption or impact on the economy and other aspects of life, measurements of 
corruption itself, and measurements of the dynamic of corruption and its effects. 
Svensson (2005) notices that in a quantitative analysis of corruption all reliance is on the 
likely correlation between different forms of corruption. 
Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that can take many forms. 
Noonan (1983, p. 43) says: “Corruption is an unquantified phenomenon; it is impossible 
to say whether the multiplication of laws and prosecutions is reducing it, keeping even 
with it, or falling behind. In the absence of a quantitative basis for evaluating the efficacy 
of criminal laws in this area, the success of the law is measured in terms of its symbolic 
impact.” Measuring corruption is necessary not only for understanding the scale and 
scope of the problem in higher education, but also for making simple comparisons 
between countries and conducting comparative analysis of corruption in national 
educational systems. 
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Johnston (2001, p. 157) notes: 
Other than the question of definitions, few issues have so thoroughly stymied the 
comparative study of corruption as that of measurement. Types and amounts of 
corruption vary among, and within, societies. Theory tells us that these contrasts 
reflect political and economic influences, history, and culture, and in turn affect 
societies and their development in important ways. But the difficulty of measuring 
corruption has long made it difficult to make such comparisons, to test hypotheses, 
and to build sound, comprehensive theories. 
Johnston (2001, pp. 160-166) raises several concerns about measurement, 
including reliability, precision, and validity as well as “bribery bias,” all of which are 
equally important for international corruption rankings and comparative analysis of the 
levels of corruption in different countries. In his view, the following question might be of 
primary importance: “can we devise relatively inexpensive measures that are still 
sensitive to changing levels of corruption, and can give useful guidance to anticorruption 
efforts?” (Johnston, 2001, p. 172) He suggests looking into scaling correlates of 
corruption rather than attempting to measure corruption itself. This assumption that 
certain conditions and the phenomenon of corruption itself are closely linked may be 
mapped at the opposite end of the vector of measuring effects of corruption, so popular in 
development economics, rather than internal changes in corruption. 
Kaufmann (1998) suggests that the measurement of corruption should be focused 
on different types of abuses, different types of public offices, some types of private gains, 
and factors influencing such abuses. His typology of corruption focuses entirely on the 
public office and by definition has serious limitations. While considering corruption in 
  33 
higher education, one should admit the fact that corruption in its different forms takes 
place in private higher education institutions as well as in public ones, and is not 
necessarily connected to the different levels of government or state bureaucrats and 
public officials. Kaufmann (2005, pp. 150-155) considers such aspects of corruption as 
bribery for ignoring counterproductive regulations and getting around socially necessary 
regulations, as well as misappropriation of public budget and patronage. The author 
presents a methodology for measuring corruption as related to public offices, based on 
surveys and hard data analysis. He further suggests focusing on public agencies and 
financial transparency as well as such characteristics as reliability, prioritization, and 
integration of the various approaches. 
As may be seen from the most recent work on corruption in education (Cahn, 
1986; Sykes, 1987; Noah and Eckstein, 2001; Anderson, 1992; Segal, 2004; Washburn, 
2005), case studies supplemented with superficial analysis constitute the bulk of what 
might be interpreted as a research methodology. The multiplicity of cases of corruption 
referred to in these studies pushes them beyond the borders of a simple case study, yet 
they remain insufficient to move into the realm of quantitative research. At the same time, 
this overload of cases does not carry with it a sufficient portion of analysis and synthesis 
and other qualitative methods that would be of great benefit to the research. At this stage, 
research on corruption in education, and higher education in particular, is almost 
nonexistent. Accordingly, the methodology used in first attempts to investigate the issue 
may at best replicate methodology used in the field of development economics and in the 
field of public policy. 
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As higher education becomes more of a business-like industry, methodology 
borrowed from white-collar crime theories might also be of help. Imports of categorical 
apparatus and research methodology from these fields and their adaptation to the field of 
education, and higher education in particular, might be the major task for future research 
on education corruption. Development of research methodology in the fields of 
development economics and public policy will facilitate a further development of the 
categorical apparatus. These developments will further be utilized in studying corruption 
in education. The two major parts of the study will include an investigation of the media 
reflections on corruption in higher education and a research of the legal record on the 
cases of corruption in higher education. 
The first part of the study considers corruption in higher education in the media, 
following publications in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and the 
Russian Federation (RF). It addresses the question: How is corruption in higher education 
reflected in the world media, what particular aspects of corruption receive more of the 
media’s attention and why? Specifically, it analyzes selected publications in two major 
international languages, English and Russian, for the period of 1998-2007, devoted to 
corruption in higher education. 
The categorization of corruption in higher education for this study includes means, 
forms and phenomena, spheres where it exists, and areas of interaction where it is found. 
The means are: bribes, kickbacks, kinship, personal connections, reciprocity (exchange of 
favors), and fraud. The forms and phenomena include: bribery, nepotism, favoritism, 
fraud, embezzlement, cheating, plagiarism, ethics misconduct, and breach of contract. 
The spheres are: access to higher education, academic process, graduation, credentials, 
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licensing and accreditation, faculty hiring and promotion, research, grants, medical 
services. The interactions include: state-university, business-university, faculty-students, 
faculty-administration, students-administration, and state-students relations. 
The second part of the study considers corruption in higher education through 
legal records, following publications and court cases in the US and the RF. The major 
focus here will be on the few selected cases of corruption in US higher education. These 
cases are broadly publicized in the media. They are significant and affect large number of 
higher education institutions and constituents, including educators, students, parents, and 
general public. The legal cases to be analyzed are at the core of the development and the 
reform of the higher education industry. They reflect processes of decentralization, 
commercialization, and marketization of higher education along with the processes of 
coordination, quality assurance, and state control in the industry. 
The task of this part of the study is to address the question: How is corruption in 
higher education understood and defined in court cases, what particular cases receive 
more attention, and how do these cases correlate with the major educational reforms, 
changes, and socio-economic context in the nation? Specifically, it analyzes records of 
selected legal cases devoted to corruption in higher education. The cases of corruption in 
higher education considered in courts include fraud in educational loans, quality of 
educational programs, credentials, credentials evaluation and accreditation, attempts to 
monopolize discretion over the admissions decisions, collusion, embezzlement, research 
misconduct, and medical fraud. 
The case of the US versus University of Phoenix in 2006 points to the federal 
funds received by the University in form of student aid. The University might have been 
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ineligible because of non-compliance with certain federal laws and regulations. The case 
is being developed on the ground of the False Claims Act and anticipates possible fraud 
in state-university relations. Chapman University received federal funds in the form of 
student aid, but might have been ineligible as well. The major challenge in the case 
considered in 2006 was the time necessary to receive credit hours. As a result, students 
might have been defrauded because of insufficient instruction time and the state was 
defrauded as well. 
Possible corruption takes place in student-university relations and in state-
university relations. The State of New York Attorney General launched an investigation 
in 2007 to discover some doubtful practices with student loan preferred lists, 
administered by colleges’ financial aid officers. The case points to possible attempts to 
establish a near-monopoly and to defraud students in local markets of educational loans. 
The case involves state-university relations and student-universities relations. The 
government conducts the investigation on students being defrauded and guided to more 
expensive loans by college administrators. 
One of the major cases that attempted to establish possible corruption in 
admissions involved MIT and a number of other Ivy League colleges in 1990. The 
colleges were making agreements prior to admitting graduate students in order to reduce 
the total cost of the offerings in form of scholarships and financial aid. This implies 
monopoly in admissions, collusion, and consumer fraud. The colleges admitted 
wrongdoing and stopped the practice, while MIT won on appeal, pointing to its non-
profit status. Another broadly publicized case of 1985 involved Stanford University and 
later a few other colleges. The major consideration here was overcap payments of up to 
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72 cents on every $1 received in the form of federal grants as well as the ways in which 
some of the federal research money was spent. The case implied possible fraud in state-
university relations. A number of cases with diploma mills involved state-university 
relations, consumer-university relations, and degree holders-employers relations. Cases 
of educational quality fraud involve consumers or students, providers or colleges, and 
accreditation agencies. Research fraud involves the state as the major source of funding 
while medical fraud committed in university hospitals involves patients and insurance 
companies. 
The cases of corruption in higher education selected for the study include most 
recent developments in college funding, including ties between colleges and the 
educational loans industry. The investigation was initiated by the Attorney General of the 
State of New York, Mr. Cuomo, and followed by another 27 states throughout the 
country. Two other cases may include a for-profit educational institution based in 
California that was accused by the state in defrauding its students, playing on the 
mismatch of students’ financial aid and academic abilities and agreed to a settlement of 
$6.5 million in restitutions, penalties, fines, and compensatory payments, and the case 
with the University of Phoenix based on the False Claims Act. 
The case may necessitate development of certain measures, such as the Consumer 
Education Fund established by the Attorney General, as well as changes in legislation, 
designed to prevent doubtful practices in the future. Provision of private educational 
loans is a growing industry in the US. It rose sharply from $1.7 billion in 1996 to $17 
billion in 2006 and is expected to grow continuously and rapidly in the future. Similar 
developments may take place in other nations in the future. The process of transferring 
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education financing to private educational loans represents the major trend in higher 
education funding and may soon be borrowed and adopted in other countries. 
Subsequently, legislative regulations and changes in the legislation are necessary as well 
as provisions in the university’s code of conduct not only in the US, but in many other 
nations. 
The classification also points to some possible theoretical developments. The core 
of the problem as related to corruption is in an intentional restriction of students’ access 
to reliable information about available educational loans. This implies imperfect 
information, imperfect competition between the educational lenders, and a certain degree 
of monopolization of the market of educational loans and eventually brings into fore the 
antitrust law. 
A grounded theory approach will be utilized to develop theoretical extensions 
based on the analysis of media reports and legal cases of corruption in higher education. 
These theoretical extensions will present explanations of how the corrupt systems in 
higher education function, based on what grounds, and how they evolve and develop in 
existing and changing socio-economic contexts. According to Moghaddam (2006), “The 
grounded theory approach consists of a set of steps and processes which are the building 
blocks of a quality grounded theory. Grounded theory… focuses on making implicit 
beliefs explicit.” (p. 1) Grounded theory refers to theory developed inductively from data 
(Charmaz, 2000). Grounded theory was introduced in 1967 to present a reliable way of 
connecting for diverse facts into an explanatory theory when “data are fractured, 
conceptualized, and integrated to form theory” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.3). Referring 
to Creswell (2002), Moghaddam (2006, p. 1) points out that “What Glaser and Strauss 
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suggested as grounded theory is actually a ‘systematic, qualitative process used to 
generate a theory that explains, at a broad conceptual level, a process, an action, or 
interaction about a substantive topic’” 
The grounded theory approach is specifically designed to address issues that have 
not been well researched. Corruption in higher education remains a theoretically 
undeveloped problem. Even a simple theoretical description of the phenomenon of 
corruption in higher education industries of different countries is virtually absent. 
According to Moghaddam (2006), “The strongest cases for the use of grounded theory 
are in studies of comparatively unexplored areas.” (Moghaddam, 2006, p. 2, as referred to 
Samik-Ibrahim, 2000) The grounded theory approach is used to generate a new 
explanatory theory rather than use one ‘off the shelf’ to enlighten a procedure, action, or 
interaction, a step-by-step, systematic process to stay close to the data (Creswell, 2002). 
Grounded theory may be applied to the areas where no extensive scholarly literature 
exists. 
Based on the foundations of grounded theory, the basic strategy that may be 
applied in studies of corruption in higher education may be formulated as the sequence of 
the following steps: 
 Identification and demonstration of relevant and necessary grounds for 
corruption to exist, including intensity of monetary transactions in the system; 
 Identification of preconditions for corruption to exist, including complexity of 
the system, presence of the comprehensive legal system, and discretion, 
delegated to public officials. All of these should be carefully weighted on the 
scale of their relative values, significance, and level of development. 
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 Specification of the necessary conditions for corruption. These may include an 
imperfect legal system and an imperfect market system. Defining conditions for 
corruption will depend upon the concepts and frames used to determine and 
categorize corruption. 
 Presenting evidence of corruption by using illustrative techniques borrowed 
from both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. 
 Describing building blocks of corruption in the industry. 
 Presenting a system of corruption as a whole, with its net of interrelations and 
agents participating in such net. This will involve intensive use of the method of 
analysis and synthesis and lead to generalizations. 
 Finally, generalization will be used as a platform or a starting point for 
deduction. Deduction will allow for identifying otherwise invisible pockets of 
corruption. 
The method of induction may be used in studying corruption in higher education 
based on particular cases. According to Bernard (2000, p. 493), “Analytic induction is a 
formal, qualitative method for building up causal explanations of phenomena from a 
close examination of cases. The method involves the following steps: 
(1) Define a phenomenon that requires explanation and propose an explanation. 
(2) Examine a single case to see if the explanation fits. 
(3) If it does, then examine another case. An explanation is accepted until a new 
case falsifies it.” 
Dubs (1930, p. 127) describes a four-step process of testing inductive 
generalizations in the following way: “General procedure for the logical testing of a 
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rational inductive generalization consists, first, in the formulation of a hypothesis; second, 
in the elaboration of the consequences of that hypothesis, which is deduction; third, in the 
checking of those consequences with experience, to see whether they are exactly found in 
experience, which is often by immediate description; and fourth, in the judgment as to 
whether the hypothesis has been verified (is true) or not.” 
Generalized induction will be used to apply conceptual frames borrowed from 
economics, political science, organizational theory, and education to build a new theory 
on the ground of factual material that comes from the media, legal cases, data, and on-
line resources. Media reports on corruption in higher education are based on people’s 
perceptions about corruption, people’s personal experiences, and legal reports that either 
prove or disprove facts of corruption in the education industry. But perceptions shape 
future corrupt behavior of individuals and educators as well. This further increases the 
significance of media reports on corruption in higher education. 
Legal cases are also of high significance, because they have a potential to 
establish legal precedents, lay the ground for future legal regulations, and shape public 
perceptions about fairness of the system and the scale of corruption in higher education. 
The utilization of the two major sources available--legal cases and media reports—with 
the focus on different types of national higher educational systems will add to the value 
of this study through its comparative, international, and interdisciplinary perspectives. 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
The research carries some limitations. First, the areas left unattended in 
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categorization of corruption include gross waste and misallocation of the resources. Gross 
waste and misallocation of the resources constitute a so-called grey area of corruption in 
education, especially when personal or material gains are not pursued. Even though gross 
waste and misallocation of resources is detrimental to higher education, in most instances 
it does not constitute an illegal act, unless personal benefit is pursued. The same is true 
with mismanagement of higher education institutions. While systemic mismanagement 
has a negative impact on the health of academia, it is not considered an act of corruption 
as long as it does not include embezzlement, fraud, or other illegal activities. Second, the 
legal records available for the study are those from the US. While investigations and 
court rulings on corruption in higher education in the RF are highlighted in the media, the 
court records are unavailable. Third, some basic statistics on corruption in higher 
education in the RF and other countries of the former Soviet Bloc are obtained by the 
researchers from the open sources in both Russian and English languages, while in the 
US such statistics are lacking. These limitations, however, will not prevent from 
accomplishing the goal of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
HIGHER EDUCATION CORRUPTION IN THE WORLD MEDIA: 
PREVALENCE, PATTERNS, AND FORMS 
 
Introduction 
 
Corruption in higher education is a newly emerging topic in the field of education 
research. Scholarly work on corruption in higher education is lacking while the problem 
itself is significant. The presence of corruption in higher education throughout the world 
is a growing concern for the industry as it influences its effectiveness and efficiency.
3
 
The negative impact of higher-education corruption on economic development and social 
cohesion is also disturbing.
4
 With the rapid internationalization of higher education and 
the growing volume of trade in educational services, matters of educational credentials--
and credibility in general--become ever more important.
5
 This chapter considers 
                                                 
3
 There are numerous media sources that include publications focused on different 
aspects of corruption in higher education internationally. An excellent selection of media 
titles devoted to corruption in higher education may be found at the Center for 
International Higher Education at Boston College. 
4
 See, for instance, Silova, Iveta, Mark Johnson and Stephen Heyneman. (2007). 
Education and the Crisis of Social Cohesion in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. 
Comparative Education Review, 51(2) (May), pp. 159-180. 
5
 See, for instance, Altbach, Philip, and Jane Knight. (2006). The 
Internationalization of Higher Education: Motivations and Realities. In The NEA 
Almanac of Higher Education. Washington, DC: National Education Association.; De 
Wit, Hans. (2002). Internationalization of Higher Education in the United States and 
Europe: A Historical, Comparative, and Conceptual Analysis. Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
For the issue of international credentials recognition see Heyneman, Stephen, Kathryn 
Anderson, and Nazym Nuraliyeva. (2007). The Cost of Corruption in Higher Education. 
Comparative Education Review, forthcoming, p. 26. 
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corruption in higher education as reflected in the world media, including such aspects of 
corruption as its prevalence, patterns, and dominating forms. The findings help to 
determine which aspects of corruption should be given more consideration in future 
research and which ones might be prioritized. 
 
Research question 
 
The research of corruption in higher education does not face the lack of 
methodological approaches, as they may be borrowed from other disciplines, including 
political science and economics. At the same time methodological approaches, borrowed 
from other disciplines and applied to corruption, have certain limitations. Petrov and 
Temple (2004) say that the methodology of studying corruption in education may be no 
different from qualitative research. However, some problems are encountered by the 
researchers. For instance, faculty members know of each other’s corrupt activities but do 
not discuss them. As a result, major difficulties arise when collecting information due to 
specifics of the topic—corrupt practices remain illegal. 
Another problem that researchers may face is the low level of reliability of the 
information obtained from surveys and interviews. Not only does the media reflect 
perceptions, problems, and trends, but it also shapes perceptions about corruption. Hence, 
the media is important in researching corruption not only as a reflector from which 
people collect information, but as an instrument of shaping and facilitating corrupt 
behavior as well. Moreover, it is noticed by several authors that perceptions of the public 
about corruption lead to an increase in the number of incidences of corruption and the 
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total volume of benefits obtained through corrupt ways (Cabelkova and Hanousek, 2004; 
Tumennasan, 2005; Olken, 2006). An increase in public perceptions about corruption in 
higher education facilitates a further increase in corruption as well as the total amount of 
corrupt benefits accumulated by the college instructors and administration. This 
underlines the importance of the media as a signaling agency that informs the general 
public about corrupt practices, customs, and norms. Democratic changes and processes of 
openness and transparency increase the role of the media in the society. 
This chapter considers corruption in higher education in the media, following 
publications in the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and the Russian 
Federation (RF). The research question can be formulated as follows: How is corruption 
in higher education reflected in the world media, what particular aspects of corruption 
receive more of the media’s attention and why? Specifically, this chapter analyzes 
selected publications in two major international languages, English and Russian, for the 
period of 1998-2007, devoted to corruption in higher education. This recent period has 
been selected because all of the sources are available on-line and consequently have 
much broader outreach than they had before. Other research questions include: Which 
forms of corruption in higher education are given most attention, which ones are 
underrepresented, and why? How do the media in one region comment on corruption in 
higher education in other regions? How does the media coverage of corruption in higher 
education correlate with the statistical data on the prevalence of corruption in each region? 
And how do all of these correlate with the major educational reforms, changes, and socio-
economic context in each of the nations in general? 
Different aspects of corruption in higher education are reflected in just about 
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every news source or edition. The research has chosen sources that provide the most 
comprehensive reflection on both nationwide and international problems, including the 
entire spectrum of the problems associated with higher education corruption. These 
sources consider significant cases of corruption, broadly discussed in the society. They 
present stories built of information obtained from reliable sources and have a high level 
of credibility. 
 
Research methodology 
 
This research identifies one source that specializes in higher education and one 
major news source for each of the regions, including North America (the US), Europe 
(the UK), and the former Soviet Union (the RF) with populations of approximately 300, 
60, and 150 million, respectively. These countries represent different models of higher 
education organization, including such key aspects as governance, management, funding, 
and admission policies. The selected on-line non-scholarly publications in the US and the 
UK can be accessed only for a fee, while publications in the Russian Federation are 
accessible for free. All of the publications are not limited to the national borders, instead 
having a much broader outreach. 
In the US, the focus is on The Chronicle of Higher Education, a specialized 
edition, and The New York Times, a non-specialized edition; In the UK, this research 
reports on corruption in higher education in The Times Higher Education Supplement, a 
specialized edition, and The Guardian, as a non-specialized edition; in the RF, this 
chapter investigates on-line editions of Gazeta.ru, a non-specialized edition that has a 
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substantial regular section on higher education, and Newsru.com, a non-specialized 
edition. All of the media sources presented above address to a certain extent both 
domestic and international issues in higher education. 
The publications are grouped depending on the particular problem they address. 
This criterion has been chosen as best addressing the issue of corruption internationally. 
The groups are as follows: corruption in access to higher education, including violations 
in national and international educational tests, violations in entry examinations, and 
bribery; corruption in research and research grants, including violations of the rules of 
conduct, presentation of results known to be incorrect, fraud, plagiarism, and corruption 
in obtaining grants; corruption in academic process, including low quality of instruction, 
unearned diplomas, degrees, and educational certificates, cheating, plagiarism, collusion, 
diploma fraud, production, distribution, sale, and usage of fraudulent certificates, diploma 
mills, term papers for sale, including those exchanged through the internet; corruption in 
auxiliary activities, including intercollegiate athletics; industry-specific corruption in 
higher education management and administration, including fraud, embezzlement, and 
provision of false information; corruption in auxiliary branches, including academic 
publishing, development and provision of educational software, and supply of 
educational services and goods. Classification of corruption in higher education used in 
this study is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
 
Criteria used and classification of corruption in higher education 
 
Phenomenon. What takes place? 
Bribery of all types and forms 
Nepotism: kinship 
Favoritism: preferential treatment 
Fraud: research fraud, healthcare fraud, non-compliance, managed and biased information flow 
Embezzlement: from the university, by the university 
Cheating: by students, prospective students 
Plagiarism: by students, faculty 
Ethics misconduct, including sexual misconduct 
Breach of contract 
Means. What means are used in corrupt activities to achieve certain goals? 
Bribes: monetary, non-monetary (services etc.) 
Kickbacks: monetary (normally a percentage of the total contract value) 
Kinship: relatives 
Personal connections: relations 
Reciprocity: exchange of favors 
Fraud: fraudulent documents, claims, 
Locus. What are the areas and processes that get corrupted? 
Access to higher education: tests (SAT, CET, TOEFL, GRE, GMAT, LSAT, GSE), admission 
decisions, entry examinations, donations, gifts, corporate sponsorship 
Academic process: grades, additional time for ADDs, time to a client/consumer (student) 
Graduation: gifts, petitioning, banquets, etc. 
Credentials: diploma mills, transfer of credits, fake diplomas 
Licensing and accreditation: provision of services below established standards (have to pay) 
Faculty hiring and promotion: bribes, nepotism, expectation of favors, pass-overs, 
discrimination 
Research: fraud 
Grants: embezzlement 
Healthcare: time to a client/consumer (patient) 
Interactions. What are the interactions, relations where corruption takes place? 
State-university: funding, student financial aid, grants, non-profit status, taxation 
Business-university: research with biased results, educational loans, healthcare fraud 
Faculty-students: all kinds of bribes, misconduct, underpaid and free services 
Faculty-administration: unfair treatment, promotions, dismissals 
Students-administration: breach of contract 
State-students: financial aid fraud, aliens 
Source: completed by the author 
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The research carries some limitations. The areas left unattended in categorization 
of corruption include gross waste and misallocation of resources. Gross waste and 
misallocation of resources constitute so-called grey area of corruption in education, 
especially when personal or material gains are not pursued. Even though gross waste and 
misallocation of resources is detrimental to higher education, in most of the instances it 
does not constitute an illegal act, unless personal benefit is pursued. For instance, 
investments in university presidents’ residences and renovations, addressed only in US 
media, are considered by some as misallocation of the university resources. While the 
merit of such investment may be arguable, the legality of it stays intact. The same is true 
for mismanagement in higher education institutions. While systemic mismanagement has 
a negative impact on the health of academia, it is not considered as an act of corruption as 
long as it does not include embezzlement, fraud, or other illegal activities. 
The key words used in the search within the identified sources include: 
accreditation, admissions, bribe, bribery, cheating, college, corruption, degrees, diploma 
mills, education, embezzlement, examinations, fake, favoritism, fraud, higher education, 
higher education institution (HEI), misconduct, nepotism, plagiarism, research, tests, 
university, as well as cross-references of all of the above. Each media report on 
corruption-related issue in higher education is read, analyzed, and assigned a place 
according to the developed classification. The classification itself is being enriched in the 
process of analyzing the news on corruption in academia. For instance, the mafia-
university relations subcategory is added to the Interactions section of the Classification, 
based on the reports about the existing connections between the mafia and a higher 
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education institution in Italy.
6
 
 
Major findings 
 
The following results were obtained based on the detailed description of 
classification and criteria of corruption in higher education. The media points to the 
presence of the phenomenon of corruption in the three national systems of higher 
education. This phenomenon manifests itself in bribery of all types and forms, including 
offering and accepting money. Bribery is most common in the RF with bribes paid in 
cash, including in national and foreign currency and through personal account transfers.
7
 
Bribes are also offered in the form of commodities, including durable goods and non-
durable goods, services, and sex. Forms of corruption are not limited to bribery in cash 
and goods and services. The phenomenon of corruption also includes exchange of favors 
based on the principle of reciprocity as well as nepotism, including preferential treatment 
based on kinship. Another form of corruption discussed in the media is favoritism. This 
includes preferential treatment, based on personal favors. 
Fraud as a phenomenon of corruption is known to have few forms. First, there is 
research fraud that takes place in research universities, where generation of new 
                                                 
6
 See Bollag, B. (2000). The academy and the mob. The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, (December 1), p. A51; Bollag, B. (2000). 37 at Italian university charged with 
Mafia ties. The Chronicle of Higher Education (November 3), p. A52. 
7
 Lemutkina, Marina. (2004). 50% roditelej platyat prepodavatelyam vztyatki [50 
percent of parents pay bribes to faculty members]. Gazeta.ru (February 17); V Rossii v 
2003 godu roditeli potratili na vziatki 26,5 milliarda rublei na obrazovanie svoih detei [In 
Russia in 2003 parents have paid 26.5 billion rubles in bribes for their children’s 
education]. Newsru (June 24, 2004); MVD: vziatki v obrazovanii dohodyat do milliona 
rublej [Ministry of the Interior: size of a bribe in education reaches one million rubles]. 
Gazeta.ru (June 10, 2006). 
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knowledge is one of the major functions along with teaching and learning. Research fraud 
occurs when research procedures are adjusted or misused to meet the interest of involved 
parties, and results are misreported to meet certain expectations.
8
 A well-known form of 
research fraud in the US and to a lesser extent in the UK is the biasness of pharmaceutical 
research conducted in universities and funded by pharmaceutical companies.
9
 Data 
manipulations in medical research may eventually lead to serious consequences for 
patients. 
Second, there is healthcare fraud that takes place in university hospitals, medical 
centers, and other medical facilities that operate under the auspices of higher education 
institutions. Healthcare fraud occurs when patients and/or insurance companies are 
overcharged for the services performed, charged for services not performed, or services 
are not rendered appropriately according to the set procedures. This type of fraud is not 
related to academic process per se, unless medical treatment is a part of training for 
medical students. 
Third, fraud in higher education can mean a concealed non-compliance, when 
federal and state laws are broken for personal and/or institutional benefit. Such cases may 
be prosecuted under the False Claims Act. For instance, this law was applied to the 
                                                 
8
 Brainard, J. (2000). As U.S. releases new rules on scientific fraud, scholars 
debate how much and why it occurs.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (December 8), 
p. A26; Guterman, L. (2004). German university revokes Ph.D. of scientist who falsified 
data as a Bell Labs researcher. The Chronicle of Higher Education (June 16); Jacobson, J. 
(2005). MIT fires biology professor who admitted faking data. The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 52(12) (November 11), p. A13. 
9
 Eichenwald, K., & Kolata, G. (1999). A doctor’s drug trials turn into fraud: 
research for hire. New York Times (May 17), pp. A16-17; Bernstein, N. (1998). Charges 
of research fraud arise at Cornell AIDS lab. New York Times, (September 26), pp. A1, B6. 
Boseley, S. (1999). Independent body needed to curb fraudulent research. Guardian 
Weekly (September 16-22). 
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University of Phoenix in 2007. This private for-profit institution of higher education that 
operates in multiple locations in the US and enrolls over fifty thousand students was 
accused in using enrollment practices and pay-for-performance scales for its admissions 
officers that would go in contradiction with the federal laws. The non-compliance with 
the law makes vulnerable those university revenues that come from the federal student 
financial aid packages. If the lawsuit is lost, the non-compliance can cost the university 
billions of dollars.
10
 
Fourth, fraud exists in the form of managed and biased information flow, 
including having preferred educational loan providers list, as is the case in many colleges 
throughout the US. Financial aid officers and college administrators in several states were 
accused of conflict of interest in expectation of personal and/or institutional benefits, 
such as possible kickbacks, and profit-sharing in exchange for cooperation with private 
lenders.
11
 Transgressing rules and procedures may be a commonplace yet not addressed 
practice, until it amounts to a large-scale problem with a clearly visible negative impact 
                                                 
10
 Van Der Werf, M. (2006). Federal Appeals Court reinstates False-Claims 
lawsuit against U. of Phoenix. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 53(4), (September 15), 
p. A33. The case contends that the university, which is part of the Apollo Group, a 
publicly traded corporation, paid recruiters on the basis of how many students they could 
get to enroll. The U.S. Department of Education prohibits institutions from giving "any 
commission, bonus, or other incentive payment based directly or indirectly on success in 
securing enrollments." The university certified that it was in compliance with all federal 
regulations when it applied for eligibility for Pell Grant funds and other federal money 
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act. 
11
 See, for instance, Field, Kelly, & Keller, Josh. (2007). Cuomo Accuses 
Education Dept. of Lax Oversight of Lenders: In Continuing Scandal, Aid Administrators 
Develop New Code of Conduct. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 53 (May 4), p. A33; 
Field, Kelly. (2007). College Board Drops Student-Loan Program. The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, 54 (September 7), p. A34. There is total of over 40 publications on the 
issue of student loans and associated fraud and different defrauding techniques in The 
Chronicle of Higher Education in 2007. All of these publications are based on the results 
of the continuing investigation conducted by the Attorney General of the State of New 
York Mr. Cuomo. 
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on certain groups of stakeholders and the society in general. 
Embezzlement as a phenomenon of corruption in higher education works in two 
major directions: embezzlement from the university, committed by university employees, 
and embezzlement by the university, including misappropriation of research grants from 
the government. Both of these forms may qualify for white collar crime.
12
 
Cheating is yet another phenomenon of corruption, reflected equally in the media 
in the US, the UK, and the RF. Cheating is committed by students in tests and 
examinations and by prospective students in entry examinations and national tests 
regarded as entry examinations.
13
 Cheating should not be considered as a relatively 
innocent or less explicit form of corruption, as compared to bribery. Buying a term paper 
on-line often replaces the need to pay a bribe. In this case the faculty member is not 
involved in corruption, but the student achieves the same goal of receiving unearned 
grade or admission to a college. 
Plagiarism is committed both by students in writing academic papers and by 
                                                 
12
 One of the investigations reflected in the Newsru reports that former president 
of the Lugansk branch of the Inter-Regional Academy of Personnel Management (MAUP) 
embezzled 831.9 thousand UAH. See: Byvshy rector luganskogo filiala MAUP prisvoila 
831,9 tysyach griven. CityNews (December 25, 2006). Gazeta.ru reports on the audit of 
the Russian department of education Oversight, conducted by the Attorney General’s 
Office. The Department is being accused in wasteful spending of around 30 million 
rubles. See, for instance, Lemutkina, Marina. (2006). Genprokuratura poshla na ediny 
ekzamen [The Attorney General’s Office took up on the standardized test]. Gazeta.ru 
(June 6); Lemutkina, Marina. (2006). Rosobrnadzoru propalili obshak [Rosobrnadzor lost 
its sources of illegal income]. Gazeta.ru (September 25); Lemutkina, Marina. (2007). 
Rosobrvygovor [Rosobrreprimand]. Gazeta.ru (April 9). 
13
 See, for instance, Desruisseaux, P. (1999). Cheating is reaching epidemic 
proportions worldwide, researchers say. The Chronicle of Higher Education, (April 30), p. 
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faculty in scholarly writing and research.
14
 
Ethics misconduct, including sexual misconduct, is not related directly to 
academic process and is not confined to higher education institutions only, but can be 
found in other organizations as well. The issue of sexual misconduct in academia is not 
paid much attention in the media, except The Chronicle of Higher Education in the US. 
Another phenomenon that can hardly be found in any reports by the selected 
media sources is an abuse of public property, despite the fact that many public higher 
education institutions in the US, the UK, and the RF own and manage large academic 
facilities, numerous other premises, and land. There is only one report in Newsru that 
presents a groom picture of spaces in student dormitories being leased to private 
businesses, immigrants, and even illegal aliens, while out-of-town students, entitled to 
free housing, are denied accommodations in these dormitories for the lack of space. 
Money received from businesses is perceived to be filling pockets of college 
administrators, including those responsible for student housing. The situation may be 
typical for state higher education institutions in Russia, located in large cities, where cost 
of renting is increasingly high and demand for square footage is growing. 
Breach of contract is a more serious phenomenon of corruption than is normally 
considered. The number of students in the class, lecture time, faculty-to-student ratio, 
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 US and UK sources were quick on accusing even the Russian President 
Vladimir Putin of plagiarism. Specifically, they commented on plagiarism in President 
Putin’s doctoral dissertation based on the findings of an American researcher. The 
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quality of libraries, laboratories, and other facilities and equipment, and accessibility of 
faculty are all points over which fraud may occur. Unclear rules and conditions of 
educational contract leave enough room for abuse and allow for corruption in academia. 
This aspect of the academic process is either left unattended or is not referred to as 
corruption by the media. Some reports on quality of education and scandals around it 
may be found in the Russian media, including the conflict between students and the 
Department of Sociology in Moscow State University
15
 The media cares about 
credentials, when individuals buy fake degrees, but it cares little for breach of contract, 
when universities supply educational services below the announced quality. 
Means used in corrupt activities to achieve certain goals include bribes, kinship, 
personal connections, reciprocity, and fraud. Bribes can be monetary and non-monetary, 
including durable goods and non-durable goods, services, and sex. Kickbacks as a form 
of delayed bribes can include direct payments, tuition waivers, registration fees, trips, 
vacations, services, gifts, office supplies and equipment. Often kickbacks are calculated 
as a percentage of the total contract value. Kinship includes relatives’ discretion, access, 
and ability to influence decisions. Personal connections are good relations with people 
who are in a position of discretion, access, or ability to influence decisions. Reciprocity 
means exchange of favors. Means of fraud are fraudulent documents, including IDs, bank 
statements, and fraudulent claims. 
Locus or areas and processes in higher education that become corrupted or are 
susceptible to corruption include access to higher education, academic process, 
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graduation, credentials, licensing and accreditation, funding, faculty hiring and promotion, 
research, grants, and healthcare. 
Corruption in access to higher education occurs or is connected to: standardized 
tests, regarded in lieu of the entry examinations; admission decisions, made by the 
members of admission committees and/or admissions offices; entry examinations, 
administered by the universities; sponsorship, donations, gifts, and contributions, 
including anonymous ones. In the US, donations are not reported as possible bribes in 
exchange for admissions to prestigious universities, simply because this is “the way the 
system works.” Fundraising, a recent trend in some British universities, is now discussed 
in the media, but is not associated with possible corruption in admissions. The same is 
characteristic of Russian higher education institutions. President of Moscow State 
University (MGU) Victor Sadovnichy reports that some new buildings on the 
University’s campus were built thanks to generous donations of corporate sponsors. 
Sadovnichy also prizes himself for managing to triple faculty’s salaries thanks to external 
sources of income.
16
 
Corruption in the academic process occurs with unfair or biased assignment of 
positive and negative grades; unequal initial conditions for students, including additional 
time for test for ADD
17
 students, whose special needs are based on false or incorrect 
medical diagnoses; time spent on a student as a client or consumer of educational services, 
including office hours and consultations not held by professors. 
Forms of corruption in graduation include gifts, graduation by petitioning, and 
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organization of banquets by matriculating students for their professors. As follows from 
works of Rait (1931), Rashdall (1936) and Thelin (1982), these forms of corruption come 
from medieval universities and remain largely unchanged. They are considered quite 
innocent and are not paid much attention by the media. 
Corruption linked to academic credentials includes provision of educational 
credentials, diplomas, transcripts, certificates, and other related documents by diploma 
mills; transfer of educational credits from a lower-quality institution or a diploma mill to 
a higher-quality or higher-ranked institution; production, sale, and usage of fake diplomas 
that reproduce diplomas and other educational documents of accredited and commonly 
recognized universities. Diploma mills were known to exist in the decentralized and 
loosely coordinated US higher education for decades.
18
 In the RF, diploma mills are 
almost non-existent even now. However, quality of educational programs in some private 
colleges is below the standards set by the government. Also, fake diplomas are reported 
to be sold on the streets.
19
 
Licensing and accreditation are procedures of quality control that are vulnerable 
to corruption. Provision of services below established standards makes higher education 
institutions pay bribes to state or regional accreditation agencies in order to gain or 
maintain accreditation and continue to stay in the educational business. This is typical for 
the RF, where colleges with poor quality of instruction have one year to improve or to be 
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 See, for instance, Bartlett, T., and S. Smallwood. (2004). Inside the 
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(June 25), p. A8. 
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closed.
20
 The growing private sector in higher education shifts the media’s attention from 
corruption in faculty-student relations to state-university relations. On the other hand, in 
the US, the government turns to the False Claims Act to encourage colleges to adhere to 
the proper teaching practices and provide quality educational services.
21
 Similar to Russia, 
diploma mills in the US pay bribes in order to gain accreditation.
22
 The government 
attempts to fight diploma mills
23
 while diploma mills defend their rights in the court of 
law.
24
 The Chronicle reports that “An unaccredited institution based in Wyoming is going 
to federal court to challenge an Oregon law that prohibits using a diploma-mill degree to 
get a job. Kennedy-Western University argued in a complaint filed in July in U.S. District 
Court in Portland, Ore., that the law violates the First Amendment rights of its alumni by 
not allowing them to claim their degrees on their resumes.”25 This self-proclaimed 
university is afraid of loosing its clientele due to the restrictions on using its worthless 
degrees. Problems of diploma mills and accreditation may also collide.
26
 
Corruption in faculty hiring and promotion includes lack of objectivity in 
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recruitment, bribes, nepotism, exchange of favors, pass-over, and discrimination. This 
topic is one of the least discussed. For instance, practices of employing ghost instructors 
in order to appropriate their publicly funded salaries are not described in the media. Some 
materials may be found in The Times Higher Education Supplement, pointing to low 
transparency and outdated procedures in faculty hiring and promotion in Italy, Spain, and 
the UK. 
Corruption in research includes research fraud. Research fraud is discussed by the 
US and UK media sources, with the focus on the links of university researchers and 
medical and pharmaceutical industry. The discussion is bound around conflict of interest, 
misreporting or not reporting unfavorable results, and biasness of interpretations.
27
 
Corruption in grants that includes embezzlement does not draw the attention of 
the media. This may be explained in part by the fact that most of the grants in higher 
education are research grants and because of the nature of research activities it is difficult 
to calculate the precise cost of the work performed and time spent on the grant. This is 
characteristic of US and UK systems. In the RF, the government is just starting to 
allocate research grants to few leading universities, after a significant break during the 
transition. Research institutes exist separately from higher education institutions, and 
hence, possible embezzlement in research grants is not related to higher education. 
Corruption in healthcare and medical services provided by university hospitals 
include reduced time to a patient, i.e. client or consumer of medical services, as well as 
billing for medical services not rendered to patients. In the RF such kind of corruption in 
higher education is non-existent since higher education institutions do not offer medical 
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services. In the US in many higher education institutions medical centers produce over 
half of the institution’s revenue and the potential for abuse is significant. However, the 
media does not report on this aspect of corruption in higher education. 
Interactions where corruption occurs include relations between state and 
university, business and university, faculty and students, faculty and administration, 
students and administration, and students and state. Corruption in state-university 
interactions includes misdeeds in funding, student financial aid, appropriation of federal 
and state grants, granting non-profit status, and taxation. Corruption in business-
university relations includes research with intentionally biased results, provision of 
private educational loans on doubtful grounds, and healthcare fraud. 
Corrupt activities between faculty members and students include all kinds of 
bribes, misconduct, as well as underpaid and free services that come from students. 
Corruption in faculty-administration relations finds its expressions in unfair treatment, 
promotions, and dismissals. The major form of corruption in students-administration 
relations is breach of contract, when the university administration fails to deliver quality 
educational services as abided by the contract. Finally, corruption in relations of state and 
students include financial aid fraud, when students defraud the government on their 
ability to pay, and legal status, when students use educational programs to gain and 
maintain their alien status in the country. 
Rarely do media sources comment on such potentially corruptible practices as 
honoraria for invited speakers, who may also be key figures in allocating state funding 
and grants, making appointments to public offices, and having discretionary power over 
other important decisions. Here honoraria may play a role of a perfectly legal bribe. Such 
  61 
practices may constitute conflict of interest. Conflict of interest is highlighted, for 
instance, in the investigation of student loans in the US, where financial aid officers 
encourage students to borrow from certain preferred lenders, or in the discussions over 
potentially corrupt private tutoring services in the RF, where faculty members who sit on 
the admissions committees are also employed as private tutors for prospective students. 
At the same time the term of white collar crime is not used or applied in considering 
corruption in academia. 
There are reports on cases in higher education that at first appear to be clear cases 
of corruption but can hardly fall into any of the established categories and can not be 
categorized as cases of corruption. For instance, The Chronicle of Higher Education 
reports on the decision of New York University to return money received as a donation, 
because the donor is being accused of bank fraud.
28
 Accordingly, the nature of the money 
is not clear and may well be criminal. However, this case does not imply corruption on 
the side of the University, especially since it made an ethically correct decision to return 
the donation. 
Few other examples may be found in Newsu and include reports on an MGU 
student who owned and managed a brothel in Moscow and a group of ten individuals 
using a chemistry laboratory in MGU to produce illegal drugs. Neither of these cases can 
be classified as corruption in higher education, unless, for instance, as is in the latter case, 
it would be proven that the university administration was renting the laboratory to the 
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drug producers without proper control over their activities, and furthermore, bribes or 
kickbacks were paid. Similar information comes from the Minister of Science and 
Education, who suggests testing all of the students, who’s study is paid for by the state, 
for drug abuse. While pointing to a potentially large problem with usage of illegal drugs 
by students, this information does not relate directly to corruption in higher education. 
 
Comparing the findings by country 
 
As follows from media reports, some forms of corruption are region-specific 
while others are universal. Types of corruption are connected to the characteristics of the 
national systems of higher education (private, public, state). The general trend in the 
media is to reflect the growing concern about corruption in academia. In the US, more 
attention is now paid to fraud, plagiarism and cheating, while in the RF bribery in 
admissions and degree completion are in focus. The growing market of private 
educational loans in the US, which has increased tenfold over the last decade, rising from 
$1.7 billion to $17 billion, leads to different types of fraud in state-university relations. 
Fraudulent activities, in their turn, necessitate state and federal investigations. 
In the RF, where educational loans, both private and state, are in their infancy and 
legislation is not detailed, this kind of fraud is virtually non-existent. At the same time, 
the traditionally corrupt admissions process receives the lion’s share of the media’s 
attention. The admissions decisions are made by faculty and are often corrupt. Half of all 
the places in public higher education institutions are funded by the state, which creates 
enormous pressure on faculty and raises the stakes as well as incentives for corrupt 
  63 
activities. 
Access to higher education, expressed in terms of admission policies, is both 
restricted and broadened by corruption. Aspects of corruption in access to higher 
education discussed in the media in the RF and in the US are as follows. In the RF, 
students try to gain admission to a college. If they do it by illegal means, they defraud the 
university. There is no need to pay tuition in the governmentally funded programs, so the 
stakes are high. The measures to oppose prospective students defrauding the system 
include governmental control exercised through higher education institutions and law 
enforcement agencies. 
In the US media, corruption in access to higher education is not discussed directly. 
However, there is a room for corruption in admissions and some of the corrupt actions are 
discussed without using terms “corruption” or “fraud.” In the US, a large number of 
private universities, and especially fast growing private for-profit educational 
corporations, try to enroll students in their educational programs. One may find many 
cases when such higher education institutions defraud students in order to enroll them in 
the program or “to get them on board.” The stake for the universities here is clear—
students’ tuition that often comes from federal, state, and private educational loans and 
grants. There are several mechanisms in place to prevent such a fraud, including 
accreditation procedures by the regional accreditation boards and an oversight by the 
Department of Education. However, these are either voluntary or incomplete. 
Presumably, fraud takes place when: first, a prospective student is convinced by 
the university administrators, including admissions officers, that he can be successful in 
the program, while his previous academic records point to the opposite. For instance, a 
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prospective student is offered to enroll in a college program without having a high school 
diploma, or to complete “an accredited MBA program” without holding a Baccalaureate. 
Here a prospective student is defrauded. Simply put, a consumer is offered a product he 
cannot consume. The college files for financial aid for the admitted student. The student 
starts accumulating financial debt on his educational loans. When he drops out of college 
because of unsatisfactory academic performance, he carries financial debt. Second, when 
student leaves, the college continues to collect financial aid from the government. In 
essence, money is streamlined from the student to a higher education institution in form 
of tuition and fees. The money comes from governmental and private sources. This 
constitutes fraud on the side of the higher education institution. The essence of this type 
of fraud is in the following: the government offers loans not to everyone, but to those 
capable to be successful in the college; the government only offers financial aid to 
enrolled students. 
The missing link is private banks that provide educational loans. Providers of 
student loans compete for clients and try to maximize their profit by monopolizing the 
market. Collusion of banks with higher education institutions becomes almost inevitable. 
Such collusion would be inevitable even without monopolization of the educational loans 
market. The latest developments and investigations by the Attorney General of the State 
of New York confirm this. Private banks may even establish their own for-profit colleges 
through which they will issue and collect educational loans. This scheme will allow 
increasing the number of the customers. Repayment of educational loans is enforced by 
the law, i.e. banks are backed by the state. This provides guarantees to the banks-lenders. 
The risks of failures to refinance will be compensated for by the higher interest rates. 
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Quite possibly, educational loans industry will be the next largest industry after the home 
loans and mortgages. The principal distinction is that in the case of home loans, home is a 
collateral, while in the case of educational loans, education can hardly play the role of 
collateral, since human capital is by definition indivisible from an individual. 
According to news reports, corruption in admissions exists in both the RF and the 
US, but seems to be working in the opposite directions. While in the RF prospective 
students pave their way to a higher education institution with the help of bribes, in the US 
corrupt activities are oftentimes initiated from the side of a higher education institution 
that tries to attract students. Corruption in admissions takes place in the UK as well. 
Technical difficulties and numerous reported violations in the national standardized test 
lead to a biased picture of scholastic abilities of prospective students, and hence, to unfair 
or altered chances of entering higher education.
29
 
Individual corruption in the US is generally restricted to research fraud and, 
though to a lesser extent, conflict of interest and sexual misconduct. In the UK, the major 
discussion of different aspects of institutional and individual forms of corruption is 
concentrated around the ongoing reform that targets the funding of higher education. 
Other issues include the credibility of the results of national examinations that affect 
admissions decisions and the research ethics. 
In the RF, institutional corruption is discussed along with individual corruption or 
otherwise is not paid much attention. Major focus here is on bribery in admissions, 
academic process, graduation, as well as on the availability of diplomas for sale. Recent 
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introduction of the national test and test-based admission decisions brings to fore issues 
of credibility of the test results and makes the discussion of access and equity more vivid. 
There are certain aspects of corruption in each media source which are omitted. 
We think that omitted issues are country-related but not country-specific. For instance, in 
the US the discussion of institutional corruption misses the problem of diploma mills. 
This might be explained by the fact that the state does not guarantee quality of the 
degrees or the diplomas. Interestingly, the issue of diploma mills was given more 
attention in 1980s, when the federal government had conducted a series of investigations. 
Within the realm of individual corruption in US colleges, the missing aspects include 
bribery, possibly because there is not much of it in the faculty-student relations. In 
addition, many higher education institutions allow gifts for faculty members and staff as 
long as they do not represent conflict of interest. 
As opposed to the US, media sources in the RF do not reflect on such an aspect of 
institutional corruption as fraudulent practices in athletics. This may be explained by the 
fact that intercollegiate athletics is not a big business in the country and in the region. 
Also, medical services and healthcare fraud in university hospitals are absent simply 
because higher education institutions do not render medical services. In the discussion of 
individual corruption, missing aspects include research fraud, because most of the 
research is done outside the nation’s higher education institutions, within the Academy of 
Sciences (RAN); the leading universities are only involved in fundamental research 
where fraud is less common. 
There is a difference in scope—national or international—of reporting on 
corruption in higher education by specialized and non-specialized editions in each of 
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three countries. In the US, the specialized source comments on corruption in higher 
education internationally, while the non-specialized source comments nationally. The 
same is characteristic for UK sources. In the RF, the specialized edition comments 
nationally, while the non-specialized source comments internationally. The following 
explanation may be offered in this regard. The specialized sources in the US and the UK, 
i.e. The Chronicle of Higher Education and the Times Higher Education Supplement, 
respectively, focus exclusively on higher education, having their professional staff report 
on the problems of the industry. As globalization and internationalization of higher 
education develop, reports on higher education worldwide become necessary. At the 
same time, the leading nationwide news editions, including The New York Times and 
The Guardian, address mostly national higher education, as they reach out to the national 
reader. Here in-depth coverage of particular issues in higher education, especially in 
international and comparative perspectives, appears unnecessary. 
In the RF, the situation is a bit different. The quasi-specialized edition Gazeta.ru 
has but a special section devoted to education, and higher education in particular, along 
with several other sections. This may explain the lack of in-depth investigations or 
extended analytical reports. The reports are dedicated to domestic problems, omitting the 
issues of higher education in other countries. The specialized educational edition 
Uchitel’skaya Gazeta30 is focused entirely on the issues of secondary education, and 
hence is not included in the analysis. Analytical work may be found in few newly 
established journals with the focus on higher education, but these are scholarly 
publications. In a different way from Gazeta.ru, the major news media source Newsru 
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comments internationally. The secret is that this news edition often reprints brief 
informative reports that appear in the foreign media. The authorized reprints with proper 
on-line referencing are selected based on the promise of attracting the reader. These 
include reports on corruption in higher education worldwide. 
Forms of corruption in higher education in the US emphasize state-university 
relations. Fraud is oftentimes the product of the grey area in the legislation. At the same 
time issues of fraud are relatively easy to move to court since the government is involved 
and the state interests are at stake. Traditionally, in the US many issues are decided 
through the judiciary branch of the government. Accordingly, the media reports on the 
specific legal cases, withstanding from making generalizations. 
In the RF, where judiciary branch is relatively weak, most attention is paid to 
unfair admissions to governmentally funded places in public higher education institutions 
and bribery in academic process, because these are the most obvious forms of corruption. 
Bribes are presumed to have monetary form, which is traditionally least acceptable and 
not well-tolerated by the society. At the same time nepotism and cronyism are often 
overlooked, while these forms of corruption might have more presence in higher 
education and more impact on the admissions policy, than bribes. 
Cheating among students is given attention equally by the media in all three 
nations. The US and the UK sources are more concerned with plagiarism than their 
counterparts in the RF. Fraud and embezzlement in research grants is a new topic in 
Russian media, while in the US it was in focus for a few years. Problems of corruption in 
licensing and accreditation are characteristic of both the US and the RF. In the US, 
accreditation is still a voluntary process and the US Department of Education is 
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attempting to claim a higher authority in this realm. In the RF, issues of state-
administered obligatory licensing and accreditation are of high importance due to the 
development of private sector in higher education. Corruption in business-university 
relations, including pharmaceutical and high-tech industries, is mostly reflected in the US 
sources. 
In The Chronicle of Higher Education, the word corruption is applied almost 
exclusively to international educational practices. US media sources are very cautious 
about using explicit terminology as applied to the domestic problems in education, 
avoiding words corruption, bribery, and fraud. For instance, the topic of research fraud 
may be found in only one or two publications a year, while research misconduct may be 
seen in around five to ten publications a year. Corruption and fraud are routinely 
replaced with the terms misconduct and breach of integrity. At the same time reports on 
fraud related to cheating and plagiarism are plentiful. Areas of access and accreditation 
are left almost unattended. The issue of accreditation, voluntary in the US, does not pair 
with abuse, bribery, fraud, corruption, scandal, or scam. The same is true for admissions 
to colleges. 
As compared to the other media sources studied in this chapter, The Chronicle of 
Higher Education is the richest and most comprehensive source of information about 
higher education, with the largest scope of problems and issues highlighted in its reports. 
Similar to the US sources, in The Times Higher Education Supplement the term 
bribery is only applied to foreign higher education. Bribery is reported in Kyrgyzstan, 
India, Nigeria, Russia, Venezuela, Vietnam, Ukraine, and some other countries and is not 
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observed in the European Union countries, Canada, or the US.
31
 Most of the bribery in 
developing and transition economies is found in admissions to higher education. A 
certain political agenda can be traced through the publications. In Russia, bribes in 
admissions are reported, apparently based on the fact that the nation is in the process of 
introducing the standardized test that would replace entry examinations. Also, at least 
half of all the college places are funded by the government. In Belarus, according to The 
Times Higher Education Supplement’s reports, antigovernment protests by the students 
and educators, including dissidents, are most popular, pointing to the authoritarian 
political regime.
32
 The problem of diploma mills is related to the US, as Britain has its 
stakes in both issues of free trade and in accreditation. In China, fake educational 
certificates are in the focus.
33
 This may be explained by the large population and 
intensive migration, including into the US and the European Union. 
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Problems of quality control and licensing were reported for Russia as well.
34
 This 
may be explained by the fact that Russian higher education is still characterized by the 
high level of centralization and control. Nepotism is being reported in colleges in Italy, 
Spain, and the UK, as related to faculty hiring and promotion and student enrollment and 
retention. There are plenty of reports on fraud in higher education, including research 
fraud, cheating, plagiarism, and embezzlement. These reports, presented in The Times, 
highlight fraud in the UK, the US, and other countries. It appears from the British media 
sources, that most represented forms of corruption in the country’s educational system 
are cheating, plagiarism, and gift-giving. 
In general, level of comprehensiveness of the reports on corruption in higher 
education that may be found in The Times Higher Education Supplement is not as high as 
that in The Chronicle of Higher Education. 
The media reflects on three different systems with different access policies. US 
sources report corruption in higher education in the RF based on the information obtained 
from the Russian news sources, without specifying that education is free for over half of 
all students and that public funding of colleges is one of the fundamental grounds for 
corruption in admissions to exist. At the same time, US sources do not mention the 
widespread practice of private donations, gifts, and charitable contributions to 
universities that exist in the nation. Such practices are considered a norm, as they were at 
the very core of establishing higher education institutions and are not challenged as 
doubtful even now. 
Russian sources do not specify anything about the US higher education, with the 
                                                 
34
 See, for instance, Holdsworth, N. (2004). ’Quality Police’ Axe Poor Colleges. 
The Times Higher Education Supplement, 1627 (February 14), p. 12. 
  72 
information presented in the reports being very limited, partial, and highlighting major 
news points. Such partiality allows for taking reported cases of corruption out of the 
context. The analysis of different forms of corruption in the US higher education is 
absent. In the RF, when institutional corruption is mentioned, it is always paired with 
individual corruption. This contrasts with the US, because it tends to focus on 
institutional corruption. 
In the UK, where virtually all higher education is public and stakes of being 
admitted to a higher education institution are high, corruption in admissions is not 
reported, except for cheating, irregularities, and technical failures in the national test. 
This seems to be doubtful at first, because the cost of education is much higher than the 
recently increased fees. Nevertheless, it is possible, if one is to take into account a 
sufficient number of places in colleges to satisfy public demand and the role of the 
standardized test score as the only criterion in admissions decisions. 
Trends in time in each category more or less reflect the trends in the higher 
education industry. Private educational loans in the US, education fees in the UK, and 
standardized examinations in the RF are all in the news along with cases of corruption 
that accompany these changes and reforms. In general, more attention is paid to different 
aspects of corruption in the media now than it was at the beginning of the study period. 
The dynamics of reporting different aspects of corruption in the media are presented in 
Figures 1 to 5.
35
 
 
                                                 
35
 The data for 2007 were prorated at 1.33, since the real data analyzed for this 
year are for the period of January 1, 2007 to September 30, 2007. This was made under 
the assumption that the media reports are not season-related but smoothly distributed 
along the one-year period. 
  73 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Breach of contract
Ethics misconduct
Plagiarism
Cheating
Embezzlement
Fraud
Favoritism
Nepotism
Bribery, extortions
 
Figure 1. Dynamics of The Chronicle of Higher Education reports on corruption 
in higher education by phenomenon, 1998-2007 
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Figure 2. Dynamics of Gazeta.ru reports on corruption in higher education by 
phenomenon, 1998-2007 
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Figure 3. Dynamics of Newsru reports on corruption in higher education by 
phenomenon, 1998-2007 
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Figure 4. Dynamics of The Times Higher Education Supplement reports on 
corruption in higher education by phenomenon, 1998-2007 
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Figure 5. Dynamics of media reports on corruption in higher education by locus, 
1998-2007 
 
The Chronicle of Higher Education pays most attention to such phenomena as 
fraud, cheating, plagiarism, and embezzlement, with fraud being on the rise thanks, first 
of all, to the series of investigations lead by Mr. Cuomo. Among means of corruption, 
fraud is the leading type for the US, while bribes are most common means of corruption 
overseas. According to the source, most instances of corruption may be found in state-
university and student-university relations. The issue of educational credentials fraud and 
diploma mills appears to be regaining popularity, especially in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 
2007. In line with The Chronicle of Higher Education, The New York Times focuses on 
fraud as both a phenomenon and a mean of corruption, and on educational credentials. 
The Times Higher Education Supplement reports mostly cheating and nepotism 
domestically and bribery and nepotism internationally, both being connected to the issue 
of access to higher education. Many other areas where corruption may potentially exist 
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are left unattended. The Guardian points to cheating, plagiarism, and fraud, in academic 
process, research, and access to higher education. The number of reports over the last 
decade appears to be minimal. 
Gazeta.ru pays most attention to bribery, extortion, and fraud that takes place in 
academia, and may be found in admissions to higher education institutions, in academic 
process, in issuing educational credentials, and in licensing and accreditation. 
Accordingly, most of corruption is found in interactions between faculty and students and 
state and universities. The newspaper also publishes letters from the readers, including 
ones focused on different aspects of corruption in higher education. Newsru publishes 
news about corruption in higher education that mostly contains bribery in admissions. A 
more recent trend is discussing fraud linked to educational credentials and licensing and 
accreditation. Similar to Gazeta.ru, Newsru reflects on corruption in faculty-students and 
state-university relations. Increasing awareness of the public about the credentials fraud 
indicates that the public finally came to understanding that knowledge is of value, not 
certificates. 
The differences between media reports are not language-specific, i.e. English-
language media in the US and in the UK reflect on the country-specific aspects of 
corruption. The same is true for the Russian-language sources in the RF. 
It is difficult to establish a strong positive correlation between the media coverage 
of corruption in higher education in each of the three countries and the level of corruption 
perceived to be characteristic for the society. According to the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), in 2006, the RF was in 121
st
 place with the score of 2.5, and the US at 20
th
 
position with the corruption score of 7.3. The UK was least corrupt, occupying the 11
th
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position.
36
 The statistical data on corruption in higher education in the US and in the UK 
could not be found. The RF is quite unique in this sense. The scope and major forms of 
corruption in higher education reflected in the media correlate with the results of polls 
and surveys on corruption, including those conducted by the INDEM foundation.
37
 The 
data presented by INDEM indicate an increase in corruption in higher education for the 
period of 2001 to 2005. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Corruption in higher education receives good coverage in the media. The level of 
transparency is high enough to highlight the issue, its significance, scale and scope, and 
variety of forms in which it manifests itself, and inform the general public of its 
prevalence, patterns, and forms. However, the positive effect of such a high level of 
transparency and open discussion in the media on the level of corruption in higher 
education has yet to be seen. 
Corruption in higher education, and the way it is reflected in the media, appears to 
be consistent with trajectory and pace of reforms that take place in higher education 
industry in the US, the UK, and the RF. Introduction of college fees in the UK, reduction 
of governmentally funded places in the RF, and the growing significance of private 
educational loans in the US, all lead to an increase of corruption in access to higher 
                                                 
36
 Transparency International 2006. Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved from 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
37
 See Satarov, Georgy. (2006). Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, 
Trends. In G. Satarov (Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM 
Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm  
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education. 
The continuing massification of higher education with increasing enrollment rates 
in all three countries, as well as the emergence of for-profit sector, necessitate more 
control and coordination on the side of the government, educational institutions, and the 
public. Growing concerns over the quality of educational services lead to an increase in 
reporting bribery, fraud, cheating, plagiarism, diploma mills, breach of contract, and 
other forms of misconduct. The processes of internationalization and globalization of 
higher education put an emphasis on such aspects of corruption as credentials fraud and 
research fraud. 
Socio-economic context of educational reforms and changes in each country 
leaves its print on major forms of corruption in higher education. For instance, in the RF, 
economic transition and sharp decline in salaries of college faculty lead to an increase in 
bribery and nepotism. In the US, growing competition between higher education 
institutions leads to an increase in fraud associated with student financial aid. 
Lastly, growing levels of transparency and information flow lead to a better 
understanding of different forms of corruption and its scope and scale. The media plays a 
primary role in highlighting the issue. However, media reports are focused on corruption 
per se, and often on its causes, but do not offer solutions or ways in which the public can 
resist corruption. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
GREY AREAS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: 
ILLEGALITY VERSUS CORRUPTION 
 
Introduction 
 
Corruption in higher education has long been neglected as an area of research in 
the US. One reason for this might be that the relative scarcity of prosecuted cases has 
made it at first appearance not a large problem in the nation’s higher education, not 
significant enough from the researchers’ standpoint to be paid much attention. Another 
explanation for this is that the all of the scholars attended higher education institutions 
and most of them teach in colleges and universities. The sense of belonging and close 
affiliation may prevent from involving in research of academic corruption. 
Also, scholars as well as the media are overly cautious about the language of 
investigations and usage of such explicit legal terms as corruption, bribery, fraud, 
replacing them with such terms as misconduct and breach of integrity. Finally, definition 
of education corruption itself is still vague and undeveloped. This creates uncertainty in 
the subject matter of the prospective research, approaches to be applied, and 
methodologies to be employed. The limits of the object of the research, i.e. the locus, also 
remain unclear for those who would want to venture to study corruption in higher 
education. The major task of this chapter is to address the question: How is corruption in 
higher education understood and defined in legal cases, what particular cases receive 
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more attention, and how these cases correlate with the major educational reforms, 
changes, and socio-economic context in the nation? Specifically, it analyses records of 
selected legal cases devoted to corruption in higher education. 
 
Legality versus corruptibility 
 
It might be useful to start the endeavor of defining corruption in higher education 
with the legal definition of corruption as presented in the US federal laws. Similar to 
scholarly publications, in legislation most of the attention is paid to political corruption.
1
 
In general, on the federal level, aside the political corruption, one may find more 
concerns with foreign corrupt practices than with domestic ones. These include The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq.) The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act is a United States federal law known primarily for two of its main 
provisions, one that addresses accounting transparency requirements under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and another concerning bribery of foreign officials, and 
International anticorruption and good governance provisions.
2
 The Act was amended in 
1998 by the International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998 which was designed to implement the 
anti-bribery conventions of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
                                                 
1
 See references to political corruption “Section 610 of the Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act makes it a crime for a corporation or a labor union to make a 
‘…contribution or expenditure in connection with…’ federal elections.” Reference to 
United States vs. International Union of Automobile Workers, CIO, 352 US, 567, 575, 
(1957). Federal Corrupt Practices Act. Comments. Constitutionality of section 610 of the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act. California Law Review, 4693), p. 439). The Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act §602, 18. In United States Code Service: lawyers edition. General 
Index A-C, USCS. Bribery and graft, p. 879 
2
 United States Code Service: Lawyers Edition. General Index A-C, USCS. 
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Development (OECD). There are also Consumer and Borrower Protection regulations in 
the federal legislation, but they do not fill the gap between the legal regulations and a 
common sense understanding of corruption. This explains the presence of grey areas in 
the field of corruption that are left unattended. Different related laws may apply to 
different crimes or misdeeds, but precedents have to be made, corruptibility has to be 
established, and terminology has to be further developed. 
The term most associated with corruption is bribery. Bribery signifies the 
phenomenon itself and the act of corruption, while bribe denotes the mean of exchange. 
USCS, when presents definition of corruption, primarily refers to Bribery and Graft 
section.
3
 Corruption is conventionally understood as indivisible from the public sector, 
requiring a public official to be a primary object of bribery. 
According to §201 of the USCS, bribery of public officials and witnesses, the 
term “public official” means Member of Congress, delegate, or resident Commissioner, 
either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee or person 
acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of 
Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or 
by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror. This 
also includes a “person who has been selected to be a public official.”4 
A corrupt public official “directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, 
receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any 
                                                 
3
 United States Code Service: Lawyers Edition. General Index A-C, USCS. 
Bribery and Graft section, p. 578. 
4
 United States Code Service: Lawyers Edition. Crimes and Criminal Procedures 
§§1-430. Title 18 USCS. Chapter 11. Bribery, Graft, and Conflicts of Interest, pp. 278-
279. 
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other person or entity in return for: (A) being influenced in his the performance of any 
official act; (B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to collude in, or 
allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United 
States, or; (C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of 
such official or person.”5 A corrupt public official is a recipient in a corrupt transaction. 
Donor, or bribe-giver, is “whoever directly or indirectly, corruptly gives offers, or 
promises anything of value to any public official…”6 
The legal structure that operates in the realm of bribery and corruption appears to 
be over-simplistic--there are bribe givers and bribe receivers. However, complexities 
come in when particular legal cases are considered and judged on, especially those 
involving large organizations and systemic abuse of public office. There are too many 
nuances, such as “had authority,” “did not have authority,” “accepted without an intent to 
change his opinion,” “gave gift without an intent to influence the discretion or change the 
decision,” etc. 
Broader conceptual understanding of corruption is needed. Legality and 
corruptibility may be dominating characteristics of a corrupt agreement. Corruptibility 
denotes possibilities for abuse and vulnerability of the system overall, while legality 
implies certain laws set by the public through the state or the ruling regime. The issue of 
legality versus corruptibility is appealing in the sense that it positions intents, possibilities, 
opportunities, mere expectations, and public trust against such specific terms as public 
office, size of a bribe, fact of bribery, etc. 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., p. 279. 
6
 Ibid., p. 279. 
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Arora (1993) singles out four perspectives on corruption, including legal, 
historico-cultural, public interest, and market-centered approaches. Hodgkinson (1997) 
notes that “According to Arora, the main advantage of adopting a legal perspective on 
corruption is that it ‘…enables an agreement over the definition and … scope of its study’ 
(1993:2). It therefore involves defining corruption in terms of behaviour which deviates 
from the legal norms of public office.” 
Hodgkinson (1997) presents a review of conceptual approaches to the issue of 
corruption, outlines primary and secondary corruption, and points to the weaknesses and 
possible pitfalls of marketisation in public services. Hodgkinson (1997, p. 18) suggests 
that “The attempt to model public service organizations on private enterprise is meant to 
align the former with a changed socio-economic environment. The basic premise being 
that the success of the private sector model can be replicated in the public services. 
Marketisation has therefore involved a movement from ‘budgetary’ to ‘for-profit’ 
organizations.” 
Legal perspective appears to be one of the accepted forms of approaching 
corruption. Arora (1993, p. 2) points out that legal perspective “…enables an agreement 
over the definition and …the scope of its study.” In addition to legal perspective, there 
might be numerous other perspectives employed, including historic, cultural, public 
interest, and market-centered perspective. Another approach anticipates possible 
conceptual frames based on legal, economic, social, moral, and ethical responsibilities. 
As applied to higher education, a legal lens uses the set-out laws and regulations 
that project on complex processes occurring in the education sector in order to sort out 
legal and illegal ones. The economic responsibility anticipates compliance with mutually 
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accepted economic obligations under which violations of such obligations are considered 
a breach of contract. Reduced class time, increased class size, absence of office hours 
held by faculty members, and unfavorable lending terms and conditions on educational 
loans may be considered a breach of contract. While not necessarily specified in laws and 
legal provisions for higher education, such practices may be interpreted as a violation of 
economic responsibility. 
The social responsibility frame is even more complex than legal and economic 
responsibility frames. The social responsibility frame anticipates that higher education 
institution adheres to all legal and economic obligations and, in addition, performs its 
societal duties. Educational, research, cultural, and other considerations are taken into 
account. The social responsibility frame views higher education institution as an 
organization that conducts responsible research for the betterment of the society, educates 
members of the society in accordance with the best standards available, and disseminates 
knowledge to those who are in need of it. Monetary transactions and the financial 
prosperity of an institution of higher learning are secondary in such cases. This approach 
is also known as a better service for public good that increases total social welfare of the 
society. 
Finally, the moral or ethical responsibility is meant to move higher education 
institution to prioritize the issue of equity over the issue of quality, and quality over 
access. If under the economic responsibility frame, a university sets its admission criteria 
and regulates quality of educational services offered based on demand and supply on the 
education market, ethical responsibility anticipates equality in access to education and the 
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provision of highest quality educational services under the conditions of maximizing the 
position of learners and the society overall rather than of profit maximization. 
While ethical, social, and economic frames are more universalistic, the legal 
responsibility frame is clearly nation-specific. On the one hand, economic structures in 
the education sector vary country by country and can be assigned to a few basic models; 
on the other hand, legal perspective can allow for some future perspective rather than 
simple comparisons. Experiences of other nations and comparative perspective as applied 
to higher education corruption are of little help. The US higher education system is 
unique in the way it is organized and funded. 
The US higher education sector may be described as decentralized, market-
oriented, and autonomous. Other developed nations, including the European Union, have 
centralized higher education sectors that may be characterized by weak links with 
businesses and slowly emerging market-like practices. Educational loans are not common 
in the developed nations. Hence, national legislations do not reflect such practices. The 
process of commoditization of higher education in the US continues, while in Europe it 
only emerges. 
We consider corruption to be broader than it is defined in legal cases. At the same 
time we use the level of legal responsibility from the set of legal, economic, social, moral 
or ethical responsibilities to qualify deeds as corrupt. But even this approach does not 
cover all the areas. There are so-called grey areas that may be judged as corrupt yet still 
not illegal. Norms of contractual behavior accepted by the society go ahead of legislation. 
The series of investigations launched by the Attorney General of New York, Mr. Cuomo, 
is a classical example of grey area application. It leads to new, more precise, more 
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specific, contextual interpretation of existing laws, and results in new provisions, 
regulations, and codes of conduct. 
National laws differ and legality and illegality are not universal. Accordingly, 
there might be not one universal definition of corruption in higher education that would 
apply equally well to different national systems in different historical periods. Granting 
access to publicly funded higher education on any premise other than academic merit is 
equated to corruption. Access to higher education in exchange for a bribe is deemed to be 
corrupt. In the decentralized market-based systems of higher education, gaining access to 
educational services in exchange for payments is a norm. Depending on the system and 
legal frameworks laid in the society, certain forms of funding, modes of operation, 
patterns of behavior, and standards of conduct in higher education may be considered 
corrupt or non-corrupt. Corruption in higher education is time and place specific and may 
be found in public and private higher education institutions. 
This chapter uses operational definition of corruption in higher education as a 
system of informal relations established to regulate unsanctioned access to material and 
nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office of public or corporate trust. In this sense, 
corruption in higher education anticipates abuse of public trust by certain participating 
groups or individuals-participants of educational process in a broad sense, and processes, 
closely related to educational process, such as research, selection of students, funding, 
use of public property etc. To summarize, this chapter considers corruption as it implies 
illegality or a precedent and at the same time does not limit its area of investigation by 
the legal definition of corruption only. 
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Corruption as a grey area 
 
A grey area is a term used to mark things that are unclearly defined, a border that 
is hard or even impossible to define, or a definition where the dividing line tends to shift. 
A grey area of definitions signifies a problem of sorting reality into clearly cut categories. 
A grey area in legal terms is an area where no clear legislation or precedent exists. It is 
also not clear whether the existing rules are applicable to specific cases and to what 
extent. A grey area of legislature as applied to particular industries, sectors, market 
segments, or areas of social life signifies an ethical dilemma, where the border between 
corrupt and non-corrupt activities is vague. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) use the term “grey area” in addressing economics of 
corruption. Kaufmann and Vicente (2005, p.3) propose “a new explicitly micro-founded 
definition of corruption: it is viewed as a collusive agreement between a part of the 
agents of the economy who, as a consequence, are able to swap (over time; we present a 
repeated game) in terms of positions of power (i.e. are able to capture, together, the 
allocation process of the economy). This is the idea underlying high-level corruption or 
‘influence’, and is broader than the notion of bribery, which corresponds to a particular 
sharing pattern of the joint payoff from the referred relationship.” 
The challenge to the domain of bribery in the issues of corruption, however, does 
not eliminate grey areas that exist in both legislation and scholarly work. Grey areas in 
legal scholarship and in economics project on legislation and the national economy, 
respectively, and overlap. Tax evasion and fraud as key characteristics of shadow or 
unofficial economy are good examples of such an overlap. 
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Petrov and Temple (2004) comment that “we find unconvincing the proposition 
that there exists a continuum from ‘honest’ to ‘corrupt’ behaviour. Such a continuum 
implies a ‘grey area’. The example given at a recent conference on corruption in 
education of such a ‘grey area’ was the practice of some US universities of giving the 
children of alumni preference in admission procedures. This example simply adds to our 
doubts about the ‘continuum’ notion: one may judge this to be an undesirable way of 
managing university admissions, but a stated institutional policy, presumably adopted 
with the intention of in some sense benefiting the institution as a whole, cannot, we 
suggest, sensibly be classified as corrupt.”7 
Clearly, Petrov and Temple are against the notion of grey area. This chapter 
agrees with the notion of legality and illegality as applied to the problem of corruption, 
yet considers necessary to accept the fact that not all types of corrupt activities or forms 
of corruption are embedded in the national legislations. Furthermore, the legal lens is 
perfectly applicable to corruption in education, but not sufficient to understand and 
reflect on the complexity of the issue. The broad scope of the problem explains the 
vagueness of its borders. 
The legal frame, however, has its limitations. In Hodgkinson’s (1997, p. 19) view, 
“A legal perspective would negate the possibility of investigating a change in the nature 
of corruption.” To substantiate this view, Hodgkinson refers to Arora (1993, p. 2), who 
points out that legal frame would not “…allow looking into actions or inactions which 
corruption laws do not cover, yet which need to be included. In fact, corruption laws and 
                                                 
7
 In their critique of the grey area notion, Petrov and Temple refer to Hallak, J., & 
Poisson, M. (2002). Ethics and Corruption in Education. Results from the Expert 
Workshop held at the IIEP. Paris, November 2001. Paris: IIEP-UNESCO. 
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gaps in these may themselves be an object of corruption in some systems; yet legal 
perspective will not deal with such actions or inactions, for law permits their exclusion.” 
Change is not the only challenge to the legal approach. The use of terminology sets 
certain limits as well. 
The term “white collar crime” was coined by Edwin Sutherland at the American 
Sociological Society meeting in 1939. Sutherland defined the term as “crime committed 
by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.”8 
White collar crime anticipates high skills of a criminal and sophistication of the criminal 
act. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has adopted the narrow approach, defining 
white-collar crime: “...as those illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, 
concealment, or violation of trust and which are not dependent upon the application or 
threat of physical force or violence.”9 According to the FBI white collar crime is 
estimated to cost the United States more than $300 billion annually.
10
 
White collar crime does not contradict the definition of corruption and can be 
linked to corruption through the legal concept of commercial bribery. People tend to use 
area-specific stamps, such as corporate fraud, political graft, abuse of public property, 
embezzlement from state funds, breach of academic integrity, etc. Accordingly, white 
collar crime is attached to the corporate world, embezzlement and fraud to the public 
sector, student cheating and plagiarism to the world of academia, and research fraud to 
think tanks. This type of heuristics prevents one from considering the many instances of 
                                                 
8
 Sutherland, Edwin (1949). White Collar Crime. New York: Dryden Press. 
9
 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1989). White 
Collar Crime: A Report to the Public. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. p. 
3. 
10
 Legal Information Institute. Cornell University Law School. Retrieved October 
15, 2007, from http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/White-collar_crime 
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corruption that take place in the education sector. Media reports and the results of 
investigations indicate that all of those forms of misconduct are common in higher 
education. 
 
Selection criteria for legal cases 
 
The cases of corruption in higher education considered in US courts include fraud 
in educational loans, quality of educational programs, credentials, credentials evaluation 
and accreditation, attempts to monopolize discretion over the admissions decisions, 
collusion, embezzlement, research misconduct, and fraud.
11
 
This chapter uses the following selection criteria for choosing legal cases for 
consideration: degree of corruption, level of explicitness, scale and scope, significance, 
precedent, level of publicity, total funds at stake, and future prospects, including both 
domestic and international applications. Specifically, it focuses on cases that take place in 
higher education, positioned in so-called grey area or uncharted waters of legislation, yet 
may be highly explicit and deemed inappropriate or unethical, and significant and 
promising in terms of their scale and scope. They may become a precedent in legal 
practice as related to domestic laws applied to the US higher education sector. 
At the same time, this study extends its reach in two critically important directions. 
First, it overcomes conventionally imposed limitation on cases of corruption as occurring 
in the public sector only. Second, it considers cases where higher education institutions 
                                                 
11
 See court cases and decisions at West’s Federal Practice Digest 4th, 18A and 
18B, Colleges and Universities, St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1999; and West’s Federal 
Practice Digest 4
th
, 18B, Colleges and Universities, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part. St. 
Paul, MN: West Group, 2007. 
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interact with both the state and private for profit entities. The heavy involvement of state 
and federal funds along with state and federal regulations attached to funding, as well as 
the state interests in higher education in a broader sense form the bridge that connects the 
public and private sectors. This permits an analysis of corruption independently from the 
form of property of a given higher education institution. 
This chapter considers corruption in higher education through the legal cases, 
following publications, legal records, and court cases in the United States (US). The 
major focus is on the few selected cases of corruption in US higher education. Some of 
these cases are broadly publicized in the media and discussed in scholarly literature.
12
 
Others are only briefly mentioned in the specialized media sources that focus on 
problems of higher education, even though they may represent a legal precedent with a 
potentially large future impact on the industry.
13
 They are significant and affect large 
number of higher education institutions and constituents, including educators, students, 
parents, and general public. The legal cases to be analyzed are at the core of the 
development and the reform of higher education industry. They reflect processes of 
decentralization, commercialization, and marketization of higher education along with 
the processes of coordination, quality assurance, and state control in the industry. 
This research carries certain limitations, which are expressed in the set selection 
criteria. The selection criteria restrict the study to significant cases of corruption in higher 
education, and hence preserve the high degree of relevance of the conducted research, 
                                                 
12
 See, for instance, the price fixing investigation of the so-called Overlap group 
in 1991, reflected in some scholarly work, including Sykes, Carol. (1988). ProfScam: 
Professors and The Demise of Higher Education. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway. 
13
 See, for instance, Van Der Werf, M. (2006, August 6). Lawsuit U. The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, 52(48), p. A23. 
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while at the same time maintaining a reasonable level of abstraction in order to purify the 
legal cases and focus on their essence. For instance, if the United States Code Service 
(USCS)
14
 reports on a case of embezzlement of public funds, committed by an 
administrative staff member in a public higher education institution, this case will not be 
considered in this study. First of all, embezzlement is not limited to the higher education 
sector. This practice is not distinct but rather common for all the industries, including 
both public and private sectors. Second, the case of embezzlement is clear and is 
therefore not worthy of study. However, the way the court determined whether the case 
should be considered under the corruption law may be of interest, as it implies problem of 
definitions. 
In a case where a university administrator and a custodian or subcontractor collide 
in order to unlawfully benefit from a certain operation, a court will only consider the case 
if the net benefit obtained in an illegal way sums up to five thousand dollars or higher. If, 
however, the net benefit will be lesser than five thousand dollars, the state statutes on 
corruption will not apply. Hence, if a public university overpaid a private contractor for 
the services rendered as a result of improper collusion between the administrator and 
subcontractor, the court will focus on the sum of the immediate damage. 
This study tends to focus on the nature and the essence of a particular misdeed, 
rather than on the net benefit and the appropriate statutory limitations that may apply, 
depending on the state legislation. Simply put, for the court, the issue is both illegality 
and the size of illegally obtained benefit, while for this study the case of corruption exists 
no matter whether the total benefit was less than five thousand dollars or more than five 
                                                 
14
 United States Code Service: Lawyers Edition. Crimes and Criminal Procedures 
§§1-430. Title 18 USCS. 
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thousand dollars. In addition, if an alleged collusion took place between relatives, then 
this study would classify such a case as an example of embezzlement, nepotism, and 
committed fraud. Another limitation is concerned with clear cases of corruption. In such 
cases, no additional research is needed to establish the case of corruption, since it was 
already established by the court. 
 
Legal cases: description and essence 
 
Major cases under the False Claims Act include US versus University of Phoenix, 
US versus Oakland City University, and US versus Chapman University. In the case of 
University of Phoenix, the complaint says that the institution certified that it was in 
compliance with all the US Department of Education regulations when it paid recruiters 
based on how many applicants they enrolled. This constitutes a direct violation of the law. 
The complaint was dismissed in US District Court in Sacramento and is now on appeal at 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Similar to University of Phoenix, Oakland City University is accused of violating 
the False Claims Act. The case is considered a precedent because the Seventh Circuit of 
the US Court of Appeals ruled that the university knew it was illegal to pay recruiters and 
deceived the US Department of Education in order to obtain a certification of eligibility 
to receive federal funds. 
In the case of Chapman University, the complaint says that the institution, as part 
of the accreditation process, certified that it was giving the required amount of classroom 
instruction in its academic programs, when it was not. If it had revealed the truth, the 
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complaint alleges, Chapman would not have been accredited and would be ineligible to 
receive federal grants and student loans. The case is active before US District Court in 
Santa Ana, CA, because the judge denied a motion to dismiss it. 
One of the most interesting legal cases that has developed over the last twelve 
months, starting in February of 2007, is a set of investigations launched by the Attorney 
General of the State of New York, Mr. Cuomo, that looks into educational lending 
practices and other related issues. The investigation discovers possible misdeeds in the 
link between numerous colleges and universities and businesses. In addition, other abuses 
of students as consumers, such as false advertisements in study abroad programs, have 
also become objects for investigation. 
New York has a rich history of corruption. This may be explained in part by the 
presence of a large diverse mega-polis, New York City, and a large public sector, 
including public education. Large scale public projects and social programs, such as 
education, healthcare, public housing, transportation, utilities, and such, significant 
financial flows and monetary transactions, complexity of the system of public and private 
contractors and subcontractors, large bureaucratic apparatus, and complex relations 
between the state and the private sector create an ideal environment for corruption. As the 
result, there is a relatively well developed and detailed legislation on corruption, bribery, 
graft, and fraud in New York State as compared to other states. Numerous precedents and 
cases decided in state courts present an opportunity to research corruption in higher 
education in the legal context. 
The Attorney General has been leading an ongoing investigation into the student 
loan industry. He requested information from more than sixty public and private colleges 
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and universities nationwide regarding the standards they use to determine which lending 
companies are included on their “preferred lender” lists. Financial aid administrators 
often produce such lists to direct their students toward the lenders that are most preferred 
by the schools but may not offer the best deals for students and parents. 
The Attorney General’s Office plans to file a law suit against Education Finance 
Partners (EFP), a student loan lender that operates in the growing industry educational 
loans.
15
 Investigations conducted by Mr. Cuomo revealed the existence of specific 
arrangements between the EFP and over sixty colleges and universities, including 
Fordham University, Long Island University, St. John’s University, Boston University, 
Clemson University, and Baylor University. A formal notice has been issued to the EFP 
that the Attorney General’s office will be filing suit over deceptive practices in the 
company’s student loan business. The suit is the first filed in a nationwide investigation 
into the college loan industry. Specifically, the EFP was accused of paying kickbacks to 
colleges and universities that consistently placed the company on the preferred loan 
providers list. 
The initial investigation conducted by the Attorney General has revealed that 
“Education Finance Partners has repeatedly paid schools in exchange for steering loans to 
EFP and for putting EFP on ‘preferred lender’ lists. Approximately 90% of students 
choose their lenders from their school’s preferred lender lists. Cuomo’s investigation has 
uncovered that neither the schools nor EFP adequately disclose to students that EFP is 
paying the schools to be promoted as a ‘preferred lender.’ Cuomo’s legal action alleges 
that the relationship and financial arrangements between EFP and the schools constitute a 
                                                 
15
 See Appendix A, Notice of intention to sue. 
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deceptive business practice. Cuomo also revealed today that EFP made its financial 
kickback arrangements with schools through what are called revenue sharing agreements, 
which often were based on a tiered system that would give a higher percentage to the 
schools based on the amount of loans referred.”16 
The arrangement of rewarding colleges by the lender that can mount to the 
practice of paying kickbacks resulted in potentially large amounts of money paid by the 
EFP to universities participating in the preferred lender program. For example, the EFP’s 
agreement with Duquesne University gives the school 60 basis points, i.e. 0.6 percent of 
the net value of all referred loans. The agreements are structured to encourage the schools 
to refer as much business as possible to the EFP. For example, the EFP’s agreement with 
Boston University provides that Boston University will receive 25 basis points or 0.25 
percent of the net value of referred loans of at least $1,000,000 up to $5,000,000; 50 basis 
points or 0.5 percent of value of referred loans between $5,000,000 and $10,000,000; and 
75 basis points or 0.75 percent of the net value of referred loans over $10,000,000.
17
 
Mr. Cuomo accuses that some schools, such as Drexel University in Philadelphia, 
received over $100,000 in kickbacks from the EFP in a single year. Under Drexel’s 
agreement with the EFP, dated April 1, 2006, Drexel has agreed to make the EFP its 
“sole preferred private loan provider.” In return, the EFP has agreed that Drexel will 
receive 75 basis points (.75 percent) of the net value of referred loans between $1 and 
$24,999,999; and 100 basis point (1 percent) of all loan amounts of $25,000,000 or 
greater. Furthermore, the Attorney general alleges that the EFP engaged in deceptive 
                                                 
16
 Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announces first legal action in college loan 
industry investigation (March 22, 2007). Retrieved from 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2007/mar/mar22b_07.html 
17
 Ibid. 
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marketing practices by using schools’ logos, mascots, and names in the EFP promotional 
materials to imply that the EFP had the school’s official endorsement: “EFP’s marketing 
practices were clearly intended to imply that the universities had endorsed EFP loan 
products for individual student borrowers. Deceptive marketing is just that and it limits 
the information available for students to get the best deal in their college loans.”18 
The named cases are clear candidates for legal precedents, insofar as these cases 
reflect on deeds that take place in higher education and positioned in grey areas. Such 
cases await legal interpretations that will likely be influenced by a socio-economic 
context rather than by previous precedents in similar circumstances alone. The summary 
of the reviewed cases is presented in Table 3. 
 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 
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Table 3 
Cases on the grounds of the False Claims Act, Consumer Protection Act, Higher Education Act, and Anti-Trust Laws after 2000 
 
University Plaintiff Ground Date filed Date settled Settlement  
(in millions) 
Allegations Essence 
Total Plaintiff 
University of Phoenix, 
Apollo Group 
Former employees 
(two admissions 
officers) 
False Claims 
Act 
Mar. 2003 Dec. 2009 $78.5 $28.0 Incentive pay 
for recruitment 
state and 
consumer 
fraud 
Oakland City University 
 
Former employee 
(one director of 
admissions) 
False Claims 
Act 
Mar. 2003 July 2007 $5.3 $1.4 Incentive pay 
for recruitment 
state and 
consumer 
fraud 
Chapman University 
 
Former employees 
(three instructors) 
False Claims 
Act 
Mar. 2005 pending - - Insufficient 
instruction 
time 
state and 
consumer 
fraud 
Corinthian Colleges Inc. 
 
State on behalf of 
consumers, (class-
action) 
Consumer 
Protection 
Act 
 July 2007 $6.5 $5.8 False 
advertising, 
unfair business 
practices 
consumer 
fraud 
Education Finance 
Partners 
(private student loan 
provider) 
State on behalf of 
consumers, (class-
action) 
Higher 
Education 
Act, Anti-
Trust 
Mar. 2007 Apr. 2007 $2.0 $0 Preferred 
student loan 
providers list 
consumer 
fraud, 
kickback 
Dozens of public, private, 
and private for-profit 
colleges; a dozen private 
student loan providers 
State on behalf of 
consumers, (class-
action) 
Higher 
Education 
Act, Anti-
Trust 
Mar. 2007 Feb. 2008 $14.0 $0 Preferred 
student loan 
providers list 
consumer 
fraud, 
kickback 
Source: Completed by the author 
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Analysis and discussion: legal cases in the context 
 
The analysis and the discussion of legal cases presented in this study seek to 
answer the following questions. First, what is in the essence of each case? What are the 
underlying interests of groups involved, including consumers of educational services, 
providers of educational services, regulatory authorities, legislators, and the state in 
general? Second, is the case new or there were earlier precedents or attempts to create a 
precedent on a similar case? Third, are there new ways to interpret old rules and laws that 
are used in the case? Fourth, how is the case positioned in the context of educational 
reforms and socio-economic processes in the society in general? This study addresses 
sequences of events or cases, existing established and possible ties, common 
fundamentals for different or similar cases, socio-economic context, trends in the 
education industry, and processes of modernization and reform in the society. 
There is also an additional set of questions that may be addressed in the analysis 
and the discussion. This additional set includes the following major questions. First, what 
is the degree and direction of the governmental interference in each of the cases? Here, 
we attempt to consider the government in a broader sense than just a legislative branch 
that includes prosecutors and the court system. Second, what are the possible future 
implications of the processes, cases, and legal decisions made? Are there any spillovers 
or potential for spillovers on other national educational system? Broader spillovers on the 
European Union and the developing nations may be possible. Third, do the findings 
support our definition of corruption in higher education? 
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The case of the US versus University of Phoenix in 2006 points to the federal 
funds received by the University in form of student aid. The University might have been 
ineligible because of the non-compliance with the certain federal laws and regulations. 
The case is being developed on the ground of the False Claims Act and anticipates 
possible fraud in state-university relations. Chapman University received federal funds in 
form of student aid, but might have been ineligible as well. The major challenge in the 
case considered in 2006 was the instruction time necessary to receive credit hours. As a 
result, students might have been defrauded because of the insufficient instruction time 
and the state was defrauded as well. 
Possible corruption takes place in student-university relations and in state-
university relations. The State of New York Attorney General launched an investigation 
in 2007 to discover some doubtful practices with lists of preferred providers of student 
loans, administered by colleges’ financial aid officers. The case points to possible 
attempts to establish near-monopoly and to defraud students on the local markets of 
educational loans. The case involves state-university relations and student-university 
relations. The government conducted the investigation on the basis of students being 
defrauded and guided to more expensive loans by college administrators. 
Cases built on the ground of anti-trust regulation have been considered before. 
One of the major cases that attempted to establish possible corruption in admissions 
involved MIT and a number of other Ivy League colleges in 1990. The colleges were 
making agreements prior to admitting graduate students in order to reduce the total cost 
of the offerings in form of scholarships and financial aid. This implies monopoly in 
admissions, collusion, and consumer fraud. The colleges admitted wrongdoing and 
  101 
stopped the practice, while MIT won on appeal, pointing to its non-profit status. Another 
broadly publicized case of 1985 involved Stanford University and later few other colleges. 
The major consideration here was overhead payments of up to 74 cents on every $1 
received in form of federal grants as well as the ways in which some of the federal 
research money were spent.
1
 The case implied possible fraud in state-university relations. 
It is within the Attorney General’s purview to prosecute cases that imply monopolistic 
agreements.
2
 
A number of cases involving diploma mills included state-university relations, 
consumer-university relations, and degree holder-employer relations. Cases of 
educational quality fraud involve consumers or students, providers or colleges, and 
accreditation agencies. Research fraud involves the state as the major source of funding, 
while the medical fraud committed in university hospitals involves patients and insurance 
companies. 
The cases of corruption in higher education selected for this study include the 
most recent developments in college funding, including ties between colleges and the 
educational loans industry. The investigation was initiated by the Attorney General of the 
State of New York Mr. Cuomo and followed by another twenty seven states throughout 
the country. Two other cases based on the False Claims Act include a for-profit 
                                                 
1
 Anderson, Martin. (1992). Impostors in the Temple: American Intellectuals Are 
Destroying Our Universities and Cheating Our Students of Their Future. New York: 
Simon and Schuster. 
2
 The attorney general had power to prosecute for offences committed as part of 
the means, plan, or scheme by which violations of §340, prohibiting monopolies were 
effected, and any criminal act done in furtherance of a violation of such section was 
subject to investigation and prosecution by the attorney general. People v. Dorsey, 1941, 
176 Misc. 932, 29 N.Y.S.2d 637. McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York 
Annotated. Book 19. General Business Law. Thomson West. 2004. p. 318. 
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educational institution based in California that was accused by the state of defrauding its 
students, playing on the mismatch between students’ financial aid and academic abilities 
and the case with the University of Phoenix. In the first case, there was a settlement 
achieved and the university ultimately agreed to a settlement of $6.5 million in 
restitutions, penalties, fines, and compensatory payments, while the second case is still 
under review. 
The recent scandals of university financial aid officers, preferred educational loan 
providers list, and possible kickbacks were highlighted in several issues of The Chronicle 
of Higher Education in April-August 2007, can be analyzed through the proposed 
classification frame. This will help to understand whether the cases represent corruption 
of higher education and what is in the essence of each case. In cases investigated by the 
State Attorney General Mr. Cuomo, financial aid officers suggested a particular private 
bank-lender to students. The bank may not have the best offerings for the students and 
would be ruled out otherwise. The non-competitive bank loan offers attract clients. This 
may constitute fraud. And fraud is a phenomenon of corruption. The next question is 
whether this is an intentional fraud or it is a result of negligence or incompetence. 
Intentional fraud takes place if financial aid officers commit it in expectation of 
personal or material gain. Material gain can come through holding shares in the bank 
placed on the preferred loans provider list and through receiving kickbacks in the form of 
consultation fees, gifts, etc. Accordingly, the means of corruption are kickbacks. Banks 
might pay kickbacks deceptively worded as “referral affiliate benefit packages” to 
colleges’ financial aid officers in the form of gifts, meals, accommodations, consulting 
fees, travel expenses, registration fees, tuition waivers, and shares of the lending 
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agencies. Being on the preference lender list increases the profitability of the bank, the 
profitability of the shares, and, hence, the revenue of the shareholders. Such practices 
raise several questions: Does this represent clear conflict of interest? Is this illegal? Is this 
against the university rules? Are such practices transparent? What rules are established 
and by whom? 
The locus of corrupt activities in this case includes access to higher education and 
possible breach of contract. The area primarily affected is access to higher education 
since loans are intended to fund the studies. Educational loans provided on non-
competitive ground or not the best possible terms and conditions reduce the degree of 
accessibility of higher education, increase student debt, and eventually lead to the 
withdrawal of more competitive providers from the market. The practice of having a list 
of preferential loan providers may also constitute a breach of contract between the 
student and the university. This is only possible if universities are under the obligation to 
provide their current and prospective students with the best possible options in terms of 
educational loans, both private and public. 
The possibly corrupt interactions in the presented case include: business-
university relations with possible collusion between banks-providers of educational loans 
and universities or admissions officers; relations between students and college 
administration, where administrators commit possible fraud by presenting students with 
the preferred lenders list; and, finally, interactions between the state and higher education 
institutions, including the investigation conducted and out-of-court settlements achieved, 
as well as restitutions and voluntary acceptance of the code of conduct set by the state for 
the future. 
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Legal argumentation 
 
Definitions of bribery are arguable. One of the issues that may be raised in 
connection with alleged kickbacks to particular college financial aid officers may be 
loans and tuition waivers that they received from for-profit providers of educational loans. 
People versus Hyde case of 1913 in the State of New York dismissed the charges of 
corruption on the ground that the fact of obtaining a loan itself does not constitute 
corruption unless the direct benefit to the loan receiver is proven.
3
 
The definitions of bribery are structured so to address donor and recipient issues 
or, as they are called in legal documents, bribe receivers and bribe givers. Bribe giving 
and bribe receiving can be of first, second, and third degree and constitute three different 
classes of felonies, accordingly. As related to bribe giver, §200.00 of the Consolidated 
Laws of New York states that “A person is guilty in the third degree when he confers, or 
offers or agrees to confer, any benefit upon a public servant upon an agreement or 
understanding that such public servant’s vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or 
exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced.”4 As related to bribe 
                                                 
3
 “In order to constitute bribery within the meaning of former Penal Law 1909, 
§372 [now this section], it must be shown that the officer received some personal 
advantage, pecuniary or otherwise, that influenced his action or decision, and the fact that 
a city chamberlain received a loan in consideration for depositing moneys of the city in a 
certain bank does not constitute bribery in the absence of proof that the loan was in fact 
an advantage to him.” People v. Hyde (1 dept. 1913) 156 A.D. 618, 141 N.Y.S. 1089. 
McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated with Practice Commentaries by 
William C. Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 219.end. West Group, 1999, p. 278. 
4
 McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated with Practice 
Commentaries by William C. Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 219.end. West Group, 1999. 
p. 259. Article 200. Bribery involving public servants and related offences, p. 267. 
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receiver, §200.10 states that “A public servant is guilty of bribe receiving in the third 
degree when he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon 
an agreement or understanding that his vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or 
exercise of discretion as a public servant will thereby be influenced.”5 There are also such 
terms as rewarding official misconduct and receiving reward for official misconduct and 
giving and receiving unlawful gratuities. 
Bribes do not have to be in monetary form, but can be present in any form 
possible that conveys the benefit to bribe receiver. In People versus Hochberg case of 
1978 it was established that “Benefit accruing to public official need not be tangible or 
monetary to constitute a ‘bribe’.”6 Sex can also be considered as a form of a bribe. People 
versus Teitelbaum court case of 1988 points to a clear case of corruption of government 
officials with sexual services being used as a bribe: “Evidence that police officers had 
told narcotics offender that everything would be alright if she accompanied officers to 
apartment, and that offender had subsequently performed oral sex on officers, was 
sufficient to support officers’ conviction for bribe receiving in second [now third] 
degree.”7 
The scope of authority does not limit the responsibility for bribery.
8
 Bribe giving 
anticipates a clear expectation that the public officer, i.e. bribe receiver or recipient 
                                                 
5
 Ibid, p. 275. 
6
 People v. Hochberg (3 dept 1978) 62 A.D.2d 239, 404 N.Y.S.2d 161, 
McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated with Practice Commentaries by 
William C. Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 219.end. West Group, 1999, p. 271. 
7
 People v. Teitelbaum (2 Dept. 1988) 138 A.D.2d 647, 526 N.Y.S.2d 230. 
McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated with Practice Commentaries by 
William C. Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 219.end. West Group, 1999, p. 279. 
8
 “It is sufficient to justify conviction for bribery if officer to whom bribe was 
offered assumed under color of his office to perform function belonging to his office, 
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retains the authority to help the donor to cross the red tape, i.e. overcome the restrictions 
set by the law or by the public officer himself/herself. It does not matter whether the 
public servant actually has a power or authority to meet the expectations of the donor and 
to match his/her demands in full. People versus Graham case of 1977 points out that the 
public official is “assumed to have power” by the bribe giver.9 
Agreement or mutual understanding is an essential characteristic of a corrupt 
transaction. The expectation of crossing the red tape should be present at least on the side 
of the bribe giver. People versus Tran case of 1992 found that “’Agreement or 
understanding’ is the key element of the bribery statutes. The ‘agreement’ between the 
bribe giver and the bribe receiver must be mutual. Alternatively, the ‘understanding’ must 
be at least a unilateral ‘perception r belief’ in the mind of the bribe giver that the bribe 
‘will’ influence the receiver’s conduct. If the bribe giver offers or confers a benefit with 
only the intent that the bribe receiver’s conduct be influenced thereby, or with only a 
‘mere hope’ that the receiver’s conduct would be influenced thereby, the crime of bribery 
is not committed.”10 
Bribe giver or donor is not necessarily the initiator of a corrupt transaction. 
Extortion is another form of corruption that takes place when a public officer in charge 
demands a bribe from a potential donor in exchange for the officer’s action or inaction in 
                                                                                                                                                 
even if right to perform function did not exist. People v. Chapman, 1963, 13 N.Y.2d 97, 
242 N.Y.S.2d 200, 192 N.E.2d 160. McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York 
Annotated with Practice Commentaries by William C. Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 
219.end. West Group, 1999, p. 271. 
9
 “’Bribery’ is offering to public servant benefit to induce him to act or refrain 
from acting in matter over which he may be assumed to have power. People v. Graham (4 
dept. 1977) 57A.D.2d 478, 394 N.Y.S.2d 982, affirmed 44 N.Y.2d 768, 406 N.Y.S.2d 36, 
377 N.E.2d 480. p. 269. 
10
 People v. Tran, 1992, 80 N.Y.2d 170. p. 260 
  107 
favor of the donor. Coercive power is usually used by the public servant in order to extort 
a bribe. The fact of extortion does not substitute for bribery, because extortion results in 
bribe. According to the Consolidated Laws of New York, “It is expressly made no 
defense to bribe receiving that the defendant was extorting or coercing a bribe and could 
therefore be guilty only of extortion or coercion, not bribe receiving [§200.15].”11 
In case of extortion, the donor is protected from the legal responsibilities that 
would normally apply to a bribe giver in a typical case of bribery. The special provision 
was introduced for such a protection, because in the case of extortion the donor is 
considered a victim of corruption rather than an accomplice. The Penal Law in New York 
State holds the donor harmless on the ground that he/she is a victim of coercion or 
extortion.
12
 
Corruption is not limited to bribery involving public servants and related offences. 
Legislation outlines yet another type of bribery, commercial bribery.
13
 Commercial 
bribery anticipates damage to employer. This makes commercial bribery a classical case 
of the principal-agent problem. Accordingly, numerous theoretical developments within 
the principal agent frame, made in economics and political science, may be applied to 
                                                 
11
 McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated with Practice 
Commentaries by William C. Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 219.end. West Group, 1999. 
Article 200, §200.05. Bribery involving public servants and related offences, p. 264. 
12
 “Upon the declaration that bribe receiving and extortion were not mutually 
exclusive crimes, the bribe giver who was the victim of extortion would no longer be able 
to defend on that basis. This, out of arguable ‘equitable considerations’ [compare Model 
Penal Code §240.1], a special defense to bribery was formulated which in essence held 
the giver harmless if the giver gave in response to extortion or coercion [§200.05].” Staff 
Comments of the Commission on revision of the Penal Law. Revised Penal Law. 
McKinney’s Spec. Pamph, (1965), p. 291. 
13
 McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated with Practice 
Commentaries by William C. Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 219.end. West Group, 1999. 
Commercial bribery, p. 122. 
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commercial bribery. The point we want to make in this chapter is that the legal concept of 
bribery extends beyond the notion of public officer, i.e. that the employee who betrays 
his/her principal does not have to be a public employee. Accordingly, the state does not 
have to be involved. Involvement of the state through the state representatives is no 
longer a necessary precondition for the case to be considered within the realm of bribery 
and corruption. 
The essence of bribery is in the intent to influence conduct of someone in charge 
of certain functions, duties, or responsibilities. In case of corrupt public official, the abuse 
is of the public, since the official represents interests of the public. But not all states or 
political regimes represent best interests of the public. Therefore, corruption is not limited 
to public officials or public sector. According to Consolidated Laws of New York, “The 
essence of bribery … is in the ‘intent’ to influence improperly the conduct of another by 
bestowing a benefit, and the essence of bribe receiving is in the ‘agreement or 
understanding’ that the recipient’s conduct will be influenced by the benefit.”14 This 
definition does not imply the participation of a public official or a public servant. Nor it 
implies any involvement of the state. 
Commercial bribery can be of two degrees. If the case of bribery was at the stage 
of intent or agreement, then it would qualify as a commercial bribery of second degree. If, 
however, the transaction itself would take place and there would be clear damage to the 
interest of the principal resulting out of such transaction, then commercial bribery would 
qualify as first degree. The Statutes of New York set a total benefit benchmark of $1000 
                                                 
14
 McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated with Practice 
Commentaries by William C. Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 219.end. West Group, 1999. 
Commercial bribery, p. 122. 
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for the benefit to participating parties in a corrupt transaction and a damage of $250 to the 
principal, betrayed by his/her agent.
15
 
Higher Education Act of 1965 regulates the sphere of educational loans in the US. 
However, some issues of consumer rights protection as well as state and federal 
jurisdictions are still not clear. Parents can borrow a PLUS loan to cover education 
expenses for dependent undergraduate students enrolled at least half time in an eligible 
program at an eligible school. PLUS loans are available through the Federal Family 
Education Loan (FFEL) Program and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program. 
Eligibility of a student anticipates high school diploma, eligibility of parents anticipates 
good credit, and eligibility of the program and the college anticipates accreditation. 
Conditionality is attached to all governmental educational loans and certain conditions 
apply to all the participants of this type of contract or transaction. At the same time 
colleges may be found under no responsibility to provide quality educational services to 
students and hence students can not return their payments made out of state loans, if no 
federal loans are involved.
16
 Student loans, made, issued, or guaranteed, under Higher 
                                                 
15
 “If the value of the benefit exceeds $1000, and as a consequence of the bribing 
or bribe receiving there is economic harm to the employer or principal in excess of $250, 
the crimes are aggravated to commercial bribing in the first degree.” McKinney’s 
Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated with Practice Commentaries by William C. 
Donnito. Book 39. §170.00 to 219.end. West Group, 1999. Commercial bribery, p. 123. 
16
 C.A.7(Ind.) 1990. Students could not seek rescission of student loans 
guaranteed by state and private agencies on theory that, because of close connection 
between solvent business college and lenders and other defendants, defendants were 
subject to defense based upon college’s failure to provide student with education; since 
loans were guaranteed by private and state agencies, rather than federal government, they 
were not subject to protections of federal regulations, under which defense might be 
available in cases involving Federal Insured Student Loans and federal PLUS loans. 
Higher Education Act of 1965, §401 et seq., as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. §1070 et seq. Veal 
vs. First American Savings Bank, 914 F.2d 909, rehearing denied. Source: West’s 
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Education Act are also exempt from federal trade Commission rule on preservation of 
consumer defenses.
17
 
The issue of educational loans and all the abuse associated with it extends beyond 
interactions between students and colleges, since colleges themselves do not hold student 
loans. The decision made in Veal versus First American Savings Bank states that “Rule 
that assignee who is not holder in due course takes instrument subject to defenses against 
assignor existing at time of assignment could not be used to charge lenders who granted 
guaranteed student loans with alleged fraudulent activities of insolvent business college, 
since college was never “holder” of student notes and lenders were never assignees of 
college.”18 This provision points to the need to better educate consumers about 
educational and affiliated financial services. Consumers of educational services must be 
aware of quality, accreditation level, terms and conditions of educational loans, etc. 
Cuomo investigations of educational loans and study abroad programs are based 
on the provision that deceptive acts and practices are unlawful under the Consumer and 
Borrower Protection Act. As stated in the New York State legislation, “Deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any 
                                                                                                                                                 
Federal Practice Digest 4
th
, 18B, Colleges and Universities, St. Paul, MN: West Group, 
1999, p. 9.25(2) 
17
 Student loans, made, issued, or guaranteed, under Higher Education Act are 
exempt from federal trade Commission rule on preservation of consumer defenses, under 
which consumer credit contracts must advice holders of such contracts that they are 
subject to all claims and defenses that debtor has against seller of goods and services. 
Consumer Credit Protection Act, §104(6), as amended, U.S.C.A. §1603(6). Veal vs. First 
American Savings Bank, 914 F.2d 909, rehearing denied. Source: West’s Federal 
Practice Digest 4
th
, 18B, Colleges and Universities, St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1999, p. 
9.25(2) 
18
 Higher Education Act of 1965, §401 et seq., as amended, 20 U.S.C.A. §1070 et 
seq.; West’s A.I.C. §26-1-3-306. Veal vs. First American Savings Bank, 914 F.2d 909, 
rehearing denied. Source: West’s Federal Practice Digest 4th, 18B, Colleges and 
Universities, St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1999, p. 9.25(2) 
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service in this state are hereby declared unlawful.”19 In case of private educational loans, 
the consumer and borrower protection considers borrower as a consumer of financial 
services. This requires transparency and full disclosure of the terms and conditions under 
which the loan is furnished to the student and served by the student. 
According to the Consumer Protection Act, “The essential elements of a violation 
of New York law prohibiting deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, 
trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in New York are: (1) proof that a 
“consumer-oriented” practice was deceptive or misleading in a material respect, and (2) 
proof that plaintiffs were injured thereby.”20 But there is a safe harbor for lenders and 
college financial aid officers that may be found in the state legislation. Specifically, the 
court does not accept claims about deceptive practices when such practices were fully 
disclosed to the consumer.
21
 
The excursion into the legal definitions and peculiarities leaves many questions 
unanswered. For instance, both coercion and extortion are considered in legislation. 
However, the bribe giver in such cases is considered a victim. But what about public 
employees and elected officials who are coerced by their supervisors to solicit bribes and 
accept bribes? This anticipates the corruption and coercion policy as a mechanism of 
                                                 
19
 Article 22-A. Consumer protection from deceptive acts and practices. §349. 
McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated. Book 19. General Business 
Law. Thomson West. 2004. p. 320. 
20
 Champion Home Builders Co. v. ADT Sec. Services, Inc., 2001, 179 F. 
Supp.2d 16, as amended. 10. Elements of action, generally. §349. Consumer protection, 
McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated. Book 19. General Business 
Law. Thomson West. 2004. p. 333. 
21
 “There can be no claim for deceptive acts or practices when the allegedly 
deceptive practice was fully disclosed.” Broder v. MBNA Corp. (1 Dept. 2001) 281 
A.D.2d 369, 722 N.Y.S.2d 524. 11. Deceptive acts, generally. §349. Consumer protection, 
McKinney’s Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated. Book 19. General Business 
Law. Thomson West. 2004. p. 335. 
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administrative control. And what about complex systems? The entire legal frame appears 
to be quite simplistic. 
Legal provisions that exist in the legislation, including Higher Education Act, 
False Claims Act, and Consumer Protection Act and are presented in this chapter cover 
all the three areas: 1) corruption as related to the state (private individual bribes public 
official in order to obtain unduly benefits); 2) corruption as related to client and business 
(a client (subcontractor etc.) is abusing a business by bribing business’ agent); and 
corruption as related to consumer and business (consumer fraud, when business deceives 
consumer). However, the legal frame is simplistic, while the system of interrelations in 
the higher education industry is rather complex. 
 
Implications 
 
Kaye, Bickel, and Birtwistle (2006) point out that “There is widespread concern 
that higher education is being compromised by being turned into a ‘commodity’ to be 
‘consumed’.” The authors attempt to explore the trends in both the UK and US, and 
consider how the law has responded to them. They argue that “there is an important 
distinction to be drawn between ‘commodification’ and ‘consumerism’. Education has 
always been a commodity to be bought and sold; the true danger lies in the move to a 
‘rights-based’ culture where students (and politicians) see education merely as something 
to be ‘consumed’ rather than as an activity in which to participate. Whilst the law seems 
thus far to have been something of a bulwark against this movement, it remains an open 
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question as to whether this will continue to be the case if HEIs do not themselves act 
more proactively in challenging this damaging view of higher education.” 
One can argue about the extent of consumerist approach in higher education 
across the nations, but the trend of presenting the higher education sector as a provider of 
educational services is obvious. The market mechanisms that are being introduced on an 
increased scale in higher education do not free the industry from corruption, including 
bribery and different other forms of misconduct. The equilibrium of supply and demand 
with consumers voting with their dollars for best possible choices do not necessarily lead 
to the elimination of public sector based corruption. Different forms of corruption exist in 
private sector as well. The legal definitions presented earlier explain why the range of 
investigations launched by the New York State Attorney General is under the auspices of 
consumer protection and fraud rather than corruption and bribery. 
The case may necessitate development of certain measures, tools, and even 
institutions, such as the Consumer Education Fund established by the Attorney General 
of New York, as well as changes in legislation, designed to prevent doubtful practices in 
the future. Provision of private educational loans is a growing industry in the US. It rose 
sharply from $1.7 billion in 1996 to $17 billion in 2006 and is expected to grow 
continuously and rapidly in the future. Similar developments may take place in other 
nations in the future. The process of transferring education financing to private 
educational loans represents the major trend in the higher education funding and may 
soon be borrowed and adopted in other countries. Subsequently, legislative regulations 
and changes in the legislation are necessary as well as provisions in the university’s code 
of conduct not only in the US, but in many other nations. 
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The classification also points to some possible theoretical developments. The core 
of the problem as related to corruption is in an intentional restriction of students’ access 
to reliable information about the available educational loans. This implies imperfect 
information, imperfect competition between the educational lenders, and a certain degree 
of monopolization of the market of educational loans and eventually brings into fore the 
antitrust law. 
The Cuomo cases in higher education are clearly not those of subprime loans and 
predatory lending, yet. However, this may well be the case in the future. The Consumer 
Education Fund, established by Mr. Cuomo, is primarily focused on educating 
constituents on predatory lending issues. There is a legacy to this issue as well. In 2000, 
then HUD Secretary Mr. Cuomo joined forces with Treasury Secretary Lawrence 
Summers, former President of Harvard University to form the national predatory Landing 
Task Force. Investigations in inappropriate lending patterns in higher education are not a 
surprise but rather a natural development. The investigations of misdeeds in educational 
loans touch upon broader financial aid issues and then naturally develop into 
investigations in possible abuses in study abroad programs. The investigations may 
eventually address all the areas where consumer fraud in higher education has a potential 
or already takes place. 
Colleges use practices of hidden fees and bundling products and services. Even if 
predatory landing and consumer deception do not fall under the corruption and bribery 
provisions, kickbacks do. Kickbacks are bribes that are promised in advance and clearly 
anticipate expectations on the side of the bribe giver. At the same time they are paid post 
factum and present certain guarantees to the donor. As the educational loan industry 
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grows, so are the opportunities for abuse. This situation and what appears to be a long 
term trend in thee education industry can no longer be ignored by the authorities.
22
 
Higher education loans constitute an $85 billion per year industry, as rightly 
mentioned by the Attorney General in multiple legal documents. The sum itself is not big, 
but the industry is growing rapidly.
23
 According to the New York State Department of 
Education, two-thirds of all four year college graduates nationwide now have loan debt, 
compared with less than one-third of graduates in 1993. In New York State, 59 percent of 
undergraduates took out loans to finance their college education. The average student 
graduating from a four-year college in New York owes $17,594 on graduation day.
24
 
Lastly, the results of the investigations and intentions to sue point to the practice 
of what one would define as “admitting without admitting,” when colleges and private 
providers of educational loans de facto admit the wrongdoing or misconduct, but de jure 
regarded as not guilty. Both the higher education institutions and the providers of 
educational loans that are under investigation agree to stop their doubtful practices, sign 
the Code of conduct offered by the Attorney general, and even contribute to the 
Consumer Education Fund, set by the Attorney General. This “voluntary” contribution, 
                                                 
22
 “EFP aggressively offered schools cash kickbacks in exchange for business,” 
Cuomo said. “This kickback scheme was widespread and took place from coast to coast, 
at colleges large and small, public and private. This lawsuit is just the beginning of an 
investigation that will show that lenders put market share above fair play. A preferred 
lender ought to mean that the lender is preferred by students for its low rates, not by 
schools for its kickbacks. With the cost of college rising every day, the last thing students 
want to hear is that their lender may be muscling aside a more competitive loan package.” 
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announces first legal action in college loan industry 
investigation (March 22, 2007). Retrieved from 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2007/mar/mar22b_07.html 
23
 Retrieved January 31, 2008, from 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/family/student_lending/student_lending.html 
24
 Retrieved from http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2007/mar/mar22b_07.html 
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made by for-profit enterprises, along with the refusal to admit any wrongdoing prevents 
from establishing a true court based legal precedent. At the same time, such half-victories 
achieved through bargaining and negotiations work as political dividends for Mr. Cuomo, 
who is an elected official. 
The situation reminds a forceful offensive campaign of the state on the free 
enterprises with the demand for money. As follows from one of the settlements: “In 
recognition of the Attorney General’s leadership in improving the circumstances under 
which education financing is made available to college students and consistent with Sallie 
Mae’s commitment to educating the public about the financial aid process, Sallie Mae 
agrees to donate $2 million to the New York Attorney General’s national fund for 
educating high school seniors and their parents regarding the financial aid process.”25 
 
Conclusion 
 
The importance of the study of court cases on corruption in US higher education 
is threefold. First, court cases present additional lenses to study definitions and aspects of 
corruption in higher education that do not exist in other systems. Second, the national 
system of higher education with its mixture of public and private, non-profit and for-
profit higher education is undergoing process of evolutionary changes that vary from 
state to state. The forms of corruption develop and change accordingly. Third, the US 
higher education shows pathways for reforms in numerous other national educational 
                                                 
25
 The report on the Settlement with Sallie Mae, April 11, 2007. Retrieved 
January 31, 2008, from 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/family/student_lending/student_lending.html 
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systems. Many national systems of higher education, including those of the former Soviet 
Bloc, undergo major changes and reforms moving toward the market-based systems that 
in many ways replicate higher education industry that exists in the US. Accordingly, 
forms of corruption that are currently present in the US education will eventually develop 
in the transition educational systems as well. Learning about the forms and mechanism 
through which corruption in US higher education perpetuates will help in predicting 
corruption in other national educational systems. 
Those few works that address corruption in higher education focus entirely on the 
issue of access, including such aspects as admission, retention, and affordability. The 
issue of quality, not least fundamental, is still missing from the research on corruption in 
education. The legal frame offered in this chapter and applied in investigations of 
allegedly corrupt activities on the side of educational institutions allows for addressing 
both issues: access and quality. The selection of cases and their analysis point to 
problems in the access and the quality of higher education as well as the ways in which 
legislation and the judiciary may be used in such cases. 
The processes of decentralization, marketization, commoditization, and 
privatization in higher education rise questions of accountability, transparency, quality, 
and access. Decentralized financing of higher education anticipates cost sharing based in 
part on educational loans. The decentralized US higher education that long been 
considered an exception among other developed nations now turns into a sector from 
which inferences are to be drawn. This anticipates spillovers of the problems, but not the 
solutions. Forms of corruption that long existed in the US education sector, including 
those in quality assurance through accreditation, compliance with state and federal laws, 
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and provision of educational loans now have a perspective to develop in other 
educational systems as well. 
The law and the legislative process in general are central not only to the way the 
US system is organized, but also to the way it operates and resolves current problems. 
This fully applies to US higher education. If an individual or an institution wants to 
resolve a certain problem, the solution may be found primarily within the court system. 
The judge is to decide and the decision is to be made based on laws. 
National systems of higher education in other countries can be characterized as 
centralized systems with states often playing dominating role in most of the issues. 
Accordingly, the decisive power belongs to the executive branch, including the Ministry 
of education and other ministries that impose numerous regulations and restrictions, 
impose sanctions, and resolve current problems. If a higher education institution does not 
comply with certain rules and provisions and students’ or state interest are compromised, 
the institution may well be placed on probation or closed, and the leaders of this 
institution may be reprimanded or replaced. The so-called administrative resource plays a 
key role in decision making and dispute resolution. Hence, while the problems faced by 
the US higher education industry and national education industries in other countries may 
be common, the solutions will have to be found in different areas. This statement explains 
why the essence of legal cases is important. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CORRUPTION HIERARCHIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
Introduction 
 
Countries of the former Soviet Bloc reform higher education faster than most 
European countries. Political, economic, ideological, language, and cultural factors are all 
important for the reform. One of the negative sides of the reform is growing corruption of 
higher education institutions and in the educational industry overall. Corruption, and 
higher education corruption in particular, is something known but not described 
theoretically. At the same time, increasing scale and scope of corruption in higher 
education in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, as well as numerous other countries, 
urges better understanding of the problem within the context of socio-economic 
transformations. 
This chapter presents an overview of the research on corruption in organizations 
and hierarchies and then develops models of corrupt organizations, including vertical 
structure, horizontal structure, and vertical hierarchy. Possible future structures of corrupt 
organizations are presented as forms of evolution of horizontal structures. The three 
organizational forms of corruption as well as their possible future developments are 
projected on higher education. Suggestions for future research of corruption in 
organizational perspective are presented in the conclusion. 
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Corruption in hierarchies 
 
Lui (1986) considers dynamic models of corruption and inclusion of deterrence as 
a factor of reducing corruption or confining it within the certain limits. One of the means 
of deterrence as well as control is collection of compromat, i.e. materials or information, 
evidence of wrongdoing, used for allegations and accusations in illegal or immoral 
activities. Ideally, supervisors in organizations as hierarchical structures monitor agents 
and control their behavior in order to prevent potential acts of corruption. However, 
corruption may develop vertically across the levels in an organizational hierarchy. Carillo 
(2000, p. 3) notes: “But corruption can propagate within the hierarchy. We capture this 
recursive property of corruption by assuming that agents can share the bribe with their 
superiors in exchange for not being denounced.” This presupposes existence of collusion 
between supervisors and agents. 
Issue of collusion is addressed in Gong (2002), Khalil & Lawarree (1993, 1995, 
1996), Laffont & Martimort (1997), Lambert-Mogiliansky (1995), Olsen & Torsvik 
(1998), Strausz (1996), and Tirole (1986). These works examine collusion-proof 
contracts in different settings of the principal-agent frame. Principal-agent theory, first 
developed in economics to study relations between the owners of the enterprises and their 
managers, is now widely used in investigating numerous issues in public policy and may 
be applied to the issues of higher education corruption. Principal-agent structure is 
multilevel. National leader is an agent to his electorate while at the same time he is a 
principal to presidential administration. This hierarchy may be scaled down to the local 
elected and appointed officials. Principal-agent problem in the fields of public policy and 
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economics is described by Banfield (1975), Becker and Stigler (1974), Darden (2002), 
Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978, 1999), and Solnick 
(1998), to name but a few. 
Principals and agents are both self-interested actors, so their preferences often 
diverge. This agency problem not only urges a principal to monitor the agent, but also to 
try different mechanisms of controlling his behavior. Agent abuses his position by getting 
involved in corruption and by encouraging his subordinates to do the same in order to 
blackmail them later. Describing collective corruption Gong (2003, p. 88) says that its 
purpose is: “to maximize individual gains and/or minimize the risks associated with 
corrupt activities.” In fact, vertical hierarchy uses risk minimization as a tool for 
maximizing total benefits for the regime. Minimization of formal risks is an essential part 
of the corruption and coercion scheme. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) investigate possible implications of centralization and 
decentralization of corrupt organizations on the total volume of corruption. They consider 
vertical structures and come to the conclusion that decentralization of corruption leads to 
an increase in the total volume of graft collected by corrupt bureaucrats. Problem of 
corruption in hierarchies is researched by Bac (1996, 1998, 2001), Olsen & Torsvik 
(1998), and Varian (1990). Corruption in hierarchies is studied in connection with the 
principal-agent theory. Olsen & Torsvik (1998) combine the principal-agent theory and 
issues of collusion by considering collusion in organizations within the principal-agent 
frame. Guriev (2003) considers three-tier hierarchies with principal, bureaucrat, and 
agents. Carillo (2000) develops four-tier hierarchical model that includes corrupt 
behavior. Waite and Allen (2003) make an attempt to follow the possible top-down and 
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bottom-up channels of conveying benefits of corruption as well as resources in 
educational systems. 
Another part of studying corrupt hierarchies in organizations is the cost-benefit 
analysis used in designing cost-effective models and mechanisms of supervision. Bac 
(1998) investigates the problem of organizing three agents in a hierarchical monitoring 
structure and designing a corresponding incentive system to minimize the cost of 
implementing a target level of corruption. Bac (1996, 1998) combines hierarchies, cost-
benefit analysis, and collusion in potentially corrupt structures and demonstrates that the 
possibility of collusion may prevent the implementation of anything less than full 
corruption. He asserts that “In relatively flat hierarchies, economies of scale in 
monitoring reduce implementation costs but may increase the risk of collusion.” (Bac, 
1998) 
Different types of hierarchies include the hierarchy where one supervisor 
monitors two subordinates with the supervision chain, whose upper part is shown to 
display a higher risk of collusion than its lower part. Different hierarchical structures are 
then contrasted with each other in order to follow the performance of each in terms of 
better supervision and control. This helps understanding possible measures to prevent 
corruption in organizations. 
Corrupt structures in higher education have evolved from vertical to horizontal 
and back to vertical, depending on the region. This chapter presents vertical structure, 
horizontal structure, and vertical hierarchy and makes projections about their possible 
future developments. 
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Vertical structure 
 
Vertical structure is taken as an initial form of organizational structure with some 
presence of corruption. Major characteristics of the vertical structure include an absolute 
degree of centralization and concentration of formal authority. Bribe-takers or 
corruptioners have an opportunity to draw some benefits from their position without 
using their authority over their subordinates. They have to operate in conditions of clear 
laws and regulations, as well as high risk of punishment. Vertical structure anticipates a 
very high degree of monopolization and discretionary power. Corruptioners, positioned at 
the top of their organizations and institutions, enjoy a near-perfect monopoly in access to 
graft. The level of secrecy in vertical structures is very high, while corruption itself is not 
widely acknowledged. The high level of secrecy may be explained by two facts: first, 
corruptioners do not need broad networks of corrupt interrelations with their subordinates 
and so corruption is localized and confined to a small group of individuals; second, the 
risk of actual punishment is very high, and the degree of punishment is high as well. 
The form of organization that existed under the planned economy in the USSR 
can be characterized as a vertical structure. The level of tolerance of corruption by co-
workers, as well as by the public in general, was quite low. Corruption was considered 
unordinary, or extraordinary, and definitely wrong. The level of transparency was high in 
relation to the investigated and prosecuted cases of corruption. In 1986, the central 
government dismissed 13 thousand bureaucrats and economic directors and reprimanded 
another 100 thousand for corrupt activities, including embezzlement, fraud, and bribery 
(Saleh, 2003). 
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The cases of corruption were addressed in governmental publications. The 
publications themselves were authorized by the central authorities, since all media was 
controlled by the state and the Party organs (McNair, 1991). Such publications were 
based on particular legal cases. A low level of corruption among bureaucrats was 
maintained by ideology and ethical standards (Ivanov, 2005). Examples of corruption 
presented in the Soviet media included the so-called Coal mafia and Coal investigation in 
Donbass (Matsuzato, 2001), as well as numerous cases of embezzlement, fraud, and 
speculation in the retail sector. 
Corruption in higher education was disclosed in such institutions as Baku Institute 
of Economy (Bakinskij Institut Narodnogo Hoziajstva), Yerevan State University, and 
few other higher education institutions. Baku Institute of Economy was the only higher 
education institution in the USSR that was reorganized and renamed because of its 
numerous cases of corruption (Gorshkov, 2007). The special governmental commission 
investigating Baku Institute of Economy found rampant corruption and fraud during the 
investigation of entrance examinations and academic process. In Yerevan State 
University there were a few cases of extortion, when professors demanded bribes even 
from well-performing students. 
The major form of corruption in the 1980s was embezzlement. One of the 
characteristics of this embezzlement was its grand scale. While in the retail sector there 
was plenty of petty corruption, in other industries corruption was relatively rare but 
occurred on a grand scale. The predominance of embezzlement over other forms of 
corruption is easy to explain. In Soviet times, dominated and indeed monopolized by the 
centralized systems of governance, management, control, distribution, and production 
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itself, the major task for a corruptioner was embezzling from the state. The main 
difficulty for a corruptioner was to actually enjoy the benefits derived from corruption. 
The state imposed restrictions on levels of personal consumption and exercised oversight 
over the lifestyles of individuals. For instance, no one was allowed to own more than one 
car or build a two-storey private house. Access to housing was based on the number of 
family members and not the ability to pay. In the case of major expenditures, sources of 
income had to be justified by the household (Alexeev, 1988). 
In the USSR, the level of corruption varied region by region. While in the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, and the Baltic republics the level of everyday corruption was very 
small and corruption itself was confined to major cases of embezzlement and petty 
corruption in the retail sector, corruption was more common in the republics of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, including in the areas of higher education and healthcare 
(Eizenbaum, 2005). The vertical structure of corrupt organization is presented in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Vertical structure of organization with corruption 
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“1” depicts the highest level in the organization, be it a ministry, a directorate, or 
other managerial unit, depending on the unit of analysis. “2” depicts the second level in 
an organization, i.e. mid-management. Employees at the lowest level of the hierarchical 
ladder are marked with “3.” 
Understanding the vertical structure of corrupt organizations might shed some 
light on how corruption takes place in higher education institutions, e.g. embezzlement 
from state funds by the rectorate, the university president’s office. This type of corruption 
is similar to that in other organizations funded by the government. Embezzlement of 
funds was rare, while embezzlement of products was more common. A good example 
would be a director of a collective farm (kolhoz or sovhoz) who funded construction of a 
new school in his district, while building a private house in a neighboring district. He 
would use construction materials taken from the school construction site. 
 
Transition from vertical structure to horizontal structure 
 
The period of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the USSR was characterized by 
Perestroika, the movement for independence in the republics and for market reforms. 
Government funding was declining and consequently the total base for embezzlement 
was shrinking. The state funding of higher education in the Russian Federation fell during 
the period of 1992 to 1998 at an average annual rate of 19.6 percent (Kniazev, 2002, p. 
111). In Azerbaijan, public spending on education by 1997 was 34 percent of its level in 
1992 (Petrov and Temple, 2004). Parallel structures were created in order to generate 
extra income, including that coming from corrupt activities. Parallel structures were also 
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intended to increase the rate of embezzlement in order to compensate for the potential 
losses due to the shrinking base, i.e. declining government funding. 
It is important to note that the creation of parallel structures in higher education in 
order to generate extra income was not caused by the decline in funding from the central 
budget, but by the relative independence and openness and newly emerging opportunities 
for selling educational services to match excessive demand. All of these were created 
shortly before the budget cuts. Those who created the parallel structures identified within 
the base a separate segment from which to draw benefits in exchange for educational 
services. Here the general structure stays intact. A vertical structure that incorporates 
parallel structure in a corrupt organization is presented in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Parallel structure in a corrupt organization with the vertical structure 
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enterprises by which they were created. Playing on the difference in the interest rates, top 
management of state enterprises accumulated significant funds necessary for the future 
privatization of these enterprises (Blasi, 1996). 
The Ministry of Science and Education established an autonomous unit to conduct 
licensing and accreditation of newly emerging private higher education institutions. This 
department, created under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, was based on the 
principle of hozraschet, i.e. self-financing. In public opinion the term hozraschet was 
closely associated with the term “corruption.” 
For-tuition programs were created within the departments that provided 
educational services in the majors in high demand, including economics, finance, and law. 
By the year 2002, 54 percent of students paid for their education, while 46 percent were 
paid by the federal government and local administrations. It may also be true that the 
majority of students had to pay a bribe or to be involved in other forms of corruption 
during their courses of study (Smolentseva, 2002). 
Private or so-called commercial higher education institutions were created by 
those who earlier led for-tuition programs in public universities. Licensing, accreditation, 
and programs for working adults were riddled with corruption. The low quality of 
education and degrees being conferred in exchange for tuition is an example of 
corruption in parallel structures. Parallel structures enjoyed a low level of direct 
governmental control. 
In public higher education institutions, branches were created in order to 
maximize income. The quality of educational programs in these branches has been 
relatively poor. Poor quality translates into corruption, because the degrees conferred are 
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no different from those conferred by the head institutions and money is taken in the form 
of tuition and fees, as well as informal payments. The normal process of institutional 
outreach suffers from corruption. Along with well-established public universities, 
branches are also created by private higher education institutions in order to maximize 
total revenue. The quality of educational programs here is often poor as well, while 
tuition and fees are supplemented by collective and individual informal payments. 
In Kazakhstan and Central Asia more abuse took place during the establishment 
and operation of branches of public and private higher education institutions than in the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine. Some private higher education institutions and branches 
of public higher education institutions in the region are but ghosts, existing only on paper, 
much like the US diploma mills. Others only employ visiting faculty from the head 
campuses and classes are not held regularly. In Georgia, a country of around 3 million 
people, the number of higher education institutions is disproportionately large for the 
region and is several times higher than it was before independence in 1991. There were 
around 200 higher education institutions in Georgia in 2007, as compared to 535 in 
Ukraine, which has a population of 50 million, and 1068 in the Russian Federation, with 
its population of 148 million. This indicates potential problems with the quality of 
education in some of the so-called higher education institutions in Georgia (Ministry of 
Education and Science of Ukraine, 2007; Ministry of Education and Science of the 
Russian Federation, 2007). 
Relatively close control over the system of higher education by the government in 
Ukraine, even during the “liberal” 1990s, prevented, to a high degree, the rise of 
corruption in branches and consequently precluded the sharp decline in the industry that 
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would take place in some other republics starting in the late 2000s. While in the Russian 
Federation some of the private colleges and their branches are slowly disappearing, in 
Ukraine such a process is virtually non-existent. 
The key phrase that describes the period of transition from a vertical to a 
horizontal structure is “They want to eat and we do not,” as related to the higher-ups. 
This is a sarcastic phrase used by subordinates when referring to what motivates the 
actions of underpaid public servants, be it bureaucrats or faculty members, and their 
higher-ups. Centralized corruption, with its near-perfect level of monopolization of 
access to graft, no longer satisfies the majority of the employees, including the faculty 
and staff of higher education institutions. 
 
Horizontal structure 
 
One of the major characteristics of the horizontal structure is that it develops 
through a process of decentralization and of declining concentration of formal authority. 
Other major characteristics include low salaries for employees and their opportunistic 
behavior. 
Conditions in which horizontal structures form and operate include the absence of 
clear laws and regulations, low risk of actual punishment, and prioritization of financial 
survival by organizations, as well as by individuals. The degree of monopolization and 
discretionary power in horizontal structures is low as compared to vertical structures. 
Horizontal structures are less secretive. Even though corruptioners do not share the 
information, everyone knows that just about everyone accepts bribes and gifts or enjoys 
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other benefits of corruption. The existence of corrupt practices is widely acknowledged 
by the employees as well as by the general public. This situation is traditionally described 
as similar to sex in Victorian times, when “everyone does it but no one talks about it.” In 
higher education institutions faculty members know of each other’s corrupt activities but 
do not discuss them. Such a situation can be identified as a circle of silence. 
Petrov and Temple (2004, p. 87) describe this problem in higher education 
systems in the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan by noting the following: “Our own 
experiences in our region of study suggest that even the most carefully phrased enquiry to 
university members of staff about the existence of corruption in their institution can be 
taken as a personal insult. This naturally limits the scope of data collection. Students and 
former university staff members have no difficulty generally in discussing the matter, 
however.” Here internal institutional silence is counteracted with the relatively high 
external openness to discussions. 
The level of tolerance of informal payments in horizontal structures is high, as 
corruption is considered a part of everyday life. Petrov and Temple (2004, p. 92) note that 
“In Russia, our interviewees also despised bribery, but at the same time expressed the 
view that, perhaps, in the present situation, corrupt practices in higher education were 
inevitable.” Spiridonov (2000, p. 245) concludes, based on a survey conducted in 1999, 
that the corruptioner was regarded as an “absolutely normal element of real life.” 
The level of transparency is high as well, as corruption is often highlighted in the 
mass media, including both official and independent sources (RBC, September 20, 2003). 
Publications are based on generalizations, as well as particular legal cases. Corruption in 
education is discussed openly in all of the former republics, including Azerbaijan (Guliev, 
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2007), Armenia (Yerevan.ru, 2006), Belarus (Glebov, 2007), Kyrgyzstan (BPC, 2007), 
Moldova (Tudoryanu, 2007), the Russian Federation (RIA Novosti, 2004), Ukraine 
(Boljubash, 2006, CityNews, 2006). The key phrases that characterize horizontal 
structures and that are uttered in a tone that is apologetic (in both senses of the term) are 
as follows: “Everyone wants to eat,” “We are all having hard times,” “Everyone takes 
[bribes].” 
Petrov and Temple (2004, p. 90) present the following comment: “One can in 
effect hear people say in Russia: it is impossible to live honestly on such a low salary – 
this makes academics ask for and accept bribes. Corrupt practices are justified by this 
argument, not only by academics but also sometimes by students. Many in higher 
education see it as ‘forced corruption’, when both those who give bribes and those who 
take them are forced to engage in bribery because life, it is asserted, would be impossible 
unless rules were broken.” Uncovered cynicism in the state’s, as well as the faculty’s, 
conduct is obvious (Sandgren, 2002). 
In horizontal structures, most of the benefits from corruption are generated by 
each corruptioner individually and independently. The distribution of access to graft is 
based on such characteristics as rank and position. Rent-seeking behavior is 
commonplace. Horizontal structures in higher education institutions in the former USSR 
are characteristic of the period from the early 1990s to the present. This is a part of post-
Soviet reality in the spheres of higher education and healthcare. 
Major forms of corruption present in horizontal structures are bribes, as well as 
numerous latent forms of corruption, including nepotism, favoritism, exchange of favors, 
services, etc. All the forms are shaped by the process of adaptation to new realities. The 
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scale of corruption runs the full spectrum and varies from petty corruption to grand scale 
corruption, depending on the rank of the bureaucrat, his personal characteristics, etc. The 
horizontal structure is presented in Figure 8. It reminds one of a house-like structure, with 
a parallel structure as an attachment, rather than a pyramidal structure. 
 
 
Figure 8. Horizontal structure with the parallel attachment 
 
Transition from horizontal structure to vertical hierarchy 
 
The transition from horizontal structure to vertical hierarchy in different industries 
and different regions of the former USSR has taken place in different periods. In some of 
the former Republics such a transition occurred starting in the early 2000s, while in 
others it has not yet occurred in higher education. The key phrase that captures what 
occurs during such a period is: “We do have corruption, but no one talks about it.” At this 
point corruption in higher education reaches high levels. The 2000 federal budget 
allocated $2.5 billion for education (Sergeev, 2002). Referring to Kostikov (2002), and 
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Milkus (2002), Petrov and Temple (2004, p. 89) assert that Russian citizens pay annually 
up to $520 million in bribes for admission to higher education institutions as a part of a 
“shadow economy” that may go as high as $5 billion annually, “mostly in the form of 
perfectly legal payments for private tutoring or for various preparatory classes to help 
students enter higher education.” Almost a third of all families in Russia hire private 
tutors for their children graduating from high school (Bondarev, 2002). 
 
Vertical hierarchy 
 
Vertical hierarchy anticipates both formal and informal subordination. Its major 
characteristics are an absolute degree of centralization and a concentration of formal and 
informal authority. Conditions for vertical hierarchy include unclear laws and regulations, 
as well as high risk of punishment for opposing illegal practices rather than for violating 
formal rules. The degree of monopolization and discretionary power is high. There is a 
near-perfect monopoly in access to graft. 
Vertical hierarchies are highly secretive, but the presence of corruption is widely 
acknowledged. The high level of internal secrecy is explained in part by the presence of a 
developed net of corrupt relations through which corrupt practices are performed and the 
benefits of corruption channeled. The level of tolerance of corruption is high, with 
corruption accepted as a norm. Transparency is limited to formally approved 
governmental publications. Vertical hierarchy is characterized by silence because of the 
fear of being reprimanded or dismissed. 
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It would be difficult to single out just one form of corruption as the major form, 
since many forms of corruption are present, including embezzlement, fraud, and bribes, 
as well as numerous latent forms of corruption, such as nepotism, favoritism, exchange of 
favors, exchange of services, etc. Vertical hierarchy is characterized by the continuous 
invention and formalization of new forms and mechanisms of corruption, in addition to 
those inherited from the horizontal structure. The preferred form of corruption may be 
bribes in cash, since part of the illegal benefit is supposed to be channeled to the higher-
ups. Natural exchange is replaced by the monetary exchange. All services and favors 
have a clearly defined monetary value. 
The scale of corruption in the vertical hierarchy is more significant than in the 
vertical structure and the horizontal structure. All levels of corruption are present, ranging 
from petty to grand corruption. The large scale of corruption is explained by the 
dominance of the process of maximization of the total amount of illegal benefits derived 
from corrupt activities. 
The vertical hierarchies developed in the early 2000s in some of the former Soviet 
republics, when the major task for a corruptioner became maximization of total corrupt 
benefits based on sharing and profiteering. Vertical hierarchy may often be mixed with 
collective corruption and collusion. Vertical hierarchy uses risk minimization as a tool for 
maximizing total benefits. 
Vertical hierarchy is the highest organizational level of corruption, where 
corruption is institutionalized or near-institutionalized and is the result of collective effort. 
This level is characterized by the delegation of corrupt functions to subordinates. Sharing 
and profiteering are the two dominating features of the participants and the structure 
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overall. Subordinates collect bribes and then channel benefits up the hierarchical ladder. 
At this stage the top becomes a good “roof” or an “umbrella” for the entire corrupt 
structure, protecting it from a possible negative external impact. Petrov and Temple 
(2004, p. 87) point to routinization of corruption in higher education and to the fact that 
bribes are sometimes referred to as informal fees. The authors believe that, at this point, 
the rates are largely predetermined and that corruption acquires a semi-public character. 
There are numerous records and research statements that public offices are on sale 
and profitable or that bread-winning places are bought-out (Gong, 1997, 2002; Gorha, 
2000; He, 2000). In the vertical hierarchy, a lump sum payment is often required to 
receive a position in a corrupt organization (Gong, 1997, 2002). Such a practice also 
guarantees that the new employee accepts the informal rules of the vertical hierarchy and 
will cooperate and share the benefits of corruption with the top. Accordingly, if a 
potential candidate refuses to make an advance lump sum payment, it means that he is 
likely not to conform to the rules of the vertical hierarchy, and hence he is denied access 
to the organization. The lump sum payment may also be made after the employment 
during which a sufficient amount of money needed to make the payment can be earned 
and accumulated, often referred to as establishing a “credit line.” This broadly accepted 
practice is similar to that used in human trafficking and other illegal businesses. 
Sometimes this type of career path starts from the time of one’s education. For instance, 
in order to enter a police academy one has to pay a lump sum bribe. He then makes his 
money back by accepting informal payments (Newsru.com, 2006, 2007). Joining the 
traffic police after graduating from the police academy also costs money. By the time an 
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individual joins the vertical hierarchy he is already well-educated about the corrupt 
practices and ready to take part in them. 
The practice of paying bribes for entering a faculty position in higher education is 
not widespread. Nepotism and favoritism play a certain role in hiring decisions, but the 
quality of every applicant is still one of the major factors considered during the decision-
making stage of the hiring process. However, if the vertical hierarchy is to develop in the 
higher education industry, a lump sum payment for a faculty position may be required in 
order, above all, to prove future compliance with the informal rules and corrupt practices. 
The pyramid-like structure of the vertical hierarchy is presented in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. Pyramid-like structure of the vertical hierarchy 
 
In this case subordinates retain some of the benefits from corruption, while giving 
the rest part to those at the top. This process of sharing is administered through several 
links in the hierarchical chain until it reaches the top. The share can be either a fixed 
amount of money or a percentage. Some speculations about the presence of such a 
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structure in some higher education institutions in the Russian Federation are already 
present in the media (Gorshkov, 2005). The high density pyramidal structure of the 
vertical hierarchy is presented in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. High-density pyramidal structure of the vertical hierarchy 
 
The dashed arrows in Figure 10 represent paybacks from the top to the immediate 
subordinates. In this case, the top collects all the benefits of corruption and then 
distributes part of them among the subordinates. Here subordinates are no longer partners 
in the illegal activities but rather mere tools. They are instrumental in collecting graft. 
Other variations in the distribution of graft in vertical hierarchies are possible. At this 
point, informal operations of the vertical hierarchy are no different from the formal 
business-like operations of corporate structures, where revenue is collected by the 
company and then distributed in form of wages and bonuses. 
The double-ended arrows in Figure 10 symbolize extortion. Agents attempt to 
maximize their benefits by maximizing total amount of graft derived from the base by 
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using all variety of possible tools and mechanisms, including extortion. Extortion as an 
openly presented demand for a bribe in exchange for a certain service, such as permission, 
license, admission, and positive grades, was rarely practiced in higher education during 
the Soviet era. Extortion can be of at least two types. First, extortion anticipates an 
informal payment which would not be made otherwise. Second, extortion may anticipate 
an informal payment of a larger size than would be made otherwise. Petrov and Temple 
(2004, p. 90) note that, in distinction with “morally justified” corruption in Russia, in 
Azerbaijan students tend to see themselves as victims of extortion. Apparently, in 
Azerbaijan, as well as other former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
horizontal structures move toward vertical hierarchies. 
Higher education is somewhat similar to healthcare but differs significantly from 
other industries. Higher education is still archaic, as related to corruption. The reasons for 
that are as follows: first, higher education preserves high moral and ethical standards of 
conduct and a sense of collegiality; second, it has a double-directed hierarchy of 
administrative position and academic merit; third, there are no pure market-based 
relations and market–type mechanisms in the industry, i.e. higher education has yet to be 
fully commoditized. One may anticipate a relatively low level of collusion among the 
faculty members as related to sharing the benefits of corruption that exist in form of 
bribes, yet a very high level of collusion as related to exchange of favors and other forms 
of latent corruption. The three major types of corrupt structures discussed above are 
presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
 
Structural forms of organization of corruption and their major characteristics in higher 
education 
 
Indicators Vertical structure Horizontal 
structure 
 
Vertical hierarchy 
Characteristics Absolute degree of 
centralization and 
concentration of 
formal authority 
Decentralization, 
reduced 
concentration of 
formal authority, 
low compensation, 
opportunistic 
behavior 
Absolute degree of 
centralization and 
concentration of 
formal and 
informal authority 
Conditions Clear laws and 
regulations, high 
risk of 
punishment, 
centralized 
funding 
Absence of clear 
laws and 
regulations, low 
risk of punishment, 
financial survival 
Unclear and 
contradictory laws 
and regulations, 
high risk of 
punishment for 
nonconformity 
Degree of 
monopolization 
Very high, near-
perfect monopoly 
Low  High, near-perfect 
monopoly 
Discretionary power High, centralized Decentralized  High, centralized 
Level of secrecy Highly secretive, 
not widely 
acknowledged 
Less secretive, 
widely 
acknowledged 
Highly secretive, 
but widely 
acknowledged 
Level of tolerance Low  High  High, accepted as 
a norm 
Level of transparency Governmental 
publications in the 
media 
Mass media, both 
official and 
independent 
Governmental 
publications in the 
media 
Major form Embezzlement  Bribes as well as 
latent corruption 
All existing forms, 
invention of new 
forms 
Scale Grand corruption Full range, from 
petty to grand 
corruption 
Full range, 
maximization of 
total illegal 
revenue 
Period Soviet times  Post-Soviet Post-Soviet, 2000s 
Source: Completed by the author 
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None of the forms is free of problems and internal conflicts. There are certain 
immanent and developing problems and antagonisms in each of the organizational 
structures. These antagonisms, as well as changes in external environment, push the 
structures to adjust and move to the next stage. 
The vertical structures can only last as long as there is absolute power 
concentrated at the top and all the subordinates have a satisfactory level of income. As 
related to higher education institutions, faculty and administrators will only tolerate 
exclusiveness of access to graft limited to top management or the rectorate as long as 
their legal income is high enough to provide them with living standards and the social 
status allotted to them by the society. Once their level of income suffers significant 
decline without the prospect of fast recovery, they present their claims to part of the “pie” 
and start seeking other sources of income inside as well as outside of academia. 
Collecting informal payments at their full-time teaching positions, as well as part-time 
positions, becomes a norm. Centralized control, the top-down approach, administrative 
tools and artificially imposed restrictions become ineffective in reducing corruption. 
The vertical structure transforms into horizontal structure with its freedom, 
equality, and Bentham’s logic. Opportunities in access to graft are distributed amongst all, 
but they are not distributed equally. Initially, the top level dominates. Later, however, it 
becomes disadvantaged. A large portion of graft goes to those in direct contact with the 
base. The number of students directly relates to amount of graft collected. This 
disadvantage is eliminated promptly. The faculty members with limited teaching loads 
due to administrative duties collect benefits from the students by utilizing their 
administrative authority. The faculty members are called to sign some of the students’ 
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record books in the chair’s office or dean’s office or other administrative offices. This 
gives them informal approval of collecting bribes in exchange for grades. The faculty 
members, academic offices, and administrative offices compete for the students’ informal 
payments. The delineation of functions is unclear and so offices and faculty members 
may give attestation to a student interchangeably. 
The top starts seeking ways to channel benefits of corruption from the lower level 
or the “frontline” to the top. The justification for such motion is threefold: first, it is done 
under the slogan of fighting corruption within the institution; second, it is conducted as a 
part of a larger anti-corruption campaign, demanded by the central authorities; third, 
quality of education and graduates as a part of the institution’s reputation must be 
reclaimed. In essence, the top attempts to re-monopolize its access to graft and other 
benefits of corruption, improve the image or facade of the institution, and report achieved 
success to the central authorities. 
This creates at least three possible forms of future organization, including a return 
to the modified vertical structure, the formation of a hybrid or the mixed structure, or the 
creation of a vertical hierarchy. Evolution and possible options in corrupt organizational 
structures in higher education can be presented as follows: 
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Figure 11. Evolution and possible options in corrupt organizational structures 
 
The vertical structure and the vertical hierarchy are described above. Mixed 
structure as a likely option of predominant corrupt organizational structure in higher 
education combines elements of both horizontal and vertical structures with the core 
exchanges having the form of latent corruption. In the mixed structures benefits of 
corruption are derived without being served by the monetary exchange. In higher 
education institutions characterized as mixed structures, faculty members distribute 
access to publicly funded places among themselves. Access and student retention are 
shared and maintained on the collegiate basis, when faculty members agree on admission 
decisions and positive grades for students. Additional revenue is generated from the for-
tuition programs. 
Mixed structures are relatively democratic, with a high level of equality in access 
to benefits of corruption. Total amount of corrupt benefits depends on the rank and 
position of each faculty member. A top level faculty who is also positioned at a key 
administrative role has access to a larger number of publicly funded places and controls 
not only student admission and retention, but faculty hiring and retention as well. The 
Horizontal structure 
Hierarchical structure Mixed structure Modified vertical 
structure 
Vertical structure 
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central authorities are satisfied with the mixed structure, since it presents a relatively low 
level of open corruption, while the predominant latent corruption is difficult to detect. 
The state maintains an official image of high integrity in higher education (Filippov, 2001, 
Mustafayev, 2002). 
The three key questions are: What stage has the higher education industry or 
particular higher education institutions in each of the regions of the former Soviet Bloc 
reached? Can horizontal structure be considered as a steady state? Where is it moving, 
toward what structure? 
The modified vertical structure is centralized. However, in distinction from the 
vertical structure, it is market-based, and students pay for access to educational services. 
Similar to the vertical structure, there is little corruption in the modified vertical structure. 
Most of the payments are legal. Revenues are shared in form of high salaries. The 
administration fights corruption in order to channel all types of income into a formal 
stream of tuition payments. The administrators are highly paid. However, faculty 
members demonstrate some opportunistic behavior. Bribes are rare and risk of 
punishment for unauthorized corrupt activities is high. The modified vertical structure is 
only viable if the administration shares the revenue and pays high salaries to the 
employees. 
Mixed structures combine for-tuition programs and government funded programs. 
In the modified structures for-tuition programs experience the same problems as in the 
modified vertical structures. State-funded places in the mixed structures are distributed 
among the faculty members. Higher education institutions are converted into family 
enterprises. There is virtually no cash flow present in informal transactions. Shares of 
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faculty members in access to graft and other benefits of corruption differ and are not 
clearly specified. Informal authority lacks clear demarcation. This creates a ground for 
continuing conflict. Also, faculty members who do not place their children, grandchildren, 
nephews, and protégés to the higher education institution are less cooperative as they 
prefer monetary and non-monetary benefits. This touches upon those faculty members 
who have their relatives and protégés in the higher education institution. Obviously, 
monetary exchange is the most market-like form of corruption, while the mixed structure 
gives way to latent forms of corruption. 
Strengthening of latent forms of corruption goes in contradiction with the market 
reforms. Such conflict is amplified by the fact that the two forms—for-tuition programs 
and government-funded programs—not only coexist in one institution but are virtually 
indivisible. Faculty members teach in both types of programs while students are often 
mixed and are not separated by groups. In the vertical hierarchies the major conflict 
forms around the determination of shares in access to graft as well as distribution and 
redistribution of the benefits obtained from corrupt activities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter identifies three major organizational structures with corruption, 
including the vertical structure, the horizontal structure, and the vertical hierarchy. The 
criteria selected include major characteristics, conditions or environment, degree of 
monopolization and distribution of discretionary power, levels of secrecy, tolerance, and 
transparency, predominant forms and scale. Vertical structure is taken as an initial form 
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of organizational structure with some presence of corruption. Major characteristics of the 
vertical structure include absolute degree of centralization and concentration of formal 
authority. Corruptioners have an opportunity to draw some benefits from their position 
without using their authority over their subordinates. Collusion did not take place in the 
structure itself. The major form of corruption at that time was embezzlement when 
corruptioner was embezzling from the state. Usage of the embezzled funds required a 
certain form of external collusion. 
Vertical structure transformed into horizontal structure. Major characteristics of 
the horizontal structure are that it exists and develops along the lines of the process of 
decentralization, and declining concentration of formal authority. The characteristics also 
include low salaries of the employees and their opportunistic behavior. The horizontal 
structure may potentially transform into the vertical hierarchy. Vertical hierarchy 
anticipates both formal and informal subordination. Major characteristics are absolute 
degree of centralization and concentration of formal and informal authority. Conditions 
for vertical hierarchy include unclear laws and regulations, and high risk of punishment 
for opposing illegal practices rather than for violating formal rules. Vertical hierarchy is 
the highest organizational level of corruption when corruption is institutionalized or near-
institutionalized. This level is characterized by the delegation of corrupt functions to 
subordinates. Sharing and profiteering are the two dominating functions of the 
participants and the structure overall. Subordinates collect bribes and then channel 
benefits up the hierarchical ladder. 
Each of the forms is not free of problems and internal conflicts. There are certain 
immanent and developing problems and antagonisms in each of the organizational 
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structures. These antagonisms as well as changes in external environment push the 
structures to adjust and move to the next stage. In the vertical hierarchies the major 
conflict forms around the determination of shares in access to graft as well as distribution 
and redistribution of the benefits obtained from corrupt activities. Parallel structures were 
created in order to generate extra income, including that coming from corrupt activities. 
Parallel structures were also intended to increase the rate of embezzlement in order to 
compensate for the potential losses due to the shrinking base, i.e. declining government 
funding. In horizontal structures most of the benefits from corruption are generated by 
each corruptioner individually and independently. Distribution of access to graft is based 
on such characteristics as rank and position. Rent-seeking behavior is commonplace. 
Level of collusion between faculty members and administrators is very low. 
Higher education is still somewhat archaic as related to corruption. Higher 
education preserves to a certain extent high moral and ethical standards of conduct and 
sense of collegiality, it has double-directed hierarchy of administrative position and 
academic merit, there are no pure market-based relations and market–type mechanisms in 
the industry, i.e. higher education has yet to be commoditized. This creates at least three 
possible forms of future organization of corruption, including the return to the modified 
vertical structure, formation of a hybrid or the mixed structure, and creation of the 
vertical hierarchy. 
Mixed structure as a likely option of predominant corrupt organizational structure 
in higher education combines elements of both horizontal and vertical structures with the 
core exchanges having form of latent corruption. In the mixed structures benefits of 
corruption are derived without being served by the monetary exchange. Mixed structures 
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combine for-tuition programs and government funded programs. In the modified 
structures for-tuition programs experience same problems as in the modified vertical 
structures. State-funded places in the mixed structures are distributed among the faculty 
members. Higher education institutions are converted into family enterprises. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCAITON 
AS A TOOL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL 
 
Introduction 
 
A substantial block of literature considers excessive corruption as an indication of the 
weakness of the government. However, opposite may well be true. In non-democratic societies, 
corruption, informally approved, imposed, or regulated by public authorities, is an indicator of 
the power of the state, rather than its weakness. This chapter argues that corruption is used on a 
systematic basis as a mechanism of direct and indirect administrative control and redistribution 
of wealth on the state level and down to local authorities and administrations of public and 
private institutions. Control and redistribution of wealth in this case are based on blackmail and 
selective justice. 
Informal approval of corrupt activities in exchange for loyalty and compliance with the 
regime is broadly used in many countries. Legal traps are often created by the regime in order to 
encourage bureaucrats and entrepreneurs to violate the law and enforce them to comply and 
share revenues. Vertical and horizontal structures of corrupt control allow ruling regimes to 
sustain themselves and exercise coercive power over their constituents. Administrations of 
enterprises and institutions are targeted by the central and local governments in pursue of higher 
degrees of control. Corrupt administrators, managers, entire institutions, and regular individuals 
are much easier to be ruled if corrupt. 
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The goal of this chapter is to discover the net of interrelations between the state and 
higher education institutions based on corruption as a mechanism of administrative control. This 
chapter first presents field-oriented definitions of corruption that exist in different areas of the 
research. It then describes the concept of corruption as a mechanism of administrative control. 
Once conceptual framework is developed, four theoretical frames are applied to analyze the issue. 
One of the frameworks is taken from the organizational theory and the other three from public 
policy theory. Organizational theory consists of the four sub-frameworks, including structural, 
political, human relations, and symbolic frames. These frameworks, along with the principle of 
economic rationality, are incorporated in the theories of vertical structure of control and 
horizontal structure of control. Principal-agent theory is also used to investigate relation between 
corrupt authorities and universities. Utilizing several theories allows avoiding biasness in 
developing the argument. 
A simple model is developed to support the findings within the theoretical frames. Both 
vertical and horizontal structures of administrative control are presented and inference is drawn 
for higher education. This chapter specifies basic conditions of compliance and non-compliance 
of different groups of population with the regime, and explains how corrupt regimes maximize 
their position in terms of loyalty, compliance, and control. 
Implications for higher education are presented in the second part of this chapter. Higher 
education as an industry and universities as institutions or entities have certain essential features, 
uncommon for the other industries and institutions, and hence theoretical frameworks are 
adjusted to capture the specifics of higher education. Universities concentrate academic elite of 
the society, set agenda for education, including its political and ideological aspects, direct 
students, and represent substantial voting body of the population. 
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Concept of corruption and coercion 
 
Suppressed university autonomy and pseudo accountability are often used by the state to 
impose its will on faculty and control the agenda of the universities. Liability and compliance of 
university faculty and administration is of a key importance for the regime. Faculty members are 
fist placed in conditions that encourage engaging in corrupt activities and then indirectly 
blackmailed to comply. This mechanism of informal control then expands countrywide and 
exists on multiple levels. 
University autonomy, financial independence, and federal and state accountability of the 
US public universities are used to project on corrupt higher education institutions in non-
democratic regimes. Systems of higher education of the countries of the former Soviet Bloc are 
used as an object for analyzing the relations between the state and universities in non-democratic 
regimes. Time frame includes 1990-2013 with some references to earlier periods. This period is 
chosen as reflecting richness of contemporary events in changing environments of higher 
education and political structures of the countries in transition. 
Drawing from historical analogies, the chapter explains phenomenon of the “second,” i.e. 
illegal, salary as a result of an authorized rent-seeking behavior. Along with the level of 
compliance, the process and the level of sharing, i.e. redistribution of bribes and other benefits 
obtained from corrupt activities is an indicator of strength of the vertical hierarchy. This chapter 
makes a distinction between institutionalized corruption and institutionalized redistribution of 
wealth, accumulated from bribes. It argues that in higher education institutions institutionalized 
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corruption is presented by distribution of corrupt functions and sources of illegal benefits, but 
often does not lead to redistribution of bribes along the vertical axis of control. 
Zhdanov (2001) presents the following view on relation of state to corruption: 
“Corruption and government are eternal antagonists. Corruption, as a form of social corrosion, 
“eats away” at governmental structures, while governmental authority in turn strives to destroy 
corruption.” We argue the opposite based on Darden’s (2002, p. 2) definition of the state “as a 
compulsory rule-making organization that is sustained through the extraction of wealth from 
within its territorial domain.” This definition is particularly convenient in investigating power-
wealth relations in non-democratic regimes. Darden (2002, p. 5) describes vulnerability of the 
assets acquired by illegal ways and mechanism by which the government officials subordinate 
their lower-level counterparts: “Hence, the threat of exposing and enforcing his wrongdoing 
constitutes an enormously powerful sanction and places lower-level officials in an especially 
vulnerable position. The severity of this sanction allows the state leadership to practice a 
systematic form of blackmail, with payment exacted not in cash but in obedience.” This chapter 
develops the concept of corruption and coercion and applies it to higher education. 
The practice of making people guilty and blackmailing them is not new. The scheme is 
very simple and may be formulated as follows: “Make people feel guilty and propose them 
salvage in exchange of obedience”. This approach to the governance was highlighted earlier by 
Andreski (1966, 1968) in his works “Parasitism and Subversion” and “Kleptocracy or Corruption 
as a System of Government,” Banfield (1975), and more recently by Darden (2001, 2003). 
Stability of the country does not necessarily mean low level of corruption but rather a 
well-adjusted mechanism of functioning of all levels of authority, even if these authorities are 
corrupt. Shlapentokh (2003, p. 158) asserts that “When life in a country is relatively stable, 
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corruption, like some cancers, destroys a society form the inside without producing symptoms or 
even pain. This is the case for Putin’s Russia, where the political arena is calm in comparison to 
Yeltsin’s turbulent years in office.” He says that widespread corruption creates a parallel, semi-
feudal chain of command that competes with the official hierarchy. In fact, this semi-feudal 
structure is not parallel, but is in the essence of the system. It is informal, but it does not compete 
with the official hierarchy. This structure is developed and maintained by the frame of formal 
state institutions. Waite and Allen (2003, p. 294) support this view of self-sustainability of 
corrupt regimes: “Corrupt systems are difficult, if not impossible, to challenge and change from 
within, especially since the power operant in such systems is self-protective and self-
perpetuating. Also, corruption may work in tandem with other forms of repression, such as 
racism, sexism, and classism.” Payne (1975, p. 53) describes mechanism of subversion and 
corruption in national systems as well as in international politics in historical perspective, based 
on practices of dictatorial regimes. 
The phenomenon of corruption and coercion is not a new one. It has deep roots and can 
be traced through the history. Russian Tsar Ioann the IV, Grozny
1
 (1530-1584) would be a good 
example. His intent to fight corruption is as famous as his greed to centralized power, control, 
and coercion through the terror and corruption. An interesting analog from this historical 
personage would be Grozny’s Oprichniks and Oprichnina as a new phenomenon at the time and 
so-called Maski-Show
2
 in modern Russia, as well as Ukraine. Oprichniks were newly enlisted 
paramilitary who were under direct subordination to the Czar through their leader by name 
                                                 
1
 Ivan the Terrible. 
2
 Masks-Show, when law enforcement officers wear masks in order to avoid possible 
retaliation. 
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Maliuta Skuratov. These paramilitary were used to harass the old-established Council of Nobles
3
. 
Members of the Duma were targeted individually. Oprichniks normally attacked their mentions 
in Moscow, committing rubbery and murders. Property of murdered Nobles, including land and 
servants, was expropriated by the Crown. This instrument of terror worked well in coercing 
nobles, merchants, and population of Moscow. 
Maski-Shows repeat Oprichniks. Policemen in masks who appear in offices of large 
corporations, small firms, political parties, mass media, NGOs, and down to the farmers’ markets 
enforce the will of the government. They expropriate business documents and seal the premises. 
Business documents are used for investigation against the owners. Investigations are fabricated 
and represent selective justice, when firms are punished for noncompliance and refusal to share 
profits. Leaders of the law enforcement agencies use this instrument for their personal benefit 
and imposing the authority of a clan on certain entrepreneurs and corporations. 
Yeltsin, being the President of the Russian Federation, advanced the point in the media 
that if Members of the Duma
4
 will be more cooperative with the Presidential Administration in 
forming the Cabinet of Ministers, then the administration will help them with improving their 
accommodations in Moscow.
5
 
Numerous examples of informal pressure on the public officials and administrations may 
be found in the latest presidential elections in Russia. As Russia Journal Daily (March 16, 2004) 
reports: “While having successfully fulfilled the Kremlin’s orders to make sure that incumbent 
Vladimir Putin won 70 percent, the electoral authorities, nonetheless, failed to cope with their 
principal task of ensuring a 70-percent turnaround. The regions that spoiled Putin’s triumph may 
                                                 
3
 Boyarskaya Duma. 
4
 the Russian Parliament. 
5
 Pomozhem s resheniem zhilishnyh problem. 
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face sanctions.” Putin received 71.2 percent of the votes in his favor with turnout of 64.3 percent. 
In some regions turnout just exceeded 50 percent. By law, more than half of Russia’s 109 million 
registered voters must cast ballots for the election to be valid. Presidential candidate Glazyev 
said that the heads of regional administrations familiarized their subordinates with a letter 
circulated by the territorial directorates of the presidential administration, obliging regional 
authorities to apply all administrative methods to ensure a voter turnout of no less than 70 
percent and the same percentage of votes cast in favor of the incumbent president of Russia 
(Russia Journal Daily, 2004). 
A fresh lease of power presented as democratic elections is notorious for its procedural 
violations. Numerous violations have been detected by the observers: “Patients at Moscow’s 
Mental Hospital #4 eligible to vote had received ballot papers with the box against Putin’s name 
already ticked. Two patients wishing to cast their votes for other candidates were told that there 
are no other ballot papers.” (Russia Journal Daily, 2004) Violations included manipulation of the 
lists of voters and violations related to the absentee ballots, illegal campaigning for Putin at some 
polling stations. Russia Journal Daily (2004) reports: 
Prosecutors in Voronezh, western Russia, have uncovered a conspiracy by doctors 
denying medical aid to patients who refused to vote for the president. The health officials 
have already admitted their guilt, and claim that the regional authorities were in no way 
implicated in the scandal. A similar case was registered in the far-eastern city of 
Khabarovsk, where health officials, too, admitted they had ordered hospitals not to admit 
patients without absentee ballots, claiming that in doing so they were guided solely by 
their sense of civic duty. It transpired that an order bearing the astonishing title ‘On the 
Medical Guarantees for the Election of the President of the Russian Federation, the Head 
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of the Voronezh Regional Administration and the Organs of Local Self-government’ was 
signed by the acting head of the regional health directorate. The document was then 
forwarded to all regional hospitals. 
The official assumed full responsibility for the order and prosecutors said they are not planning 
punitive actions since there are no complaints from the patients. 
Same story may be told of some higher education institutions, where classes were held on 
Sunday, the Election Day, and all students were then taken from classes to the ballot boxes. 
Prisoners and military also exercise their right to vote while the objectivity of such voting 
practices raises some concerns. These electoral voting practices are quite consistent with 
population’s perceptions about corruption and corruptness of the different branches of public 
services and institutions, especially taken in light of the concept of corruption and coercion. 
Evidence from the consumer side indicates that health services are a leader in corruption, police 
is second most corrupted body, and college and university faculty and administration are third. 
Interestingly, Putin’s competitors and his criticizers did not suggest any reason why all 
the local administrators and directors of public and private enterprises appeared so cooperative 
and supportive to Putin that many of them even used informal and illegal ways of fulfilling the 
directive of 70 percent turnout and 70 percent votes “for”. One would assume that administrative 
pressure alone, especially on directorates of private enterprises, is insufficient for organizing 
such supportive campaign. 
Informal pressure here is done on a systematic basis from top to down. There is no direct 
evidence that different forms of coercion were in fact exercised based on corruptness of the local 
authorities, administrations, and directorates of businesses and state enterprises. However, 
presence of all three factors: 1) formal and informal vertical authoritarian pressure of central 
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authorities on the regional and local authorities and directorates, 2) numerous facts of corruption 
on all the levels of public policy, public services, businesses, and perceptions of population about 
presence and tolerance of rampant corruption, and 3) numerous facts that all these 
administrators, directors, and public officials have demonstrated their loyalty to the ruling 
president and utilized different formal and informal, legal and illegal, mechanisms of fulfilling 
their informal obligations before the regime, may be interpreted as a ground for the concept of 
corruption and coercion. 
Same mechanism of the state-based corruption and coercion in Ukraine is described by 
Zhdanov (2002, p. 5), who writes about the selective application of the criminal law and other 
repressive legal measures to governmental officials and politicians: “The use of juridical 
reprisals against political opponents by means of charging them with corruption (or other illegal 
acts) when there are no legal grounds to do so.” Often the laws or the normative acts are 
composed post-ante in order to prosecute an activity that took place when it was not illegal. 
Legal craftsmanship is one of the essential features of the government that uses its authority for 
the purpose of selective justice. Political rhetoric is impressive: corrupt oppositionists claim that 
they are prosecuted because they are in opposition to the corrupt regime while the regime states 
that it opposes corrupt politicians. 
 
Principal-Agent frame 
 
Principal-agent theory, first developed in economics to study relations between the 
owners of the enterprises and their managers, is now widely used in investigating numerous 
issues in public policy. Principal-agent problem can clearly be observed in the countries of the 
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FSU. Principal-agent structure is multilevel. National leader is an agent to his electorate while at 
the same time he is a principal to presidential administration. This hierarchy may be scaled down 
to the local elected and appointed officials. Principal-agent problem in the field of public policy 
and higher education is described by Banfield (1975), Becker and Stigler (1974), Darden (2002), 
Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978, 1999), Solnick (1998). The 
agency problem not only urges principal to monitor the agent, but also to try different 
mechanisms of controlling his behavior. Agent abuses his position by being involved in 
corruption and by encouraging his subordinates to do the same in order to blackmail them later. 
In fact, vertical hierarchy uses risk minimization as a tool for maximizing total benefits. Informal 
minimization of formal risks is an essential part of corruption and coercion scheme. 
In China, central authorities encourage public officials and whole institutions to involve 
in entrepreneurial activities. Entrepreneurial activities in China are heavily corrupt. Gong (1997, 
p. 285) writes: “A majority of cadre entrepreneurs emerged after Deng Xiaoping’s much 
publicized southern tour in 1992 as the party leadership appeared more willing to accept 
capitalist mechanisms such as free price and private enterprise. More and more people, including 
many cadres, began to set up shops, enterprises, and corporations, and become engaged in free-
market commercial activities.” Government officials, sanctioned by the reform directives of the 
central authorities, are granted an informal approval to make their living from service-related 
business. They are indulged for achieving economic success. 
Fundamental problem of the principal-agent framework in approaching corrupt relations 
is that the principal, i.e. the highest in the hierarchy of authority, is not an agent, i.e. does not 
represent political will and interests of his constituents. Application of the principal-agent 
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framework in the context of the corruption and coercion concept is truncated by this initial stage 
where central authority is an agent of the population. 
Inability of the central authorities to seek sustainability of the regime among its 
constituents urges them to rely on informal mechanisms of control. While formal mechanisms of 
exercising political power preserve their legality and visibility, the informal ones become of 
primary importance and slowly replace formal mechanisms of control with corrupt mechanisms. 
This replacement soon acquires systemic characteristics. One can trace the following sequence: 
singular—particular—system--unity. While on the first stage corruption as a form of control 
occurs on the case-by-case basis, on the second stage it is a recognized phenomenon, on the third 
stage it is broadly used by different branches of authority and acquires systemic characteristics, 
and on the last, fourth stage it is a norm, not only well-established but unavoidable. Along the 
sequence line the informal first emerges, then develops, becomes predominant, and finally 
overcomes the formal, while the formal being absolute on the first stage declines down to the 
fiction at the last stage. The informal becomes real and the formal becomes nominal. Agent 
becomes accountable to his principal not only on the formal level, but also and mostly on the 
informal level. 
Presence of formal channels of power is explained by the two factors: 1) certain social 
constraints imposed on the members of the central authorities by the voters, and 2) by the 
necessity of legal coercive power to enforce mechanism of corruption and coercion. At the same 
time informal channels of power become predominant ones. 
The principal who cannot rely on population as a primary base of his power and formal 
authority requires from the agent both loyalty and compliance and expects from him to be 
helpful in receiving public support. In exchange, the agent receives both the informal 
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authorization for the corrupt activities and cover-up from the principal. In this case principal is 
more concerned with personal fidelity of the agent and his willingness to share the benefits from 
corruption rather than with his performance of the formal duties. 
 
Economic rationale for the vertical structure of control 
 
Economic models of corruption are relatively well-developed. Milovanovic (2001) 
investigates rent-seeking behavior and corrupt processes of privatization and focuses on 
countries in transition. Red tape imposed by bureaucrats and utilized as a mechanism of extortion 
and conditions of corruption in equilibrium are presented by Guriev (2003). Guriev (2003) 
explains ex-ante and ex-post corruption, first studied by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) as 
“corruption without theft” and “corruption with theft,” respectively. Waite and Allen (2003, p. 
292) make a distinction between top-down and bottom-up vertical structures of corruption. They 
point out that “in corrupt systems the gains are also realized from siphoning off from the “public 
through” (top down).” 
Bottom-up flow of money means sharing of the benefit from corruption with higher 
structures or officials in the hierarchy. Developing market economy is not presupposes reduce in 
corruption. Practice shows that in many instances more market means more corruption based 
upon the fact that development of the market and the economy enlarges primary economic base 
for corruption. Gong (1997, p. 277) describes the dynamics of corruption in China and points out 
that “in contrast to the conventional wisdom that marketization is essential for reducing 
corruption, the sources of corruption are many and complex.” 
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Huntington’s (1968) well-known argument is that corruption works as a “grease-in-the-
wheels” and so may be good for growth since it relaxes the rigidity of bureaucracy. A prominent 
democratic leader and then mayor of Moscow proclaimed this theory in early 1990s. The idea 
was, again, that corruption in transition societies is invaluable as “grease” or machine oil for the 
proper functioning of the state machine, or as an antidote against inefficient organization of 
society and bad state policy (Polterovich, 1998; Kagarlitsky, 2002; Shlapentokh, 2003). Tanzi 
(1998) criticizes this approach pointing out that “when rules can be used to extract bribes, more 
rules will be created.” He (2000) describes cost and benefits of corruption in transition 
economies arguing that in the rigid bureaucratic structures corruption is bad and good at the 
same time. Organizational hierarchy models may be found in Tirole (1986) and Laffont and 
Tirole (1991). 
Goorha (2000) presents two approaches to the basis of corruption, saying that under the 
Pigovian approach corruption is a byproduct of government intervention and under the interest 
group approach it is based on politicians acting as deal-makers. Solomon and Foglesong (2001, 
p. 76) suggest that “individual acts of corruption in postcommunist countries are part and parcel 
of a powerful and genuine form of social organization, that is, clientelism.” They refer to Sajo’s 
(1998) work on corruption saying that “corrupt activity by officials and businessmen in Eastern 
Europe does not reflect a moral deficit but rather a structure of opportunity, in which there is no 
viable alternative to clientelist relations. In fact, Sajo warns us, no confrontation with corruption, 
including conflict-of-interest rules, can serve more than a public-relations function, as long as 
clientelist dependences predominate, private property is not well demarcated and protected, and 
there are no guaranteed salaries to safeguard personal autonomy.” (Solomon and Foglesong, 
2001, p. 76) 
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Positive role of the state in developing and sustaining corruption is often underestimated. 
Prominent Russian economic reformer Chubais, famous for his liberal views and privatization, 
said that “Corruption depends very little on the authorities. It depends on the people.” (Chubais, 
2002) Shlapentokh (2003, p. 156) criticizes Putin for his declarations about strengthening the 
state and at the same time avoiding taking serious action against corruption and commenting on 
the issue of corruption in the media. For us it is normal, because according to the concept of 
corruption and coercion strengthening the state through vertical administrative hierarchy is 
exactly what is necessary to advance the policy of coercion through corruption. This policy, in its 
turn, leads to further strengthening of the state machine. Accordingly, Russian leader always says 
about the importance of administrative resource and managed democracy. 
The processes of sharing and profiteering create a base for and strengthen the vertical 
structure of the corruption and coercion mechanism. Degree of sharing of the benefits from 
corruption is an indicator of strength of vertical hierarchy. Formal frame is necessary to enforce 
sharing and the state is utilized as a formal structure for that matter. Zhdanov (2002, p. 7) 
suggests necessity of existence of such formal system by saying that “The perpetrators of 
corruption cannot exist without the official subsystem. This subsystem is a necessary prerequisite 
for them to establish corrupt relations; in order to abuse authority, one must first posses it. One 
must have been appointed to an appropriate position within the agencies of central governmental 
authority (or local self-government), and must have both actual powers and the opportunity to 
use them officially. Besides that, the official subsystem serves as a cover for the unofficial one. 
In the first place, the perpetrators of corruption use the powers granted them by the law to 
achieve their unlawful goals. In the second place, they use official status to evade the 
responsibility provided for by law.” 
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The leaders always expect to obtain a share of the illegal income, including income from 
corrupted activities. Darden (2002) creates an impression that the leaders are only concerned 
about obedience and secrecy of bribery and embezzlement, when their primary concern is rather 
about the sharing. Strength of the vertical hierarchy is defined not only by blackmail-loyalty 
relation, but by the share subordinates pay to the top, or so-called “roof.”6 Good description of 
the cluster of corruption rights (by analogy with the property rights) would be a significant 
contribution to the field. There are numerous records and research statements that public offices 
are on sale and profitable or bread-winning places are bought-out (Gong, 1997, 2003; Gorha, 
2000; He, 2000). Rose-Ackerman points out that “Initially, payoffs to superiors may be a means 
of buying their silence, but if payments are institutionalized, they become a condition of 
employment, organized by superiors for their own gains.” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 83) Gong 
(2003, p. 100) states that in China “today, buying and selling office has become a rather common 
phenomenon.” We argue that distribution of these places occurs not only on a market basis, but a 
basis of present and expected loyalty to the regime. In China, the policy of “making money by 
public institutions themselves” allowed public institutions to make money to supplement their 
insufficient budgetary income and improve their staff members’ welfare (He, 2000, p. 252). 
The central authorities in China reduce or even terminate financial allocations to their 
subordinates. Moreover, as it happens in Cuba, public institutions and businesses are expected to 
donate into the different local initiatives, assuming that they are a priory corrupt and are hiding 
some of their revenues from taxation. 
Issue of the “second” salary in exchange of loyalty is of primary importance in 
understanding economic incentives for corrupt behavior and its use for the vertical administrative 
                                                 
6
 Krysha. 
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control. Here is another view on the same problem. First, the issue may be that there is no 
formal, or “first”, legal salary. Or at least it is not a salary in its real meaning, with its economic 
and social functions. Interesting analog from the same historical personage Ivan Grozny would 
be his prescription to the unpaid government servicemen and officials throughout the Russian 
Empire to “feed from the service.” This does not lead to creating a loyalty by authorizing the 
additional, “second” salary, that is bribes, but rather to “legalize” or authorize the process that is 
already in place nationwide. Second, there is no need for the state to take a burden of financing 
its employees through the fiscal system and redistribution. These corrupted, indeed market-based 
mechanisms work directly, maintaining the flow of resources or income from the public to the 
state officers. 
 
Model of compliance and control 
 
Those state officers or public officials whose present “legal” salary plus bribes minus 
risks of taking bribes are equal to the fair market salary that would be paid otherwise are 
indifferent to the current regime and hence irrelevant to the regime’s agenda. This may be 
expressed as the following equation: 
 
ps + b - r = fms                                                                                           (1) 
 
where ps is present salary, b is total of bribes and other benefits from corrupted activities, 
r is cumulative for risks connected with corrupted activities, and fms is fair market salary. 
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Those public officials, whose ps + b - r < fms are potentially in opposition to the regime. 
Those public officials, whose ps + b - r > fms are in support of the system, and as so, of the 
regime, which maintains continuity of the system. 
Regimes in Russia, Ukraine, and other countries of the FSU are often personified. If other 
candidates for the leadership positions promise better benefits, both legal and/or illegal, the 
“supporters” will be willing to overthrow the current regime, not to say about those “indifferent” 
and “in opposition”. 
In these circumstances the primary task of the current personified regime in order to 
sustain its existence is creating and maintaining of the system that maximizes ps + b - r and 
minimizes fms. Since any positive integer for r decreases left side of the equation, the task is to 
maximize ps + b and minimize fms and r. The following equation would be a good first 
condition for sustainability of the regime, based on corruption: 
 
ps + b >fms + r                                                                                          (2) 
 
The Grozny’s “feed from the service” authorization and approval of fair corruption is 
exactly diminishing r to zero in order to balance the equation, where ps of unpaid servicemen is 
equal zero. 
More interesting is that the equation allows seeing the issue of loyalty under the wider 
angle. Local authorities and heads of the state enterprises and joint-stock companies are, indeed, 
not only economically influential, but have significant influence on the voters. The question one 
might ask is what are the criteria for the selection for the key positions, where loyalty is crucial 
for the regime? In distinction of early times of transition, when loyalty had to be “earned” from 
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the existing directors and chairmen in exchange for other benefits, in present times directors and 
especially local authorities are appointed by the leaders. One may agree that a common feature of 
the new local leaders is that they are not very bright and are lacking leadership skills, education, 
honesty, etc. The answer on the question is that their fair market salary (fms) is minimal. 
Therefore, by reducing the risks (r) to zero, the regime can maintain stable loyalty of the local 
leaders with the relatively low present salary (ps) and benefits from corruption (b). It should be 
noted, that the r = 0 only for those who are loyal to the regime. Potential presence of the risk of 
punishment gives to the regime not only loyalty, but the right to share in the benefits from 
corruption. In this sense graft is not only a basis for the blackmail, but also the result of a certain 
kind of a social contract. 
Goorha (2000, p. 32) suggests that better paid public officials are less corrupt: “That the 
PPP GNP per capita has a negative partial effect on corruption in both regressions can perhaps be 
explained on a more intuitive level. If we allow the value of this variable to be a proxy for the 
level of pay of corrupt agents and in particular government sector employees, we would expect 
that a rise in the average level of pay would decrease corruption. A substantive affirmation of 
this result awaits detailed government sector wage level data in each transition economy 
considered.” This statement is based on the assumption that there is a correlation between per 
capita GNP and public official’s salary, which may not be true. Also, this statement does not 
reflect what we have done in our model, i.e. public officials are appointed on the basis of their 
low opportunity cost expressed in terms of their fair market salary on the open labor market. 
According to the data analysis, presented by Shleifer and Treisman (2003, p. 27-28), the 
level of administrative corruption is very high in poor countries of the FSU, such as Uzbekistan, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan, lower in Russian Federation, Bulgaria, and Lithuania, and even lower 
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in relatively wealthy Hungary and Slovenia. Individuals’ perceptions about corruption put Russia 
lower than Argentina, Brazil, Romania, or Lithuania. This supports our suggestion that underpaid 
public servicemen and officials are most likely to be corrupt and that this is a broadly accepted 
practice of financing public services by the government. 
 
Horizontal structure of control 
 
So far we have considered a structure of administrative control, based on corruption, 
which we have identified as vertical. Horizontal structure of this type of administrative control 
may be of no less importance than the vertical one. Horizontal structure mostly addresses issues 
of the relations of colleagues of a certain institution, organization, department, division, or 
subdivision, i.e. organizational unit, who operate on the same level and are located on the same 
ladder of subordination. 
Horizontal structure of administrative control and corrupt relations can be considered as 
existing in the following two environments: competitive and noncompetitive. Competitive 
environment is an environment where an employee can benefit from dismissal of or reprimand to 
his colleague or colleagues. Open competition is not a necessary characteristic of the competitive 
environment. 
In the competitive environment the employee will report, either formally or informally, 
on his colleague’s misconduct to the administration. Before reporting, the employee will, of 
course, weight possible benefits and costs of the reporting. The benefit may be caused by the 
dismissal of or reprimand to the colleague while the cost may be the report of the colleague on 
the employee’s misconduct in respond. This situation may well be described using the frames of 
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the game theory. If the expected benefit is greater than the possible cost of the contrary report in 
respond, then the employee will report. 
Administration benefits from this type of competitive environment and encourages it. 
Employee’s reporting behavior in the competitive environment gives the administration an 
opportunity to exercise its blackmail based administrative control without even collecting 
compromat
7
 through the own internal investigations. The function of checking the information, 
however, exists. Administration normally receives information on wrongdoing from the several 
sources and if it describes a particular case or behavior in a same way, then this information is 
considered as trustworthy. 
Internal investigations are normally launched by the administration not at a time when the 
signal of misconduct is received, but when it has already been decided who will be dismissed, 
and who will replace the dismissed. Therefore, the internal investigation becomes a formality, 
necessary to put a procedure in a proper form. Internal investigation may also be used as a last 
warning for the non-complying employee that he should comply rather than that he should stop 
his wrongdoing. Often an employee is dismissed even without launching an internal 
investigation. Instead he is proposed a choice of either leaving the position or being put under 
investigation. This type of adverse procedure is in fact one of many indications of adverse 
process of social transformation overall, where created institutions precede emergence of their 
functions and where legal procedures are used to enforce informal or illegal processes. In any 
case, an internal investigation is used when an employee does not comply with the 
administration. 
                                                 
7
 Compromat, or compromising materials – materials or information, evidence of 
misconduct or wrongdoing, used for accusations in illegal or immoral activities. 
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Noncompetitive environment is an environment where an employee cannot benefit from 
the dismissal of or reprimand to one or several of his colleagues. This noncompetitive 
environment does not exclude a possible presence of an open competition. For instance, if 
employees in the department compete openly in volume of sales or number of publications, this 
competition is a part of their job and does not violate the condition of noncompetitive 
environment. 
Certainly, there are reporting of misconduct occur in noncompetitive environments, but 
these reporting are not based on the rational behavior, as it happens in the competitive 
environment. Reporting in noncompetitive environment is based on personal relations, including 
sympathies and antipathies, and patterns of behavior. This type of motivation may be considered 
as irrational. 
Noncompetitive environment may be separated on cooperative and neutral. In the neutral 
noncompetitive environment an employee is indifferent to whether his colleague is dismissed or 
is getting reprimand or he is not. Good example to illustrate this type of environment would be a 
tickets sale on a large train station. Employees of the book-offices often hold tickets on those 
trains, where number of potential passengers is higher than the number of places, and then 
realize these tickets through the agents for the higher price. Due to a large number of the ticket 
sellers, they are indifferent to whether their colleague gets dismissed for this type of wrongdoing. 
In the cooperative noncompetitive environment an employee will be impacted negatively 
if his colleague is dismissed or reprimanded. This negative impact may be formal, or informal, 
direct or indirect. An example may be any organized net of corruption. In the Former Soviet Bloc 
it is a well-known situation, called “krugovaya poruka,” where “one will not find the ends” or 
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“one will not find a guilty.”8 It can be presented as a “circle of mutual guarantees” or a “circle of 
silence,” based on the principle of reciprocity. This type of cooperative noncompetitive behavior 
may also be characterized as a cover up. Cover up may be of two types: internal and external. 
External cover up takes place when the employees defend each other before the clients or 
representatives of the general public. Internal cover up is a situation when colleagues try to 
defend each other before the administration. 
Below we will give a brief classification of negative impacts of the colleague’s dismissal 
on the employee, which can take place in a cooperative noncompetitive environment: 
 Formal negative impact – dismissed colleague may choose to report on the 
employee, his peer, and this employee will be dismissed as well 
 Informal negative impact – the employee will fall under the suspicion in 
wrongdoing or an extra surveillance, based upon the fact, that his colleague was 
accused in wrongdoing 
 The employee may be dismissed as a partner or a suspected partner in corrupt 
activities 
 Indirect negative impact – the employee looses a partner, and who knows, how 
the new colleague, replacing the dismissed one, will behave 
Counter-motivation to report based on the fear of an indirect negative impact is especially 
widespread in organizations or environments where the certain level of cooperation is necessary 
for corrupt activities (so-called corrupt chain), or maximizing an illegal profit and benefits from 
corruption (pool). 
                                                 
8
 Vinovatogo ne naidesh. 
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Horizontal structure may also be presented in a different way. For instance, it can be 
separated on neutral and non-neutral. In this case both competitive environment and cooperative 
noncompetitive environment will be included in the non-neutral environment. Non-neutral 
environment will be defined as an environment where an employee will be impacted either 
positively (benefit) or negatively (bear a cost of) in case of dismissal or reprimand of his 
colleague. This way of analyzing the horizontal structure will ultimately be using the same tools 
and descriptions given above. 
In the neutral noncompetitive environment administration will encourage reporting of 
misconduct by creating an atmosphere of mutual distrust, suspicion, and personal antipathy 
among the colleagues. 
In the cooperative noncompetitive environment administration is often itself a part of the 
corrupt network, including the role of an organizer and a leader. Vertical redistribution of the 
revenue from bribes is an essential feature of this type of cooperation. Nevertheless, control is 
important for the administration. First of all, if administration is involved in wrongdoing, it a 
priory has compromising information on its subordinates. Administration also controls for an 
aside activities or extra profits drawn by the subordinates without a prior acknowledgement and 
sharing with administration. This can be named as a control over generation of illegal revenue 
squared. This situation is depicted on the scheme as a vertical link. 
In case when administration is not involved, it has to break a cover up in order to get a 
compromat on its subordinates. Infiltration of a stool-pigeon is one of the tools to get the 
necessary information and then blackmail the subordinates and propose them a cover in 
exchange of loyalty. Another tool is to enforce one of the employees, accused in wrongdoing, to 
inform on his colleagues under the threat of dismissal or criminal prosecution. Extra benefits or 
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favor may work as well. It is depicted on the scheme as a cover up. The horizontal structure of 
control is presented in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. Horizontal structure in administrative control with corrupt behavior 
 
Genesis of state-university relations 
 
In order to follow how mechanism of corruption and coercion may be applied to higher 
education and higher education institutions of the FSU in particular, we will first consider 
relations of the university and the state in historical perspective. It should be said that at the time 
when first institutions of higher education emerged in Medieval Europe, there were no nation-
states and there were no social institutions in our contemporary understanding as well. Medieval 
Universities did not play a significant role in the social life and the state did not pay much 
attention to politicization of the learning institutions. 
Hyde (1972, p. 19) warns against a false dichotomy between the worlds of learning and 
of politics, based on an underestimation of the social links between them saying that “This 
Horizontal structure 
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illusion is easier to sustain in considering periods when both states and institutions of learning 
had well-defined constitutions. By looking first at a time when both worlds were still in a state of 
flux, the reader may be reminded that neither academics nor politicians work in isolation, but 
both are rooted in society – in this case, the cramped, violent, and competitive society of 
medieval Bologna.” 
University autonomy in the Middle Ages was something natural, a part of a guild 
structure of the society, and not a result of the institution’s struggle for its self-governance and 
financial independency. However, university development and its growing social influence urged 
leaders of the feudal states to consider university as a player on political arena. The states started 
to develop relationships with the universities and universities had to establish certain nets of 
external relations. Universities had acquired not only charters, granted by the states, but also 
Papal privileges. Thelin (1982, p. 32) offers very precise description of how university external 
relations were built at that time: 
The major structural gains for a university lies in its history of external relations – 
acquisition of privileges, exemptions, and a charter. The pattern involved three stages: 
first, a university gained the ecclesiastical status which made it immune from local 
secular urban jurisdiction; second, it received royal exemptions which meant that the 
king protected the university from both city authorities and the bishop; finally, a 
university was granted papal privileges, which meant that the institution was accountable 
to Rome, exempt even from control by a nation’s king. 
University privileges were often granted after a dispute between student s and local 
authorities. Squabbles between “town and gown” gave a king a convenient excuse to 
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intercede and to extend his own authority over a city. Philip Augustus, for example, made 
the following rule in favor of students at Paris in 1200: 
Neither our provost nor our judges shall lay hands on a student for any offence whatever; 
nor shall they place him in our prison, unless such a crime has been committed by a 
student that he ought to be arrested. And in that case, our judge shall arrest him on the 
spot, without striking him at all, unless he resists, and shall hand him over to the 
ecclesiastical judge, who ought to guard him in order to satisfy us and the one suffering 
the injury. 
Thus, students were given clerical status, accountable to ecclesiastic authority; they were 
protected from civil authorities. The privilege was set “forever by fixed law” that the 
university provost would affirm by oath to the scholars to abide by the king’s regulations. 
State leaders and the church used universities for their political purposes and control over 
the curriculum. By granting special statute to a university a state leader received a tool of 
influencing a town where this university was located. It granted certain immunities and 
privileges to university students and professors and consequently expected loyalty in exchange. 
In its turn, Catholic Church was influencing local leaders by using universities as one of the tools 
of internal pressure. From this it may be concluded that universities were historically important 
ideological institutions and gained more weight in being politicized. The church, the city 
governors, and the local leaders were interested in controlling universities and guaranteeing their 
loyalty in order to sustain themselves. 
Vagueness of the social role and functions of the early European universities and their 
loose relations with the state are certainly not a characteristic of the Russian university system. 
University system in Russian Empire has been developed under the different scenario. From the 
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very beginning the state was the initiator, promoter, financier, controller, and benefactor of the 
university system. Moreover, the state was the only institution to perform these functions. 
Therefore, the university system in Russia is traditionally centralized. The Ministry Education in 
Russia was created at the time when there were only two universities in the country: St. 
Petersburg University and Moscow University. 
Flynn (1988, p. 3) describes creation of the university system in the Russian Empire 
under the auspices of the newly established Ministry of Education: “It soon was agreed, in 1802, 
to found a Ministry of Education whose governing body, called the Main School Administration, 
would direct all education throughout the empire through six universities, which were founded 
between 1802 and 1804. Moscow State University, founded in 1755, was redesigned in 1804.” 
The ministry subcommittee worked on drafting legislation and the statutes for universities. 
Not everything went successfully at the start. Successful restructuring of Moscow 
University was counterbalanced with the extreme difficulties in Kazan: “At the other end of the 
scale, as well as opposite side of the empire, the university at Kazan clearly was a failure. Many 
professors had been recruited from German universities, but few stayed long in Kazan. At no 
time did the faculty number more than half that required by the statutes, while the student body 
never exceeded fifty. University autonomy, i.e. faculty self government, was not attempted, for 
the curator simply appointed a ‘director’ while not permitting election of a rector or the 
convening of a council until late in the decade.” (Flynn, 1988, p. 8) The result of this top-down 
approach in governing the established rather than emerging university was that professors did not 
have too much of a freedom. Not much professors could do about it but to leave.  
In distinction of Kazan, Kharkov University has developed successfully thanks to the 
centralized power and effort of the state-appointed curator: “Kharkov was not so badly off as 
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Kazan, in great part because its curator S. O. Potocki, energetically pursued his task in recruiting 
faculty, insisted on the election of rector and council according to the statutes, and even found a 
way to borrow students from the church’s local college, when too few students enrolled to make 
feasible the opening of the university in 1805.” (Flynn, 1988, p. 10) Centralized effort of the 
state brought its fruits: “By the late 1830s, none of the universities had fewer than four hundred 
students while Moscow enrolled nearly nine hundred.” (Flynn, 1988, p. 18) This state 
involvement in the process of the university building may be explained by two facts: first, state 
was the only force capable of creating the university system; and second, state was interested to 
create a system where state control would be an immanent part of the existence of the 
universities. 
Flynn (1988, p. 19) describes position of the state authorities regarding control over 
universities: “Tsar Nicolas I meant clearly to answer the university question by blocking the 
university’s ability to promote change. He wanted the universities to serve the common good by 
supporting the autocratic Russia he had inherited from Peter the Great and his successors. This 
proved difficult, perhaps impossible, even in the short run. It was difficult even to find new 
rectors, unless the government was willing to pass over the men obviously best qualified for the 
posts. Thus, the rectors appointed were the same men previously elected.” The Soviet system of 
higher education inherited some of the essential features of its predecessor, the university system 
of the Russian Empire. Weak university self-governance was counterbalanced by the strong state 
control. In Coleman’s (1965, p. 226) words, “The Soviet Union has built up a single monolithic 
educational system under omnipresent party control with heavy inputs of political indoctrination 
at all levels.” 
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Vertical structure of control 
 
Vertical structure of control in higher education incorporates principal-agent frame. 
Besides the general interest of administrative control, described in the previous parts of the 
chapter, there could be a special interest of such control as well, depend upon a particular 
industry or a major governmental institution, to which it may be applied. Obviously, the general 
interest of administrative control through corruption and coercion is present and fully applied to 
the higher education. We will describe the special interest of maintaining administrative control 
over the higher education. This special interest is closely linked to and often indivisible from the 
general interest, but it is based on the distinctive features of higher education, including its 
special role in the society and its organizational and cultural characteristics and norms. 
It is fact that universities became by far most important institutions for political 
socialization. As Almond (1960, p. 324) puts it, “Political socialization is the process of 
induction into the political culture.” Importance of the educational system in codifying people in 
the process of political socialization is stated by Coleman (1965, p. 18): “The concept of political 
socialization is now an accepted part of the vocabulary of political science. It refers to that 
process by which individuals acquire attitudes and feelings toward the political system and 
toward their role in it, including cognition (what one knows or believes about the system, its 
existence as well as its modus operandi), feeling (how one feels toward the system, including 
loyalty and a sense of civic obligation), and one’s sense of political competence (what one’s role 
is or can be in the system). The educational system is one of the agencies involved in this process, 
which begins at birth and, also its imprint is most pronounced during the impressionable 
formative years, continues well into adulthood.” 
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Universities have substantial political power due to the three major facts. First, university 
professorate constitutes most intelligent part of a society and its elite. Professors often participate 
in political life, occupy public offices, and work as consultants and advisors to politicians, public 
officials, and administrators. 
Second, students in many countries are one of the major political forces that easy to 
politicize and mobilize for social actions. Califano (1970, p. 23) describes student unrests and 
states that the Japanese radical students appear to be, by far, the most successful in the world in 
disrupting the social order: “Tokyo University was paralyzed by a student strike throughout 1968. 
It took eight thousand policemen two days to evict radical students from the main hall of the 
University in January 1969 – a two-day siege, similar to the later one at Kyoto, which ended an 
occupation that had lasted for over six months.” As Jarausch (1974, p. 567) states, student 
movements are often successful in shaping a critical generational identity than in achieving 
practical political, social, or institutional aims. Jarausch points that the failure of the student 
movement to reach its reforming goals largely due to its elitism may lead to incompleteness of 
modernization. 
Third, universities are large enterprises that involve not only employees, i.e. faculty, 
administration, and staff, but also their immediate consumers, i.e. students. For instance, 
Moscow State University hosts under its roof around fifty thousand students, professors, 
administrators, and staff. This makes university an object of primary importance for the state. 
Control over the universities means control over their curriculum, ideology, and behavior, and is 
a highest stake for the regimes that want to sustain themselves. While state funding for university 
is constantly decreasing, there are other mechanisms of control taking place. Replacement of 
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direct state funding as one of the primary mechanisms of control over the universities by the 
corruption and coercion mechanism is an obvious trend in the FSU. 
In the environment where everyone demonstrates rent-seeking behavior, it seems 
irrational to stay aside of the “mainstream” of economic development, including corruption. 
Instructors in higher education are intelligent people and understand that their position give them 
opportunities for receiving benefits beside their miserable salaries. The government forces the 
instructors to think quickly by not paying them in time or below the poverty level and 
encourages them to take bribes by turning a blind eye on corrupt practices in universities. 
Indulgence, as a necessary detail in the mechanism of corruption and coercion, is presented here 
in the form of informal approval, most often expressed as opinions and views of public officials 
and administrators and tolerance of the general public. 
Opinions on corruption in higher education vary. For instance, the Rector of Moscow 
State University, Victor Sadovnichiy,
9
 offered the following comment on the news about the 
arrest of two corrupt professors in one of the Russia’s regions: “Until the country will start to 
think whom, what, and how it teaches, to organize demonstrative prosecutions for bribers in 
universities is immoral and not clever. It is a blasphemy to require high moral principality from a 
professor who lives on $50.”10 Sadovnichy (2001) sees causes of corruption among college 
teachers not in terms of their moral standards, but in the manner in which they are treated by the 
government. He also suggests that “…education in universities should be free. Of course, 
commercial education also should have a right to exist, but it should exist separately from public 
education.” Another problem is demographic. Because of birth rate decrease, there will not be 
                                                 
9
 Position next to the Minister of Science and Education. 
10
 $50 is referred to as monthly salary. 
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students in the country soon: “I have data that, for instance, six thousand entered University of 
Mordova this year, and 7200 were born in the republic.” (Sadovnichiy, 2001)11 
Sharing and profiteering in state-university relations does not occur on a regular basis. 
Sharing is not a widespread practice in the relations between the state and universities. Visual 
secrecy of a university is maintained by the government. Even share in bribes is sacrificed in lieu 
of this image. Of course share in bribes would be insignificant, and benefits are still drawn by the 
public officials in form of their children placement to the universities. 
Corruption in higher education institutions, even if flourishing for the last fifteen years or 
so and existing previously, is still not well-institutionalized. Rampant corruption is often occurs 
on the non-systemic basis. Distribution of corrupt functions develops along both vertical and 
horizontal axes and so does distribution of corrupt benefits, derived from corrupt functions. This 
vaguely institutionalized scheme does not lead to the vertical redistribution of wealth either 
within the institutions or between the institutions and supervising state authorities. Based on this 
statement one can draw a distinction between institutionalized corruption and institutionalized 
redistribution of wealth, accumulated from bribes. In higher education institutions illegal benefits, 
especially those received in cash, are not shared vertically. This feature makes higher education 
industry different from most of the other businesses. Of course, this is rather a general 
characteristic, than a rule. Vertical sharing of bribes occurs in some indirect ways on case-by-
case basis between private fro profit colleges and universities and local authorities and 
controlling state and educational agencies. 
                                                 
11
 Commercial education is the definition generally used to identify private for-profit 
higher education institutions. 
Mordova is one of the republics of the Russian Federation. 
University of Mordova is the major higher education institution in the Republic. 
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Russian reform of higher education that includes admission based on the results of the 
national test General State Examination (EGE) and State Personified Financial Obligations 
(GIFO), often referred as educational vouchers, shows that the state can interfere in the sphere of 
interests of university faculty and administration. Besides the fact that the reform is an attempt to 
adjust system of higher education to the new demands of the economy and make mechanisms of 
financing and admissions more adequate to the present realities in the changing society, it may 
also be interpreted as a step of increasing level of risk and decreasing the basis of corruption in 
higher education. This offence on the university placement as a domain of faculty and 
administration may well be a part of the state blackmailing campaign. Separation of powers 
between universities and the state is not an option for the regime and so it continues developing 
mechanisms of control. Most likely, the reform will never be completed or fully realized and 
faculty and administrators will preserve certain level of discretion and illegal benefits in 
exchange for the loyalty and compliance with the authorities. 
Critics of the reform predict an increase in educational bureaucracy and transaction costs, 
necessary to regulate EGE and GIFO financing schemes. The EGE is criticized not only from the 
positions of its rational, preparedness, and objectivity. More and more often the test is being 
condemned for its high level of corruption. The Dean of the School of Economics at Moscow 
State University, Victor Kolesov, contemplates that “A mythical billion in bribes, offensively 
ascribed to the heads of the top hundred higher education institutions, will be materialized and 
distributed among thousands. Corruption in this way will be ‘democratized’ for sure.” (Kolesov, 
2002) 
The reform presents real threat of redistribution of bribes and illegal benefits in highly 
corrupted sphere of entering higher education institutions from the faculty to secondary 
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education and administrators. In the present system faculty of higher education institutions make 
selection and decisions on the enrollment. If, however, entry examinations in colleges will be 
abolished and the EGE score will become major factor defining enrollment decision, secondary 
education administration and school administration are more likely to obtain most significant 
control over the enrollment by obtaining control over the elaboration and administering of the 
general state examinations. Presence of truly independent agencies in this sphere is very doubtful. 
It is obvious, that the college faculty will strongly oppose this threat to one of the major 
sources of illegal income. Monopoly on regulation and selection in entrance to higher education 
budget financed places will be defended by any means. Preserving certain number of fully and 
directly financed from the budget places may become a compromise between the authorities and 
the faculty. While bribes in cash and in kind may decrease in their volume and number of cases, 
faculty and administration will continue to secure state-funded places for their children. Public 
universities will continue to be operated as family enterprises. This invisible corruption will 
satisfy both the authorities and university faculty and administrators. 
 
Horizontal structure of control in universities 
 
Universities are not just organizations but social institutions. They are living organisms 
that reproduce themselves. Corruption in these institutions is as a disease in the organism and 
develops not only along the vertical, but horizontal axes as well. The horizontal structure of 
control developed in the first part of the chapter is now applied to investigate the specifics of 
higher education institutions. The implications of the horizontal structure for the higher 
education institutions are presented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Horizontal structure of administrative control in the university with corrupt 
behavior 
 
For this scheme, the department is a basis for analysis. In competitive environments 
faculty members struggle for students-donors, i.e. students who pay or may potentially pay 
bribes. They also struggle for a workload since more teaching hours bring more money in the 
form of a salary. Teaching hours differ and so a struggle also occurs over the teaching hours that 
require less of a real in-classroom course-load. The placement of protégés is another broadly 
accepted form of wrongdoing. Some state universities are by now transformed into family 
enterprises, where many students are relatives of faculty members and administrators and were 
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accepted into state-funded places without a due competition process. Competitive environments 
are corrupt. 
Non-competitive environments are much less corrupt. There are either no or few student-
donors or potential donors. Faculty members hold full-time appointments without the right to 
work overtime and the workload is fixed. Departments with non-competitive corrupt 
environments are also characterized by a rigid structure where corrupt activities are often 
difficult to promote. 
Noncompetitive environments are further classified as cooperative and non-cooperative 
or neutral. In cooperative environments there is often a corrupt link present between the 
professor and his assistant. Professor may ask his assistant to leave some under-performing 
students while they take examinations and then try to get some benefits from these students. The 
same link may be present in relations between the professor and the chair of the department. 
Mutual favors are a major form of informal activities in these environments. Mutual favors 
include accepting students and assigning grades as a favorable act to the asking faculty member, 
administrator, or a friend. In these cases cash does not change hands. 
Neutral environments are characterized by a high degree of professor independence. 
Professors do not influence each other and the administration does not have strong authority over 
professors. 
 
State-university relations 
 
The state is involved in higher education to a larger or lesser degree in any country. 
Nevertheless, many countries manage to avoid development of the vertical mechanisms of 
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control presented in the corruption and coercion concept. Formal mechanism of influence, 
coordination, and control are either predominant or the only mechanism of channeling power, 
and informal mechanisms are either secondary or absent. Undoubtedly, central authorities 
exercise their authority over university through the variety of ways. Plurality of forms of funding, 
both direct and indirect, based on competitive and non-competitive bases, are used as a tool to 
exercise this authority. The forms differ depend upon their application to public and private 
universities. 
Burns et al. (2000, p. 46) present major forms of the state influence through the funding 
mechanisms as follows: 
About half the students are likely to be receiving some form of a national or state 
financial assistance to help pay their tuition and fees. The institution itself is chartered by 
the state. Most of the funds that pay for the teachers, staff, and buildings at public 
institutions come from state appropriations, state bonds, private gifts encouraged by 
national tax laws, or a combination of national, state, and private sources. Faculty 
research, especially in the sciences, is likely to be supported by some combination of 
national, state, and private (yet tax-deductible) dollars. 
Another form of influence besides funding is formalized in the certain codes, rules, 
regulations, and restrictions, imposed on universities by the central authorities. Some of these 
rules are obligatory for all institutions while others are complementary and supported by 
financial incentives. The universities that comply with the rules enjoy the access to some state 
and federal funds through participation in grants, programs, and projects. Burns (2000, p. 46) 
describe some of the regulations imposed by the state authorities on universities: “The conditions 
under which students are admitted, how their grades are posted, and reported, and how faculty 
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and staff are appointed and evaluated are subject to national and state regulations. The use of 
experimental animals is subject to governmental supervision, and national and state inspectors 
check to ensure that laboratories properly dispose of used chemicals.” 
In the FSU, rules and regulations, including accreditation, curriculum, degree 
requirements, and reglamentation of the academic process, are used by the state as tools of 
administrative control. Often the tool becomes more important than the regulation itself. This 
control becomes even more important when educational space is occupied not only by the state 
universities, but independent private higher education institutions as well. Financial 
independency of private institutions is disturbing and so authorities are trying to develop more 
tools and mechanisms of control. Introducing vouchers for higher education and entitlement of 
private colleges to participate in competition for these vouchers is one of these mechanisms of 
indirect control. Once independent private institutions are invited to compete for funds, they 
become interested in being qualified for participation. This qualification is of course based on the 
discretion of the central authorities. 
The major task is to control not only public universities that always were and are under 
the authority of the related ministries, but also private colleges. In the FSU, universities are 
rather an object of public policy while in the US universities are participants in politics on the 
both state and federal levels. This trend may change in time and public universities may regain 
their autonomy from the state, but the fact itself speaks for the tendency of the central authorities 
to control higher education institutions and their willingness to negotiate and trade the autonomy 
in exchange for funding or possibly some other benefits. 
Finally, the level of cheating and toleration of cheating as an indicator of looseness of 
control and corruptness of the educational systems may be used to project on the corrupt and 
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coerce concept. Tolerance of cheating across the nations varies significantly. In the FSU, 
instructors often turn blind eye on student cheating. They think that they will always be able to 
distinct a good student from the rest. This perception is also based on willingness to control 
student body and exercise the authority of assigning grades depend on personal relations and 
attitudes towards particular students rather than on their academic progress. Findings by Magnus 
et al. (2002) indicate that cheating in universities is well-tolerated in the FSU while the US it is 
not, and Western European countries are in the middle. 
The level of cheating characterizes relations between professors and their students. In the 
principal-agent perspective professors in corrupt universities are principals and students appear 
to be their agents. Professors exercise coercive power over the students and either punish them 
for cheating or turn a blind eye depend on students’ compliance with professors’ demands. 
Logically, the opposite should be true. Since students are consumers of educational instruction 
services, they should be primary principals and professors should play the role of the agents. In 
corrupt universities the administration plays a role of the principal to professors and professors 
are principals to their students. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The positive role of the state in developing and sustaining corruption is often 
underestimated. According to the concept presented in this chapter strengthening of the state 
through a vertical administrative hierarchy is exactly what is necessary to advance corrupt and 
coerce policy. This policy, in turn, leads to further strengthening of the state machine. The 
processes of sharing and profiteering create a base and strengthen vertical structure of corruption 
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and coercion mechanism. Degree of sharing of the benefits from corruption is an indicator of 
strength of vertical hierarchy. Formal frame is necessary to enforce sharing and the state is 
utilized as a formal structure for that matter. Horizontal structure of control is utilized on the 
institutional level. The general interest of administrative control through corruption and coercion 
is present in and fully applied to higher education. This special interest is closely linked to and 
often indivisible from the general interest, but it is based on the distinctive features of higher 
education, including its special role in society and its organizational and cultural characteristics 
and norms. 
It is a fact that universities became by far the most important institutions for political 
socialization. Universities have substantial political power due to the three major facts. First, the 
university professorate constitutes the most intelligent part of a society and its elite. Professors 
often participate in political life, occupy public offices, and work as consultants and advisors to 
politicians, public officials, and administrators. Second, students in many countries are one of the 
major political forces and are easy to politicize and mobilize for social actions. Student 
movements are often more successful in shaping a critical generational identity than in achieving 
practical political, social, or institutional aims. Third, universities are large enterprises that 
involve not only employees, i.e. faculty, administration, and staff, but also their immediate 
consumers, i.e. students. For instance, Moscow State University hosts under its roof around fifty 
thousand students, professors, administrators, and staff. This makes university an object of 
primary importance for the state. Control over the universities means control over their 
curriculum, ideology, and behavior, and is a highest stake for the regimes that want to sustain 
themselves. While state funding for universities is constantly decreasing, there are other 
mechanisms of control taking place. The replacement of direct state funding as one of the 
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primary mechanisms of control over the universities by the corruption and coercion mechanism 
is an obvious trend in the FSU. 
In the environment where everyone demonstrates rent-seeking behavior, it seems 
irrational to stay outside of the “mainstream” of economic development, including corruption. 
The government forces the instructors to seek means of survival and encourages them to take 
bribes by turning a blind eye on corrupt practices in universities. Indulgence, as a necessary 
detail in the mechanism of corruption and coercion, is presented here in the form of informal 
approval, most often expressed as opinions and views of public officials and administrators and 
tolerance of the general public. 
The adverse reaction of educators is supported by numerous cases when professors go 
into power, i.e. occupy different administrative or semi-administrative positions. They occupy 
offices of chairs of different state and local committees, members of administrations, and get 
military ranks for teaching part-time in military and police academies. Faculty members secure 
their societal positions and agents attempt to become principals. This trend is common and well-
observed in the society. Businessmen go into politics to secure their property and get an access to 
the state power. 
The concept of corruption and coercion applied to higher education demonstrates how 
state interests influence unhealthy institutional environments. Nevertheless, there is a hope that 
possible democratic changes may lead to an adequate reaction and changes in higher education. 
Johns (2003) asserts in regard of Ukraine that “All of the resources are in place for Ukraine to 
have a higher education system comparable to the best in the world. But leadership is needed. 
Students’ leaders must be given the responsibility to create an academic culture that requires a 
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high standard of conduct from their peers. Faculty must be given authority and responsibility to 
restructure the curricula and the class schedule to include more elective courses…” 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
MODELING EDUCATORS’ MISCONDUCT WITH CELLULAR AUTOMATA 
 
Introduction 
 
Misconduct in education is a serious problem internationally. As the education sector 
grows, so does the scale of misconduct. The large bureaucratic apparatus, overregulation, 
outdated and unclear rules, and poor audit create opportunities for abuse. The blending of public 
sector, private firms, and personal interests of educators and education bureaucrats leads to 
collusion and evolvement of different forms of misconduct, especially widespread in large 
university systems and school districts. 
Educators’ misconduct is not limited to embezzlement of the state funds by educational 
bureaucrats or collecting bribes from students by faculty members. Misconduct in education goes 
far beyond that and may be found in secondary and higher education sectors, in public and 
private sectors, in centralized and decentralized educational systems. It manifests itself in forms 
of bribery, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, kickbacks, 
transgressing rules and regulations, bypass of criteria in selection and promotion, ghost teachers, 
cheating, plagiarism, research misconduct, data falsification, discrimination, and abuse of public 
property. In most of the instances corruption in education has a systemic character and hence can 
be modeled. Cellular automaton offers a promising methodology to study misconduct in 
education. It allows making forecasts, assessments, and predictions on the scope and scale of 
corruption within organizations. Cellular automata, used in sciences, may be applied to 
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investigate corruption in large hierarchical structures of educational organizations. This chapter 
offers a theoretical framework and a methodology based on cellular automata to study corruption 
in large educational organizations, including school districts and state university systems. 
 
The problem of misconduct in education 
 
Misconduct in education includes misconduct that arises from university-business 
relations, academic misconduct, cheating, plagiarism, and other forms of fraud, misconduct in 
relations of professors and students including sexual misconduct, research misconduct, private 
tutoring that involves conflict of interest, bribery in admissions and grading, embezzlement of 
public funds and funds of private universities, abuse of public property, gross waste, and 
mismanagement of university property. All of these forms of misconduct were given 
consideration in numerous scholarly publications. Education misconduct can be found 
throughout the world, including developed nations, transition economies, and developing 
countries. 
Major grounds for misconduct and corruption include the size of the system, amount of 
funds employed, intensity of monetary transactions, and complexity of the system. New York 
City, the largest school system in the country, has over 1.1 million students, a budget of over $14 
billion, over 1,200 schools, and 140,000 employees. Los Angeles is the second largest, with 
three-quarters of a million pupils, a $7 billion budget, 900 schools, and 80,000 employees. 
Chicago, the third largest, has half a million students, a $3.5 billion budget, 600 schools, and 
45,000 employees. The operating budgets of the New York City and Chicago districts are each 
larger than the entire amount most states invest in education. Corruption in education is 
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significant and includes bribery, fraud, gross waste, embezzlement, nepotism, cronyism, 
favoritism, and other forms of misconduct (Segal, 2004). 
Segal (2004) suggests estimating corruption, waste, and abuse on the basis of intensity by 
raising the following question: “Are they opportunistic and occasional or systemic and chronic?” 
Referring to Ermann and Lundman (1978), Segal (2004, p. 19) admits that some sporadic, 
opportunistic fraud and waste is almost inevitable in any large organization, while noting that 
systemic patterns suggest a deeper, constitutional problem: “What is striking about the New 
York City, Los Angeles, and pre-1997 Chicago school districts is how systemic and persistent 
corruption, waste, and abuse have been in certain non-core areas. The intensity of the problem is 
such that… investigators unearthed the same kinds of schemes year after year, sometimes for 
decades.” 
Corruption and lack of civic responsibility compromise the quality of schooling. Neither 
community involvement nor parental committees are helpful in restoring quality education. The 
literature on misconduct in education points to at least three important characteristics that are of 
interest for this study: the large size of educational systems and organizations where misconduct 
occurs, the systemic character of misconduct, and the role of peer pressure and oversight in 
preventing or perpetuating misconduct. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Changes in the characteristics in large educational organizations will not necessarily lead 
to the logically expected results. For instance, according to Bac (1998), increase in transparency 
in corrupt organizations may result in corruption increase. Methodology for future research in 
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organizations and corrupt hierarchies, including higher education institutions may include 
cellular automation—a relatively new methodology of studying organizations. Research of 
corruption with the use of cellular automata is virtually nonexistent. Wirl (1998) presents basic 
socio-economic typologies of bureaucratic corruption and their implications as studied through 
the application of cellular automata. 
As denoted by Wirl (1998, p. 203) based on works of Wolfram (1986, 1994), a cellular 
automaton is an iterating map F that updates at each period t the value or action of a site i, 
denoted a(t), depending on the neighbors actions in period (t-1) from a fixed radius r into the set 
of possible states, which is discrete and of dimension k, {0,1,2,…,k-1}: 
 
a t F a t a t a ti i r i r i r( ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( )).      1 1 11  
 
In deterministic cellular automata, the new state of a cell is determined on the basis of its 
actual state and states present in the neighboring cells. In the simplest case, a one-dimensional 
cellular automaton anticipates two possible states and a neighborhood of three cells. With two 
possible states and the neighborhood of three there are eight possible combinations of initial 
conditions and outcomes for the cell in focus. In a two-dimensional cellular automaton, cells can 
be positioned in hexagonal or square configurations. In a Von Neuman neighborhood, cells are 
influenced by their neighbors from four sides, while in a Moore neighborhood diagonal links are 
also involved. Hence, a Von Neuman neighborhood consists of five cells, including the cell in 
focus, and a Moore neighborhood consists of nine cells. Stochastic or three-dimensional cellular 
automata are more complex forms than one- and two-dimensional models. In stochastic models, 
the transition rule allows for stochastic or probabilistic distribution. In such case the model can 
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indicate the next state of the cell in focus based on the probability of its changing its initial state 
or preserving it. Stochastic cellular automaton reflects on spatial inter-specific competition of 
neighboring cells for the determination of the focus’ cell next stage. 
Ideally, any large bureaucracy or professional organization, including those with complex 
hierarchical structures, can be decomposed to a simple linear one-period system. The resulting 
abstraction can be processed with cellular automata based on the set rules of functions. In some 
instances initial randomly distributed cells of types a and b can evolve into a homogenous state 
at a certain stage. In other cases, evolution will lead to a set of infinite separated simple stable or 
periodic structures depicting different combinations of cells a and b. 
As applied to employees’ behavior in complex organizations, the initial chaotic patterns 
of behavior can transform into periodic patterns, homogenous state, or chaotic unorganized 
patterns indistinguishable from the initial patterns. Periodic patterns reflect repetitive behavior of 
employees. Evolution leads to emergence of complex localized structures. In this case, some 
very complex spatial patterns may arise and reproduce over long periods of time. Such patterns 
may also exhibit intriguing spatial propagation despite a perfect conservation of their shape. 
Thus, surprisingly complex behaviors can arise from the action of randomly distributed cells 
with distinct patterns of behavior and result in locally concentrated processes that are not 
strategically directed but rather sporadic. 
 
Methodology 
 
In the simplest case, a cellular automaton consists of a line of cells or, as in our case, 
education bureaucrats, with each cell carrying a value of zero or one. The site values evolve 
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synchronously in discrete time steps according to the values of their nearest neighbors to indicate 
the effect of peer pressure and moral constraints. The analysis involves initial determination of 
educators who do and do not commit misconduct. The next step is to determine the period, or the 
single step, along the timeline. For instance, for educational financiers the period might be one 
financial year, while for teachers it might be one week or one academic year. The third step 
involves programming, or setting the rules according to which cellular automation is to progress. 
The rules include determinants of peer pressure and anticipated economic benefits from 
corruption. Further developments of the given methodology are in the two-dimensional cellular 
automata that can produce patterns with complicated boundaries (Packard and Wolfram, 1985). 
Cellular automata are based on iterated functions. The process of iteration, i.e. a repetitive 
process, allows for an infinite number of equal steps. 
 
Model of corrupt behavior 
 
This chapter offers the following theoretical model for application of cellular automata to 
misconduct in education sector and more specifically to corrupt educators. It considers educators 
as rational actors that calculate their expected cost and benefit of being involved in misconduct 
and make decisions about whether to participate in corrupt activities based on net benefits. It is 
assumed that net benefit from accepting a bribe or committing other possible forms of 
misconduct is a function of the benefits of corruption, including the size of a bribe or , the risk of 
being exposed and prosecuted, and the social pressure from colleagues as well as personal ethics, 
Q = f(E,C,S). 
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Models of corruption presented in economic and political science literature normally do 
not account for social environment and personal characteristics of educators. Specifically, 
rationalistic approaches to corruption formalized in such models do not give consideration to 
such factors as influence of the educator’s colleagues, their interactions, and moral and ethical 
beliefs of the educator. The environment in which corruption is to take place as well as the 
educator’s personal views on corruption will be denoted as social pressure. The task is to 
operationalize social pressure and include it in the consideration of corrupt behavior and 
decision-making regarding the support of the system. We will incorporate social pressure into the 
initial model of corruption and compliance with the formal and informal rules that exist in the 
system and simulate the educator’s behavior with the help of numerical examples. 
Social pressure includes peer pressure on the educator and his moral considerations. It is 
assumed that in corrupt organizations peer pressure works toward encouraging corruption. 
Higher peer pressure results in a higher probability for the educator to accept bribes and to 
comply with the current system. His moral considerations, however, can work in the opposite 
direction. Contrary to peer pressure, the educator’s morality negatively impacts his willingness to 
accept bribes. Net social pressure is calculated by subtracting the numerical value of moral 
considerations from the numerical value of peer pressure. The model of decision-making based 
on the net benefits the educator i would expect from corruption is presented in the equation 
below: 
 
Q E p m d ri t i t i t i t t t, , , ,( ) ( )         1 1 1 1 1 1 ,                                                   (1) 
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where i denotes the educator, E is the economic benefit from being involved in 
corruption, d is the degree of punishment defined by law for a corrupt educator, r is the 
probability of being exposed, C is the total cost of being corrupt, p is the peer pressure, m is the 
moral considerations, S is the net social pressure, Q is the net benefit from corruption. All 
variables are taken in the period t-1. If Q<0, then the educator will decide not to support the 
current system. If Q>0, then the educator will decide to support the current system. 
Opportunity costs of working in the education sector for period t-1 can be equal to the 
educator’s present salary, benefits of corruption, social pressure, and risks, associated with 
bribery and other forms of corruption. In this case the educator is neutral to the existing system. 
He/she neither supports the system, nor is he/she willing to change it because his/her position in 
terms of income and personal wealth will likely stay unchanged. The equality can be presented 
as follows: 
 
Oi,t-1           L E p m d ri t i t i t i t t t, , , ,( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1                                          (2) 
 
If O<0, then the educator will decide not to support the current system. If O>0, then the 
educator will decide to support the system. Peer pressure is understood as a pressure of corrupt 
colleagues on the educator toward corruption. Such a pressure may come from other educators 
within the department and the administration. Accordingly, the value of p is anticipated to 
always be positive. The state pressure on corrupt educators is exogenous and hence is not 
included in the initial model. The educator’s moral standards are assumed to be against 
corruption, and hence m is negative. A numerical example of defining the educator’s decision of 
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whether to support the system in exchange for the opportunities to collect bribes or commit 
misconduct without being punished is presented in Table 5. 
 
Model simulation 
 
Table 5 provides a numerical example for the extended model presented above (2) for the 
period t-1. The assumption is made that social pressure depends on two educators who are the 
nearest colleagues of the educator whose decision is at stake. The educator’s colleagues are 
denoted in the table as i-1 and i+1. Let us assume that the social pressure function takes the 
values 0 for deviating from the colleagues’ behavior, 1 for conforming to one of the two 
colleagues, and 2 for a uniform corrupt behavior of all three educators. The values are obtained 
as results from the combination of peer pressure and moral considerations. Peer pressure is equal 
to 2 if both of the educator’s colleagues are corrupt, 1 if only one of colleagues is corrupt, and 0 
if both of colleagues do not accept bribes. Moral considerations are assigned values of 0 or 1, 
depending on whether the educator already accepts bribes. 
The degree of punishment for corrupt behavior is uniform for all of the possible 
combinations of corrupt and uncorrupt educators and has a value of 4. The probability of being 
exposed depends on the corruptness of the colleagues-educators. If the educator is not corrupt, 
the probability of being exposed is equal to 0 only if both of his colleagues are corrupt. However, 
if the educator will accept a bribe while having both of his colleagues not involved in corrupt 
activities, the probability of being exposed is equal to 1. Having only one of two colleagues 
corrupt makes the probability of being exposed equal to 0.5. Accordingly, the value of the total 
cost of being corrupt varies from 0 to 2. The value of present or legal salary of the educator i is 
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constant for all three periods, t-1, t, and t+1, uniform, and equal to 2. The fair market salary or 
the opportunity costs of the educator i is also constant for all the three periods, t-1, t, and t+1, 
uniform, and equal to 3. 
The value of the economic benefits from corruption is equal to 2. It is uniform for all the 
possible combinations. It is assumed that bribes are collected over a certain period of time. This 
period of time is similar to the one over which the corrupt educator bears the risk of being 
exposed and prosecuted. As can bee seen from the numerical example, the degree of punishment 
is twice as high as the expected benefits from corruption. This encourages corrupt educators to 
seek safe harbors, such as highly corrupt environments. A good example of a safe harbor would 
be a department where most or all of the educators are corrupt. 
Let us now assume that the authorities have lowered the degree of punishment that a 
corrupt educator may face if accused of corruption and prosecuted. We lower the existing level 
of punishment of 4 down to 2. A numerical example of defining the educator’s decision of 
whether to support the existing system in exchange for the opportunities to collect benefits of 
corruption without being punished is presented in Table 7. 
  201 
Table 5 
 
A numerical example of defining the educational employee’s decision of whether to support the system, based on such considerations, 
as total benefit, costs, and social pressure, (period t-1) 
 
Education 
employee 
Econom
ic 
benefits 
from 
corrupti
on, E 
Costs of corruption, risk Social pressure Net 
benefits, 
Q 
Present 
legal 
salary, L 
Opport
unity 
costs, 
O 
Decision 
(whether 
to support 
the 
existing 
system), 
D 
i-1 i i+1 Degree 
of 
punishm
ent, d 
Probabil
ity of 
being 
exposed, 
r 
Total 
costs, 
C 
Peer 
pressure, 
p 
Moral 
consider
ations, 
m 
Net 
social 
pressu
re, S 
yes yes yes 2 4 0 0 2 0 2 4 2 3 Yes 
yes yes no 2 4 0.5 2 1 0 1 1 2 3 No 
yes no yes 2 4 0 0 2 1 1 3 2 3 Yes 
yes no no 2 4 0.5 2 1 1 0 0 2 3 No 
no yes yes 2 4 0.5 2 1 0 1 1 2 3 No* 
no yes no 2 4 1 4 0 0 0 -2 2 3 No 
no no yes 2 4 0.5 2 1 1 0 0 2 3 No 
no no no 2 4 1 4 0 1 -1 -3 2 3 No 
* In one case in the numerical example the opportunity costs of the educator i are equal to the sum of his present salary, 
benefits derived from corruption, and risks that arise due to being involved in corrupt activities. Ideally, this would mean that the 
education employee who faces the choice of either supporting the current system or otherwise, is indifferent or neutral. The moral 
values are already given consideration in the example. However, as far as the educator’s decision is concerned, it is marked as “No,” 
meaning that the educator will likely decide not to support the system. This can be explained by some other external factors that are 
likely not to be in favor of supporting the system that allows corruption. Let us also explain it by some minimal transaction costs that 
might be incurred by the educator in order to accept bribes, embezzle, and extracts other benefits from corruption. 
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Table 6 
 
A numerical example of defining the educational employee’s decision of whether to support the system, based on such considerations, 
as total benefit, costs, and social pressure, (period t) 
 
Education 
employee 
Econom
ic 
benefits 
from 
corrupti
on, E 
Costs of corruption, risk Social pressure Net 
benefits, 
Q 
Present 
legal 
salary, L 
Opport
unity 
costs, 
O 
Decision 
(whether 
to support 
the 
existing 
system), 
D 
i-1 i i+1 Degree 
of 
punishm
ent, d 
Probabil
ity of 
being 
exposed, 
r 
Total 
costs, 
C 
Peer 
pressure, 
p 
Moral 
consider
ations, 
m 
Net 
social 
pressu
re, S 
yes yes yes 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 4 2 3 Yes 
yes yes no 2 2 0.5 1 1 0 1 2 2 3 Yes 
yes no yes 2 2 0 0 2 1 1 3 2 3 Yes 
yes no no 2 2 0.5 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 No* 
no yes yes 2 2 0.5 1 1 0 1 2 2 3 Yes 
no yes no 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 No 
no no yes 2 2 0.5 1 1 1 0 1 2 3 No 
no no no 2 2 1 2 0 1 -1 -1 2 3 No 
*Similar to the period t-1, in one case in the numerical example in the period t the opportunity costs of the educator i are equal 
to the sum of his present salary, benefits derived from corruption, and risks that arise due to being involved in corrupt activities. 
Accordingly, as we did in Table 1, we assume that the educator is in opposition to the existing system. 
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Table 7 
 
A numerical example of defining the educational employee’s decision of whether to support the system, based on such considerations, 
as total benefit, costs, and social pressure, (period t+1) 
 
Education 
employee 
Econom
ic 
benefits 
from 
corrupti
on, E 
Costs of corruption, risk Social pressure Net 
benefits, 
Q 
Present 
legal 
salary, L 
Opport
unity 
costs, 
O 
Decision 
(whether 
to support 
the 
existing 
system), 
D 
i-1 i i+1 Degree 
of 
punishm
ent, d 
Probabil
ity of 
being 
exposed, 
r 
Total 
costs, 
C 
Peer 
pressure, 
p 
Moral 
consider
ations, 
m 
Net 
social 
pressu
re, S 
yes yes yes 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 4 2 3 Yes 
yes yes no 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 2.5 2 3 Yes 
yes no yes 2 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 2 3 Yes 
yes no no 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 1.5 2 3 Yes 
no yes yes 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 2.5 2 3 Yes 
no yes no 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 3 No* 
no no yes 2 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 1.5 2 3 Yes 
no no no 2 1 1 2 0 1 -1 0 2 3 No 
*Similar to periods t-1 and t, in one case in the numerical example in the period t+1 the opportunity costs of the educator i are 
equal to the sum of his present salary, benefits derived from corruption, and risks that arise due to being involved in corrupt activities. 
Accordingly, as we did in Tables 1 and 2, we assume that the educator is in opposition to the existing system. 
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As can be seen from Table 7, the number of cases when the educator will choose 
to comply with the system increased 100 percentage points, from 2 to 4. Hence, a 
voluntary reduction of the degree of punishment from 4 in period t-1 down to 2 in period 
t leads to a significant increase in the number of cases in which the educator will support 
the system. 
Despite the significant increase in the number of cases when the educator will 
support the existing system in period t, it constitutes only half of all possible cases. This 
is not sufficient for the system that wants to sustain itself. The system can not afford an 
increase in the salaries it pays to college professors due to budget constraints. Nor can it 
facilitate an increase in the total sum of benefits educators generate from corruption. The 
size of bribes and the total scale and scope of bribery and other forms of corruption in 
education, as well as in other sectors of the economy, are mostly determined by the 
market forces, including consumer demand and clientele base, not by the state. 
Further proliferation of the corruption and compliance policy is needed. 
Therefore, as follows from equations (1) and (2), the authorities are interested in the 
reduction of the total cost of being involved in corruption for each educator. This can be 
done easily since the punishment mechanism is administered by the state. While the state 
can not regulate the risk of exposure r, it can regulate the degree of punishment d. The 
degree of punishment consists of the probability of being prosecuted and sentenced and 
the level of punishment chosen by the state in regard to the corrupt educator. While 
formally the degree of punishment may be high, the actual degree of punishment d may 
be relatively low, based on the low rate of prosecution. Furthermore, prosecution itself is 
a threat only for those who choose not to comply with the authorities’ demands. 
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Let us assume that the authorities have lowered the degree of punishment that a 
corrupt educator may face if accused of corruption and prosecuted. We reduce the 
existing level of punishment of 2 in period t down to 1 in period t+1. A numerical 
example of defining the educator’s decision of whether to support the system in exchange 
for the opportunities to collect bribes without being punished is presented in Table 7. The 
number of cases when the educator will chose to comply with the system’s demands 
increased 50 percentage points, from 4 to 6. Hence, a further voluntary reduction of the 
degree of punishment from 2 in period t-1 down to 1 lead to a significant increase in the 
number of cases in which the educator will opt for supporting the system. 
Probability of being exposed may be a function of peer pressure. Accordingly, an 
increase in peer pressure may lead to a decrease in the probability of being exposed and, 
hence, to a further decrease in the total cost of being involved in corrupt activities. This 
will lead to an even higher probability of the educator being in support of the existing 
system. 
 
Results and interpretation 
 
The results of cellular automation simulation, including those obtained after 
analyzing the large educational organizations, are best seen as graphic depictions. They 
might be simple yet reliable assessments of the future developments that reflect the scale 
and the scope of educational misconduct. Wirl (1998, p.199) says that “Although cellular 
automata are very simple, deterministic machines and thus crude approximations of real, 
economic situations, they are capable of describing self organization and complex 
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patterns (of corruption).” The images, both black and white and in color, depending upon 
the initial characteristics of the cells and the authors’ determination, allow for visual 
examination of future patterns of misconduct. The structures with the clear aisles or 
sporadic distribution of corrupt educators point toward particular educators who are 
likely to commit misconduct in the future. Most interestingly, the predictions point to 
those members of large organizations who are most likely to be involved in misconduct 
after a certain period of time and yet who at the present may even be unaware of this. 
We present three simulations based on distinct functions of deterministic patterns 
of behavior. The images appear structuralistic in nature, with dispersed triangles of 
different sizes, often localized in groups, with diffused and randomly distributed single 
cells. In all of the images generated below, black color identifies a corrupt educator, 
while white color identifies a non-corrupt educator. Two neighbors, one on the left and 
one on the right, influence their neighbor in the middle. We focus on the educator in the 
middle. For each function, we use 1000 educators in a one-year, i.e. 365-day period, 
where each cell represents a given educator in a given day. 
We present three functions. Each of the functions reflects a certain balance of 
powers and combination of factors, including central authorities, educators, pay rates, 
risk of exposure, degree of punishment, and peer pressure. Based on the significance of 
these initial factors in each of the three cases, we formulate certain dependencies 
expressed as functions 1, 2, and 3. 
Function 1. (Rule 18). Let us assume that: 1. three corrupt educators grouped 
together cause the authorities to initiate an investigation; accordingly, the risk of 
punishment for being involved in misconduct increases, and as a result the educator 
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refuses to participate in corruption. Hence, having two corrupt neighbors in period t-1 
causes the educator to become non-corrupt in period t; 2. having one non-corrupt 
neighbor causes the corrupt educator to become non-corrupt in period t, if he was corrupt 
in period t-1; 3. having two corrupt educators-neighbors causes the educator to remain 
non-corrupt in period t, because he/she reasonably expects that his/her neighbors will 
remain corrupt in period t and that three corrupt educators will cause the authorities to 
initiate an investigation. 
The risk will go up and the educator will have to refuse corruption; 4. having two 
non-corrupt neighbors causes the corrupt educator to become non-corrupt, since peer 
pressure in this case pushes him/her toward non-corruption. In addition, the risk of being 
exposed by non-corrupt peers is higher; 5. finally, having two non-corrupt neighbors in 
period t-1 causes the non-corrupt educator to remain non-corrupt in period t. The results 
of cellular automaton in for the function 1 are presented in Figures 14 through 17. 
 
 
Figure 14. Function 1. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, 
with corrupt educators being distributed randomly in day one 
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Figure 15. Function 1. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
 
 
Figure 16. Function 1. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, 
with one corrupt educator initially in day one 
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Figure 17. Function 1. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
 
Function 2. (Rule 126). Let us assume that: 1. three corrupt educators grouped 
together cause the authorities to initiate an investigation; accordingly, the risk of 
punishment for being involved in misconduct increases, and as a result the educator 
refuses to participate in corruption. Hence, having two corrupt neighbors in period t-1 
causes the educator to become non-corrupt in period t; 2. having one corrupt neighbor 
allows the corrupt educator to remain corrupt in period t, if he was corrupt in period t-1; 3. 
having one corrupt neighbor in period t-1 encourages the non-corrupt educator to become 
corrupt in period t; 4. having two corrupt educators-neighbors in period t-1 allows non-
corrupt educator to become corrupt in period t; 5. having two non-corrupt neighbors 
allows the corrupt educator to remain corrupt, since peer pressure in this case is weaker 
and does not push him/her toward non-corruption. In addition, the risk of being exposed 
by non-corrupt peers is lower. 6. finally, having two non-corrupt neighbors in period t-1 
causes the non-corrupt educator to remain non-corrupt in period t. The results of cellular 
automaton for the function 2 are presented in Figures 18 through 21. 
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Figure 18. Function 2. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, 
with corrupt educators being distributed randomly in day one 
 
 
Figure 19. Function 2. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
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Figure 20. Function 2. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, 
with one corrupt educator initially in day one 
 
 
Figure 21. Function 2. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
 
Function 3. (Rule 86). Let us assume that: 1. three corrupt educators grouped 
together cause the authorities to initiate an investigation; accordingly, the risk of 
punishment for being involved in misconduct increases, and as a result the educator 
refuses to participate in corruption. Hence, having two corrupt neighbors in period t-1 
causes the educator to become non-corrupt in period t; 2. having one corrupt neighbor 
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causes the corrupt educator to remain corrupt in period t; 3. having one corrupt neighbor 
causes the non-corrupt educator to become corrupt in period t; 4. having two corrupt 
educators-neighbors in period t-1 causes the educator to remain non-corrupt in period t, 
because he/she reasonably expects that his/her neighbors will remain corrupt in period t 
and that three corrupt educators will cause the authorities to initiate an investigation; 5. 
having two non-corrupt neighbors allows the corrupt educator to remain corrupt, since 
peer pressure in this case is weak and does not push him/her to become non-corrupt; 6. 
finally, having two non-corrupt neighbors in period t-1 causes the non-corrupt educator to 
remain non-corrupt in period t. The results of cellular automaton for the function 3 are 
presented in Figures 22 through 25. 
 
 
Figure 22. Function 3. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, 
with corrupt educators being distributed randomly in day one 
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Figure 23. Function 3. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
 
 
Figure 24. Function 3. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, 
with one corrupt educator initially in day one 
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Figure 25. Function 3. Randomly selected magnified textural structure 
 
Functions 1, 2, and 3, depicted on the images, do not necessarily correspond with 
the numerical examples we offered earlier. But in the essence, lesser peer pressure to be 
non-corrupt and the risks associated with participation in corrupt activities become 
definitive in educators’ behavior in both numerical simulations and graphic 
representations. According to Function 1, the educator is unlikely to be encouraged to 
participate in misconduct in most of the instances. As a result, the structure of the cellular 
automaton for 1000 educators in a 365-day period, with corrupt educators being 
distributed randomly in day one and with one corrupt educator initially in day one, 
depicted in Figures 14 and 16, respectively, is of a lesser density than that of Function 2. 
Cellular automaton based on Function 2 appears to have somewhat similar structure, but 
is clearly denser. This means that higher peer pressure to become corrupt and lesser risk 
of prosecution make the number of instances of having corrupt educators is much higher. 
Finally, as depicted in Figure 22, cellular automaton based on Function 3 is less 
chaotic and has a more structured appearance, than do cellular automata based on 
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Functions 1 and 2. Figure 23 presents a quite astonishing pattern of distribution of 
educators’ misconduct that starts from a single corrupt educator in day 1 and by the end 
of the year there are already a few hundred corrupt educators with a perspective of further 
proliferation until the margins are reached. The triangle that reflects the area of 
misconduct spread in the educational organization has a much higher density than the 
pyramidal structures in Figures 16 and 20. Equally interesting is that there is a clearly 
visible asymmetry in the way the cellular automaton progression is structured. The right 
side of the triangle and its center is structured along horizontal and vertical lines, while 
the left side of the equation is grouped more along the diagonal lines directed from the 
center parallel to the left lateral position. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 730-
day period, with daily steps as single periods for corrupt activities and corrupt behavior to 
change are presented in Figures 1, 3, and 5 of Appendix C. Corrupt educators are being 
distributed randomly in day one. Figures 2, 4, and 6 depict cellular automata for 1000 
educators in a 730-day period, with one corrupt educator initially in day one. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The presence of corruption in the education sector throughout the world is 
obvious; it is presented in scholarly work and is proven based on legal cases, surveys, 
interviews, and numerous publications in the media. Corruption in many national 
education systems has a systemic character, is endemic to the society, and often reaches 
epidemic proportions. Access to education, academic grades, term papers, degrees, 
credentials, and honors are all for sale. Educators of all ranks in many countries are 
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grossly underpaid along with other public employees. They abuse their position in order 
to sustain themselves. Chronic underfunding, poor coordination, lack of transparency and 
control result in an education system riddled with all types of misconduct, from outright 
bribery and kickbacks to cronyism and ghost teachers, and from grand scale 
embezzlement and fraud to gross waste and petty theft. 
This chapter presents cellular automation, a relatively new methodology to study 
misconduct in large educational organizations, and uses simulation to model the behavior 
of educators, including factors that influence their decision making. This methodology 
may be used beneficially for future research in organizations and corrupt hierarchies, 
including school districts and higher education institutions and make valid and credible 
forecasts. 
Cellular automaton may prove to be a more effective and cost-efficient 
methodology than estimation of systems of partial differential equations. Research of 
corruption with the use of cellular automata is virtually nonexistent. Wirl (1998) presents 
basic socio-economic typologies of bureaucratic corruption and their implications as 
studied through the application of cellular automata. Computational organization theory 
is presented in works of Carley and Prietula (1994), Carley and Gasser (1999), as well as 
in the journal of Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory. Some of the 
aspects of organizational corrupt structures may be studied along the lines of 
computational organization theory which uses computational and mathematical methods 
to study organizations, formulates models, and develops tools and procedures to validate 
organizational models. Eventually, this methodology will be used to improve educational 
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organizations through an increase in their organizational effectiveness and efficiency and 
a reduction and future prevention of misconduct. 
Cellular automaton based simulations can be used to model a wide variety of 
different environments and patterns of development, from corrupt practices among 
faculty in Tbilisi State University in the country of Georgia to education policy adoption 
strategies in the State of Georgia, and from distinct modes of research misconduct in 
large research universities and think tanks to opportunistic behavior of education 
bureaucrats and school teachers in large public school districts. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The presence of corruption in the education sector throughout the world is 
obvious; it is presented in scholarly works and is proven based on legal cases, surveys, 
interviews, and numerous publications in the media. Corruption in many national 
educational systems has a systemic character, is endemic to the society, and often reaches 
epidemic proportions. Access to education, academic grades, term papers, degrees, 
credentials, and honors are all for sale. Educators of all ranks in many countries are 
grossly underpaid along with other public employees. They abuse their position in order 
to sustain themselves. Chronic underfunding, poor coordination, lack of transparency and 
control result in an education system riddled with all types of misconduct, from outright 
bribery and kickbacks to cronyism and ghost teachers, and from grand scale 
embezzlement and fraud to gross waste and petty theft. 
Corruption in higher education receives good coverage in the media. The level of 
transparency is high enough to highlight the issue, its significance, scale and scope, and 
variety of forms in which it manifests itself, and inform the general public of its 
prevalence, patterns, and forms. Corruption in higher education, and the way it is 
reflected in the media, appears to be consistent with trajectory and pace of reforms that 
take place in higher education industry in the US, the UK, and the RF. Introduction of 
college fees in the UK, reduction of governmentally funded places in the RF, and the 
growing significance of private educational loans in the US, all lead to an increase of 
corruption in access to higher education. 
The continuing massification of higher education with increasing enrollment rates 
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in all three countries, as well as the emergence of for-profit sector, necessitate more 
control and coordination on the side of the government, educational institutions, and the 
public. Growing concerns over the quality of educational services lead to an increase in 
reporting bribery, fraud, cheating, plagiarism, diploma mills, breach of contract, and 
other forms of misconduct. The processes of internationalization and globalization of 
higher education put an emphasis on such aspects of corruption as credentials fraud and 
research fraud. 
Socio-economic context of educational reforms and changes in each country 
leaves its print on major forms of corruption in higher education. For instance, in the RF, 
economic transition and sharp decline in salaries of college faculty lead to an increase in 
bribery and nepotism. In the US, a growing competition between higher education 
institutions leads to an increase in fraud associated with student financial aid. Lastly, 
growing levels of transparency and information flow lead to a better understanding of 
different forms of corruption and its scope and scale. The media plays a primary role in 
highlighting the issue. However, media reports are focused on corruption per se, and 
often on its causes, but do not offer solutions or ways in which the public can resist 
corruption. Furthermore, there are so-called grey areas that often left unattended. These 
grey areas may be unclear as whether they represent corrupt practices and whether these 
practices are illegal. 
This study offers an analysis of court cases connected to corrupt practices in 
academia and related industries in order to discover the grey areas of corruption. Contrary 
to commonly shared beliefs, the legal provisions that exist in the US legislation, 
including Higher Education Act, False Claims Act, and Consumer Protection Act cover 
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all the areas of possible misconduct in education: 1) corruption as related to the state 
(private individual bribes public official in order to obtain unduly benefits); 2) corruption 
as related to client and business (a client (subcontractor etc.) is abusing a business by 
bribing business’ agent); and corruption as related to consumer and business (consumer 
fraud, when business deceives consumer). 
The importance of the study of court cases on corruption in US higher education 
is threefold. First, court cases present additional lenses to study definitions and aspects of 
corruption in higher education that do not exist in other systems. Second, the national 
system of higher education with its mixture of public and private, non-profit and for-
profit higher education is undergoing process of evolutionary changes that vary from 
state to state. The forms of corruption develop and change accordingly. Third, the US 
higher education shows pathways for reforms in numerous other national educational 
systems. Many national systems of higher education, including those of the former Soviet 
Bloc, undergo major changes and reforms moving toward the market-based systems that 
in many ways replicate higher education industry that exists in the US. Accordingly, 
forms of corruption that are currently present in the US education will eventually develop 
in the transition educational systems as well. Learning about the forms and mechanism 
through which corruption in US higher education perpetuates will help in predicting 
corruption in other national educational systems. 
The processes of decentralization, marketization, commoditization, and 
privatization in higher education rise questions of accountability, transparency, quality, 
and access. Decentralized financing of higher education anticipates cost sharing based in 
part on educational loans. The decentralized US higher education that long been 
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considered an exception among other developed nations now turns into a sector from 
which inferences are to be drawn. This anticipates spillovers of the problems, but not the 
solutions. Forms of corruption that long existed in the US education sector, including 
those in quality assurance through accreditation, compliance with state and federal laws, 
and provision of educational loans now have a perspective to develop in other 
educational systems as well. While the legal frame is simplistic, the system of 
interrelations in the higher education industry is rather complex.  
This study identifies three major organizational structures with corruption, 
including the vertical structure, the horizontal structure, and the vertical hierarchy. The 
criteria selected include major characteristics, conditions or environment, degree of 
monopolization and distribution of discretionary power, levels of secrecy, tolerance, and 
transparency, predominant forms and scale. Vertical structure is taken as an initial form 
of organizational structure with some presence of corruption. Major characteristics of the 
vertical structure include absolute degree of centralization and concentration of formal 
authority. Corruptioners have an opportunity to draw some benefits from their position 
without using their authority over their subordinates. Collusion did not take place in the 
structure itself. The major form of corruption at that time was embezzlement when 
corruptioner was embezzling from the state. Usage of the embezzled funds required a 
certain form of external collusion. 
Vertical structure transforms into horizontal structure. Major characteristics of the 
horizontal structure are that it exists and develops along the lines of the process of 
decentralization, and declining concentration of formal authority. The characteristics also 
include low salaries of the employees and their opportunistic behavior. The horizontal 
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structure may potentially transform into the vertical hierarchy. Vertical hierarchy 
anticipates both formal and informal subordination. Major characteristics are absolute 
degree of centralization and concentration of formal and informal authority. Conditions 
for vertical hierarchy include unclear laws and regulations, and high risk of punishment 
for opposing illegal practices rather than for violating formal rules. Vertical hierarchy is 
the highest organizational level of corruption when corruption is institutionalized or near-
institutionalized. This level is characterized by the delegation of corrupt functions to 
subordinates. Sharing and profiteering are the two dominating functions of the 
participants and the structure overall. Subordinates collect bribes and then channel 
benefits up the hierarchical ladder. 
Each of the forms is not free of problems and internal conflicts. There are certain 
immanent and developing problems and antagonisms in each of the organizational 
structures. These antagonisms as well as changes in external environment push the 
structures to adjust and move to the next stage. In the vertical hierarchies the major 
conflict forms around the determination of shares in access to graft as well as distribution 
and redistribution of the benefits obtained from corrupt activities. Higher education has 
double-directed hierarchy of administrative position and academic merit, there are no 
pure market-based relations and market–type mechanisms in the industry, i.e. higher 
education has yet to be commoditized. This creates at least three possible forms of future 
organization of corruption, including the return to the modified vertical structure, 
formation of a hybrid or the mixed structure, and creation of the vertical hierarchy. 
Mixed structure as a likely option of predominant corrupt organizational structure 
in higher education combines elements of both horizontal and vertical structures with the 
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core exchanges having form of latent corruption. In the mixed structures benefits of 
corruption are derived without being served by the monetary exchange. Mixed structures 
combine for-tuition programs and government funded programs. In the modified 
structures for-tuition programs experience same problems as in the modified vertical 
structures. State-funded places in the mixed structures are distributed among the faculty 
members. Corruptibility of colleges and universities are used by the state to coerce 
academics into compliance and control the agenda in higher education. 
The positive role of the state in developing and sustaining corruption is often 
underestimated. According to the concept presented in this chapter strengthening of the 
state through a vertical administrative hierarchy is exactly what is necessary to advance 
corrupt and coerce policy. This policy, in turn, leads to further strengthening of the state 
machine. The processes of sharing and profiteering create a base and strengthen vertical 
structure of corruption and coercion mechanism. Degree of sharing of the benefits from 
corruption is an indicator of strength of vertical hierarchy. Formal frame is necessary to 
enforce sharing and the state is utilized as a formal structure for that matter. Horizontal 
structure of control is utilized on the institutional level. 
In the environment where everyone demonstrates rent-seeking behavior, it seems 
irrational to stay outside of the “mainstream” of economic development, including 
corruption. The government forces the instructors to seek means of financial survival and 
encourages them to take bribes by turning a blind eye on corrupt practices in universities. 
Indulgence, as a necessary detail in the mechanism of corruption and coercion, is 
presented here in the form of informal approval, most often expressed as opinions and 
views of public officials and administrators and tolerance of the general public. The 
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concept of corruption and coercion applied to higher education demonstrates how state 
interests influence unhealthy institutional environments. Methodology for future research 
in large educational organizations with corrupt hierarchies may include cellular 
automation—a relatively new methodology of studying organizations. 
This study presents cellular automation, a relatively new methodology to study 
misconduct in large educational organizations, and uses simulation to model the behavior 
of educators, including factors that influence their decision making. This methodology 
may be used beneficially for future research in organizations and corrupt hierarchies, 
including school districts and higher education institutions and make valid and credible 
forecasts. Cellular automaton may prove to be a more effective and cost-efficient 
methodology than estimation of systems of partial differential equations. Some of the 
aspects of organizational corrupt structures may be studied along the lines of 
computational organization theory which uses computational and mathematical methods 
to study organizations, formulates models, and develops tools and procedures to validate 
organizational models. Eventually, this methodology will be used to improve educational 
organizations through an increase in their organizational effectiveness and efficiency and 
a reduction and future prevention of misconduct. 
This study makes a conceptual contribution to the subfield of corruption that 
exists in several disciplines, including political science and economics, and almost non-
existent in the field of education, and higher education policy in particular. Definition of 
corruption as it is used in economics underlines role of the state and assumes 
corruptibility of a government official. Corruption in higher education presents the need 
for a more inclusive definition. The challenge to the understanding of corruption as 
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applied to higher education arises when one is confronted with cases of bribery. These 
may take place in private higher education institutions as well as in the public ones. This 
work formulates an operational definition of corruption in higher education as a system 
of informal relations established to regulate unsanctioned access to material and 
nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office of public or corporate trust. In this sense, 
corruption in higher education anticipates abuse of public trust by certain participating 
groups or individuals-participants of educational process in a broad sense, and processes, 
closely related to educational process, such as research, selection of students, funding, 
use of public property etc. This work considers corruption as it implies illegality or a 
precedent and at the same time does not limit its area of investigation by the legal 
definition of corruption only. 
Multidisciplinary character of the performed study gives it a certain value in such 
fields as political science, development economics, economics of transition, economic 
sociology, and legal studies. Major findings of the study may be utilized in different areas 
of public policy, educational policy, educational planning, and university management. 
Results of the study may be used for the development and implementation of measures 
necessary for prevention of corruption in higher education industries in countries with 
different systems of higher education. The results can also be used in teaching such 
disciplines as Comparative and International Education Policy, Finance in Higher 
Education, and College and University Administration. 
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Appendix A 
 
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO SUE (LETTER) 
 
Dear Ms. Briones: 
You are hereby notified that the Attorney General intends to commence litigation 
against 
Education Finance Partners (“EFP”) pursuant to Executive Law Section 63(12) 
and Article 22-A of the General Business Law (“GBL”), Sections 349 and 350, to enjoin 
unlawful and deceptive acts and practices in which EFP has engaged and continues to 
engage, and to obtain injunctive relief, restitution, damages, and such other relief as the 
Court may deem just and proper. 
The unlawful and deceptive acts and practices complained of arise out of EFP's 
student loan business. EFP has repeatedly and persistently offered to make payments, and 
has in fact made payments, to colleges, universities, and vocational schools (“Schools”) 
in exchange for those Schools (a) steering students to EFP loan products, and (b) placing 
EFP on the Schools' "preferred lender" lists. Among the Schools with which EFP has had 
such revenue sharing agreements are: Baylor University, Boston University, Clemson 
University, Drexel University, Duquesne University, Fordham University, Long Island 
University, Pepperdine University - Graziado School of Business, St. John's University, 
Texas Christian University, Washington University in St. Louis, and the University of 
Mississippi. In total, EFP has or has had such agreements with more than 60 schools 
across the nation. 
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The agreements entered into by EFP require the Schools to promote EFP to its 
students as a "preferred private loan provider via the school's website, printed lender list, 
mailings, and other marketing opportunities to both first-time and serial borrowers who 
are candidates for a private loan." In return, the agreements require EFP to pay back to 
the school a percentage of the net value of the loans referred by each school. For 
example, EFP's agreement with Duquesne University provides that the school will 
receive 60 basis points (.6%) of the net value of all referred loans. Some of the 
agreements are "tiered" so as to provide increasing financial incentives for the schools as 
more students take loans from EFP. EFP's agreement with Boston University, for 
example, provides that the school will receive 25 basis points (.25%) of the net value of 
referred loans of at least $1,000,000 up to $5,000,000; 50 basis points (.5%) of the net 
value of referred loans between $5,000,000 and $10,000,000; and 75 basis points (.75%) 
of the net value of referred loans over $10,000,000. In at least one instance (Drexel 
University), the agreement provides for EFP to be the exclusive preferred lender, 
resulting in the school's pushing its students towards EFP and EFP alone. Thus, Drexel's 
agreement with EFP, dated April 1,2006, provides that Drexel has agreed to make EFP its 
"sole preferred private loan provider," in consideration for which EFP has agreed that 
Drexel will receive 75 basis points (.75%) of the net value of referred loans between $1 
and $24,999,999; and 100 basis point (1%) of all loan amounts of $25,000,000 or greater. 
Such steering and placement on the preferred lender lists occurred without 
disclosure to the student borrowers and their parents of the payments and offers to pay, 
and had the potential to mislead the student borrowers and their parents. The arrangement 
created unlawful conflicts of interest on the part of the Schools. To avoid these inherent 
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conflicts of interest, EFP must sever its financial ties with the Schools to whose students 
it makes loans. It must compete for the students' loans by offering the best loan products 
to students, not the best kickbacks to the Schools. 
EFP has also repeatedly and persistently engaged in misleading and deceptive 
business practices and false advertising by falsely representing, directly and by 
implication, that Schools endorse EFP's loan products and recommend those products for 
individual student borrowers. Specifically, EFP has (I) used Schools' names, logos, 
colors, and mascots in EFP's correspondence and on EFP's web-based promotional 
materials, creating the false impression that the Schools have endorsed EFP7s products, 
and (ii) provided Schools with EFP promotional materials for insertion into the Schools' 
financial aid award packages and tuition cost of attendance bills, again creating the false 
impression that the Schools have endorsed EFP's products. 
Retrieved May 21, 2007, from 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2007/mar/EFP%20Final%20Letter.pdf 
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Appendix B 
 
Everyday corruption practice in the Russian Federation 
 
Table 1 
 
Everyday all-Russian corruption market characteristics in the Russian Federation, 2001 
and 2005 
 
Corruption characteristics 
 
2001 2005 
Corruption coverage (share of citizens captured by the 
corruption, %) 
50.40 54.9 
Corruption risk (risk to face the necessity to pay a bribe, %) 
 
25.70 35.0 
Corruption demand (readiness to bribe, %) 
 
74.70 53.2 
Corruption intensity (average number of bribes per annum for 
bribers) 
1.19 0.882 
Average bribe amount for bribers (rubles) 
 
1817.00 2780 
Average bribe portion within cost of living (for 2001 and 2004 
respectively) 
1.21 1.17 
Average annual contribution for a briber (rubles) 
 
2162.00 2452 
Annual volume of the everyday corruption market (US$ billion) 
 
2.825 3.014 
 
Corruption coverage is the share of citizens captured (even once) by the 
corruption situation irrespective of its outcome: whether in this case they have bribed or 
not. 
Corruption risk is the share of citizens' entrapment into some corruption situation 
due to any problems. The corruption risk may be seen as an index of the authorities' 
corruption pressure upon citizens.  
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Corruption demand (readiness to bribe) is the share of cases when an average 
citizen bribes under corruption situation. The corruption demand may be seen as an index 
of the citizens' readiness to use corruption methods so that to solve its problems or some 
readiness to fall under authorities' corruption pressure. 
Corruption intensity is the average number of bribes per annum for a single 
arbitrary briber in this given year. 
Average bribe amount is the average bribe sum per a single arbitrary corruption 
deal in this given year. 
Average annual contribution is the average annual costs of a single arbitrary 
briber in this given year. This rate may be determined as product of the corruption 
intensity by an average bribe amount. 
Annual market volume is the evaluation (from the bottom) of the total turnover 
for corruption market as an entire sum of any bribes to be paid by all bribers annually. 
These characteristics (probably besides the item of corruption coverage) may be 
calculated for both total national everyday corruption market and individual and special 
markets of any everyday corruption (see below). For instance, any bribes related to the 
medical services form a special market of the everyday corruption. 
Thus, the total everyday corruption market displays its stable position. The 
average bribe value in its real form may even shows its slight decrease. But the registered 
difference may be quite compensated for by metering error. Although this dynamic 
stability is formed by mutual action of the two opposite tendencies: the authorities 
intensify its corruption pressure upon citizens and in response the citizens lower is 
corruption demand. 
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Source: Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. In G. Satarov 
(Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM Foundation. Retrieved 
May 12, 2006, from http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm  
 
Table 2 
Special everyday corruption market characteristics in the Russian Federation, 2001 and 
2005 
Problem (everyday corruption market) 
 
Corruption 
risk 
Corruption 
demand 
(readiness to 
bribe) 
 2001 2005 2001 2005 
Free medical service (outpatient clinic, hospital) 23.5 37.7 80.4 62.0 
School: to enter the school and to finish successfully, 
education process 
13.2 41.0 76.2 60.8 
Higher education institution: to enter HEI, transfer to 
another HEI, course examinations, term papers, midterms, 
theses, etc. 
36.0 52.1 66.7 63.2 
Pensions: paperwork, calculations, etc. 11.3 11.4 50.0 17.1 
Social payments: paperwork, calculations, etc. 16.2 19.8 47.4 30.6 
Solving problems related to the conscription procedure 
(military draft) 
32.6 57.7 50.0 63.4 
Employment: to get a required job or career development 24.6 29.2 80.0 35.0 
Land: to obtain some territory (for a country cottage or 
farming) 
14.9 39.8 75.0 51.1 
Dwelling: to obtain and/or legalize a relevant proprietary 
interest 
28.9 34.3 75.6 41.9 
To get dwelling maintenance and repair work services 32.2 29.5 60.5 31.6 
To obtain justice in court 26.2 39.5 59.4 43.6 
To get assistance and protection from police 27.4 40.2 77.3 54.7 
To get registration, domestic or foreign passport at the 
place of residence 
19.7 32.7 76.0 48.9 
To solve problems with road police authorities (obtaining 
driver's license, technical examination, minor traffic 
violations) 
59.3 59.6 86.0 68.9 
Source: Composed from Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. 
In G. Satarov (Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM 
Foundation. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from 
http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm  
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Table 3 
Dynamics of the special everyday corruption markets’ annual volumes in the Russian 
Federation, 2001 and 2005 
Problem (everyday corruption market) 
 
Market size, 
million USD 
Total market 
share 
 2001 2005 2001 2005 
Free medical service (outpatient clinic, hospital) 
 
602.41 401.10 0.2870 0.148 
School: to enter the school and to finish 
successfully, education process 
70.10 92.40 0.0333 0.034 
Higher education institution: to enter HEI, transfer to 
another HEI, course examinations, term papers, 
midterms, theses, etc. 
449.37 583.40 0.2138 0.215 
Pensions: paperwork, calculations, etc. 
 
0.29 7.90 0.0001 0.003 
Social payments: paperwork, calculations, etc. 
 
6.62 80.30 0.0031 0.030 
Solving problems related to the conscription 
procedure (military draft) 
12.66 353.60 0.0060 0.130 
Employment: to get a required job or career 
development 
56.16 143.40 0.0267 0.053 
Land: to obtain some territory (for a country cottage 
or farming) 
20.09 84.40 0.0096 0.031 
Dwelling: to obtain and/or legalize a relevant 
proprietary interest 
123.02 298.60 0.0585 0.110 
To get dwelling maintenance and repair work 
services 
22.67 15.60 0.0108 0.006 
To obtain justice in court 
 
274.48 209.50 0.1306 0.077 
To get assistance and protection from police 
 
29.95 29.60 0.0142 0.011 
To get registration, domestic or foreign passport at 
the place of residence 
65.84 87.70 0.0313 0.032 
To solve problems with road police authorities 
(obtaining driver's license, technical examination, 
minor traffic violations) 
368.38 183.30 0.1752 0.068 
Source: Composed from Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. 
In G. Satarov (Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM 
Foundation. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from 
http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm  
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Table 4 
Dynamics of the average bribe amount (in rubles) by sector in the Russian Federation, 
2001 and 2005 
Problem (everyday corruption market) 
 
Value Rank* change
 % 
 2001 2005 2001 2005  
Free medical service (outpatient clinic, 
hospital) 
1093 1423 8 11 0.57 
School: to enter the school and to finish 
successfully, education process 
1238 2312 7 8 1.64 
Higher education institution: to enter HEI, 
transfer to another HEI, course examinations, 
term papers, midterms, theses, etc. 
4305 3869 2 4 -0.19 
Pensions: paperwork, calculations, etc. 
 
50 2250 14 9 - 
Social payments: paperwork, calculations, 
etc. 
250 3467 13 6 - 
Solving problems related to the conscription 
procedure (military draft) 
3250 15409 3 1 7.06 
Employment: to get a required job or career 
development 
963 2448 9 7 2.91 
Land: to obtain some territory (for a country 
cottage or farming) 
2000 3713 5 5 1.62 
Dwelling: to obtain and/or legalize a relevant 
proprietary interest 
2529 5548 4 3 2.25 
To get dwelling maintenance and repair work 
services 
292 400 12 14 0.70 
To obtain justice in court 
 
13964 9570 1 2 -0.59 
To get assistance and protection from police 
 
1715 930 6 12 -0.86 
To get registration, domestic or foreign 
passport at the place of residence 
664 1426 11 10 2.17 
To solve problems with road police 
authorities (obtaining driver's license, 
technical examination, minor traffic 
violations) 
896 920 10 13 0.05 
Source: Composed from Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. 
In G. Satarov (Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM 
Foundation. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from 
http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm  
* The rank 1 is assigned to the sector based on the largest average bribe. 
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Table 5 
Dynamics of the corruption intensity within various everyday corruption markets by 
sector in the Russian Federation, 2001 and 2005 
Problem (everyday corruption market) 
 
Value Rank* change
 % 
 2001 2005 2001 2005  
Free medical service (outpatient clinic, 
hospital) 
1.098 0.847 4 7 0.883 
School: to enter the school and to finish 
successfully, education process 
2.213 0.950 1 5 2.205 
Higher education institution: to enter HEI, 
transfer to another HEI, course examinations, 
term papers, midterms, theses, etc. 
0.820 0.875 10 6 -0.259 
Pensions: paperwork, calculations, etc. 
 
0.669 0.339 13 14 1.906 
Social payments: paperwork, calculations, etc. 
 
1.065 0.657 6 12 1.480 
Solving problems related to the conscription 
procedure (military draft) 
1.010 0.650 7 13 1.377 
Employment: to get a required job or career 
development 
0.950 1.053 8 2 -0.419 
Land: to obtain some territory (for a country 
cottage or farming) 
0.655 0.698 14 10 -0.254 
Dwelling: to obtain and/or legalize a relevant 
proprietary interest 
0.848 0.809 9 8 0.178 
To get dwelling maintenance and repair work 
services 
0.771 0.954 11 4 -0.917 
To obtain justice in court 
 
0.681 0.672 12 11 0.051 
To get assistance and protection from police 
 
1.787 0.809 2 9 2.115 
To get registration, domestic or foreign 
passport at the place of residence 
1.107 1.030 3 3 0.269 
To solve problems with road police authorities 
(obtaining driver's license, technical 
examination, minor traffic violations) 
1.089 1.120 5 1 -0.110 
Source: Composed from Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. 
In G. Satarov (Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM 
Foundation. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from 
http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm . 
* The rank 1 is assigned to the market with the most intensified corruption 
activities. 
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Table 6 
 
Dynamics of the demand for public services in various corrupt markets (percent) in 
Russian Federation, 2001 and 2005 
 
Problem (everyday corruption market) 
 
Value Rank* Change, 
percent 
 2001 2005 2001 2005  
Free medical service (outpatient clinic, 
hospital) 
16.1 23.6 1 1 46.6 
School: to enter the school and to finish 
successfully, education process 
6.1 2.9 9 12 -52.5 
Higher education institution: to enter HEI, 
transfer to another HEI, course examinations, 
term papers, midterms, theses, etc. 
8.1 7.4 4 6 -8.6 
Pensions: paperwork, calculations, etc. 
 
7.1 7.0 6 8 -1.4 
Social payments: paperwork, calculations, 
etc. 
7.4 10.2 5 2 37.8 
Solving problems related to the conscription 
procedure (military draft) 
4.6 1.8 13 14 -60.9 
Employment: to get a required job or career 
development 
6.4 8.5 8 3 32.8 
Land: to obtain some territory (for a country 
cottage or farming) 
4.0 3.1 14 11 -22.5 
Dwelling: to obtain and/or legalize a relevant 
proprietary interest 
5.3 8.0 11 4 50.9 
To get dwelling maintenance and repair work 
services 
8.8 7.6 3 5 -13.6 
To obtain justice in court 
 
4.8 2.8 12 13 -41.7 
To get assistance and protection from police 
 
5.6 3.4 10 10 -39.3 
To get registration, domestic or foreign 
passport at the place of residence 
6.4 7.0 7 7 9.4 
To solve problems with road police 
authorities (obtaining driver's license, 
technical examination, minor traffic 
violations) 
9.3 6.7 2 9 -28.0 
Source: Composed from Corruption Process in Russia: Level, Structure, Trends. 
In G. Satarov (Ed.). Diagnostics of Corruption in Russia: 2001-2005. INDEM 
Foundation. Retrieved May 12, 2006, from 
http://www.indem.ru/en/publicat/2005diag_engV.htm  
* The rank 1 is assigned to the segment of the public services market with the 
highest demand. 
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Appendix C 
 
Results of Cellular Automaton 
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Figure 1. Function 1. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 2-year730-day period, with corrupt educators being 
distributed randomly in day one 
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Figure 2. Function 1. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 2-year730-day period, with one corrupt educator initially in 
day one 
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Figure 3. Function 2. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 2-year730-day period, with corrupt educators being 
distributed randomly in day one 
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Figure 4. Function 2. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 2-year730-day period, with one corrupt educator initially in 
day one 
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Figure 5. Function 3. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 2-year730-day period, with corrupt educators being 
distributed randomly in day one 
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Figure 6. Function 3. Cellular automaton for 1000 educators in a 2-year730-day period, with one corrupt educator initially in 
day one 
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